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ABSTRACT 
 
Lindsey J. Brandt: Tangled up in Truths: German Literary Conceptions of Nature between 
Romantic Science and Objective Empiricism 
(Under the direction of Eric S. Downing) 
 
This dissertation explores the relationship between literature and science in German-
speaking Europe of the 1830s and 1840s against the backdrop of large shifts in conceptions 
of nature and natural inquiry. Many scientific and literary writers of this period reflected on 
the increasing tensions between early 19th century Romantic science and modern empirical 
science, as well as the implications of these tensions for fields such as biology and geology. 
The key texts examined in this context include Lorenz Oken’s journal Isis; Carl Gustav 
Carus’s Neun Briefe über Landschaftsmalerei and Zehn Briefe über das Erdleben; Annette 
von Droste-Hülshoff’s essay “Westfälische Schilderungen aus einer Westfälischen Feder” 
and poems “Die Mergelgrube” and “Der Hünenstein”; Adalbert Stifter’s painting “Bewegung 
II” and prose tale Kalkstein; and Georg Büchner’s prose work Lenz, trial lecture “Über 
Schädelnerven,” and dissertation on the nervous system of the barbel fish. Several of the 
texts examined here seek to reconcile the newer trend toward objective empiricism with older 
elements of nature discourse reflected, for instance, in Friedrich Schelling’s 
Naturphilosophie and the aesthetic-scientific approaches of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 
and Alexander von Humboldt. As such, the writers in question often advocate for 
aesthetically inspired ways of knowing nature (i.e., through literature, Stimmung-oriented 
landscape painting, and more poetically attuned forms of science) as necessary complements 
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to empirical science. Defending the aesthetic perspective was especially important at this 
time, as a rising trend toward disciplinarity threatened to isolate modes of knowledge—such 
as poetry and science—that were previously considered inextricable from one another. 
Particularly within the realm of literary history, this period of the 1830s and 1840s is 
typically framed in terms of political events; likewise, literary works are often interpreted and 
categorized based on their authors’ political views. My findings suggest that, by examining 
the literary and scientific writings of this era in dialogue with one another, another reading of 
this period is possible. Namely, literary and scientific authors across the political spectrum 
express common concerns about the increasingly complicated relationship between humans 
and nature, as well as the capacity of the arts and the sciences to gain knowledge about that 
relationship. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  If it form the one landscape that we, the inconstant ones, 
  Are consistently homesick for, this is chiefly 
  Because it dissolves in water.  
       - W.H. Auden, “In Praise of Limestone” 
 
 
 
 The interest behind this project was sparked by an observation that, at first, seemed 
rather mundane and inconsequential: erosion imagery in Adalbert Stifter’s mid-19th century 
tale Kalkstein (Limestone).1 Why, I wondered, does so much of the physical description in 
this story revolve around wornness and dissolution? Why do the physical qualities of the 
limestone landscape described also seem to pervade the human realm, and vice versa? What I 
initially reduced to a descriptive obsession on Stifter’s part slowly evolved into a series of 
exciting discoveries about the way conceptions of nature and human nature were shifting in 
the German-speaking lands leading up to the mid-19th century. This dissertation will present 
many of those discoveries throughout the next few chapters.  
 Limestone, however, deserves its own brief moment in the sun. Throughout the 
course of this project, I remained astounded at the power of the image of that eroded 
limestone landscape, as well as its constant relevance to 19th century nature discourse. 
Admittedly, Stifter’s affinity for limestone was not an arbitrary one without weight or 
precedent. The story’s foregrounding of limestone and its unique qualities resonates with 
observations already established by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe in his 1809 novel Die 
                                                
1 Adalbert Stifter, Bunte Steine. Erzählungen, Munich, Goldmann, 1983. 
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Wahlverwandtschaften. In the famous chemistry parable of this novel, the captain cites 
limestone as an example of a substance that readily interacts or unites with other substances 
and is thus continuously in a state of transformation: 
Diejenigen Naturen, die sich beim Zusammentreffen einander schnell ergreifen 
und wechselseitig bestimmen, nennen wir verwandt. An den Alkalien und Säuren, 
[…] sich am entschiedensten suchen und fassen, sich modifizieren und zusammen 
einen neuen Körper bilden, ist diese Verwandtschaft auffallend genug. Gedenken 
wir nur des Kalks, der zu allen Säuren eine große Neigung, eine entschiedene 
Vereinigungslust äußert!2 
  
In Goethe’s story, this scientific explanation serves as a playful metaphor to shed light on the 
mysteries of human attraction and relationships. Although he is using scientific language 
here, the captain is alluding to a particular human personality or predisposition that mirrors 
limestone’s tendency to dissolve into its surroundings and give itself over to change. By 
exploring the ways that natural laws might also serve as analogies for explaining human 
nature, this famous literary conversation reflects one of the most urgent concerns of the early 
19th century: namely, the complicated relationship between humans and the natural world. 
 Eroded limestone was a particularly appealing object of reflection in this early and 
mid-19th century context because of its capacity to make visible both nature’s own artistry 
and the terrifyingly deep history of that artistry. Both concepts pervaded the European 
popular imagination during this period and are reflected, for instance, in the era’s obsession 
with landscape painting. Early Romantic landscape painters tended to exaggerate and 
anthropomorphize these qualities, as if nature itself were a forceful, conscious actor endowed 
with just as much or more power and agency than the human world. Paintings from the late 
and post-Romantic period—to which the amateur painters Adalbert Stifter and Carl Gustav 
Carus belong—tend to present scenes that are less turbulent and overtly terrifying. However, 
                                                
2 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Die Wahlverwandtschaften, Köln, Anaconda, 2008: 45. 
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they still offer visual allusions to nature’s deep history and foreground its powerful, if gentle, 
ability to draw in the human observer and elicit an affective response or altered perspective. 
Limestone landscapes, with their worn and rounded contours and labyrinthine fissures, offer 
precisely this quiet, unexpected realization of the sublime.  
 Literary authors’ fascination with limestone has endured in the 20th and 21st centuries 
as well, particularly in the Anglo-American tradition. We see this in the poetry of W. H. 
Auden, for instance, and, more recently, in the work of contemporary British scientist and 
nature writer Julian Hofmann. As if channeling Stifter’s vision, Hofmann’s essay “Time in 
the Karst Country” reflects on a transformative experience charting bird habitat in the 
limestone karst region of northern Greece: 
As I walk the last of the ridge I feel an affinity with stone. Along with my 
concerns for the future of birds on the plateau—their flight patterns more fragile 
than I’d imagined—the place has absorbed me into its pattern. I’m encircled by an 
expanse of dissolving land, an entrancing work of water worn away over ineffable 
ages beneath the same passing sun. And over the months I’ve understood this 
landscape’s capacity to alter my perception. It has opened me to the unfathomable 
beauty of distance and deep time, but also proximity: the things revealed when we 
draw near. How the envious solidity of stone is also inconstant, its eroding 
designs as rich as a shepherd’s weathered smile.3  
 
This excerpt reiterates limestone’s ability to open up a window into nature’s eternal 
processes of movement and change; its susceptibility to erosion is a conspicuous reminder 
that even something as solid and permanent as a rock has a story of development. Rock, too, 
must be born and shaped, Hofmann realizes, and it will also eventually weather and fade 
away, though at a massively different scale than the human lifespan.  
 As Hofmann’s account suggests, limestone has a remarkable capacity to draw the 
human viewer into its own story, by provoking reflection about its deep, unfathomable 
                                                
3 Julian Hofmann, “Time in the Karst Country,” http://www.terrain.org/place/27/. Accessed 02/05/2015. 
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history of change. Stifter’s Kalkstein—written within 20 years of Charles Lyell’s 
popularization of the idea we now call “deep time”4—offers a similar insight: that limestone 
landscapes slowly teach us to engage in the practice of Betrachtung (contemplative viewing) 
rather than mere Beobachtung (observation). Not only is the limestone itself susceptible to 
dissolution, then, but it also invites us to let go of our own boundaries—to become mentally 
and emotionally absorbed in the story of the landscape. Gradually, as Hofmann explains and 
Stifter shows in his story, a sense of kinship and sympathetic affinity emerge between us and 
that landscape—a process that Stifter might have called Stimmung. The insights that 
Hofmann presents in this 21st-century essay thus reflect the legacy of a kind of vision 
propounded by 19th-century German thinkers like Goethe and Stifter who sought ways to 
integrate scientific observation and aesthetic contemplation when viewing nature. To them, 
both science and poetry required this “attuned” entanglement between the human subject and 
the object observed. Only in the later 19th century would objectivity and subjective distance 
become the hallmark standards of scientific inquiry. 
 Within the 19th century context, the image of limestone clearly conveys important 
Romantic concepts and epistemic values, such as the historical-developmental view of the 
natural world and the idea of a necessary entanglement between humans and nature for both 
poetic and scientific inquiry. And yet, a limestone karst is hardly the vibrant, conventionally 
stunning Alpine landscape that one would expect to see in a Romantic landscape painting. Its 
features are conspicuously aged and worn down, and its colors are dull and faded. Always in 
a visible state of transition, limestone thus also presents a powerful metaphor for the 
precarious situation of nature-oriented German writers during the 1830s and 1840s, such as 
                                                
4 Charles Lyell, The Principles of Geology, 3 vols. London: John Murray, 1830-1833. 
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Stifter, Annette von Droste-Hülshoff, and Georg Büchner: these writers remained captivated 
by the influential Romantic work of earlier decades, but they also recognized that its 
dominance was dissolving and fading away into the past.  
 Like the image of limestone presented in Stifter’s Kalkstein, much of the literature of 
Stifter’s era is deeply invested in Romantic conceptions of nature, and yet it is also decidedly 
non-Romantic at the same time, as it always foregrounds the erosion and inevitable loss of 
that cultural paradigm, particularly in light of new trends in the sciences. These qualities of 
transience and transition are not often recognized by literary scholars as a distinguishing 
marker for this era; rather, the period’s literary works tend to be categorized according to 
their authors’ political affinities and activities, whether revolutionary (i.e., Vormärz) or 
reactionary or passive (i.e., Biedermeier). However, across the political spectrum, this era’s 
literary authors often have similar views on newly emerging conceptions of nature and 
natural inquiry as Romantic influence fades. As if both asking and responding to the question 
“What comes next?,” their literary worlds help probe and guide the new nature discourse as it 
takes shape, borrowing from old and new values and ideologies. This dissertation project 
seeks to understand how they negotiated this threshold moment and why they felt compelled 
to occupy that threshold at all. 
 
19th-Century Literature and Science 
 
19th-century science and history of science scholarship can help shed important light 
on these literary authors’ attention to nature. Since Stifter, Droste, and Büchner were all 
drawn to the natural sciences, whether professionally or as amateurs, a number of scientific 
topics enter into their works directly. As expected, then, shifting nature conceptions in their 
writing often correspond to tensions and moments of ambivalence in the realm of science. 
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The fact that many authors of this era were attuned to scientific discourse is not surprising: 
not only did the first half of the 19th century see a massive surge in popular interest in 
scientific study and nature collecting, but the practice of science itself was changing in 
conspicuous ways. Over the course of these authors’ lifetimes, objective empiricism in the 
natural sciences was beginning to exclude and surpass Romantic idealist thought, which had 
stimulated a rich tradition of natural inquiry in the decades leading up to mid-century, 
particularly in the life sciences. Human observation and contemplation were increasingly 
enhanced by and sometimes replaced with specialized instruments and complex measurement 
techniques. 
 Much of the conflicted, ambivalent nature discourse reflected in literature of the 
1830s and 1840s resonates with contemporaneous scientific and philosophical writing by 
figures such as Carl Gustav Carus, Lorenz Oken, and even Georg Büchner himself. 
Particularly striking is the fact that both the literary and scientific authors of this period seem 
to understand their primary task to be one of reconciliation. Unable to disavow the Romantic 
values they still recognize as productive, these important figures strive to find points of 
compatibility and complementarity between older and newly emerging ways of knowing 
nature and performing science. In many cases, the literary and scientific writers examined in 
this project embrace both Romantic idealism and objective empiricism for their concrete 
achievements but simultaneously reveal the deficiencies and blind spots inherent in these 
approaches. Moreover, these writers at times foster an almost mystical respect for the 
dynamism and deep history of nature, but they also endorse practical measures to make 
nature less unpredictable and less threatening to the human world.  
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 Scholars of German literature have written extensively on nature discourse in 
literature and science up to 1850. However, with the exception of some scholarship on 
individual authors or works, little attention has been devoted to the transitional period of the 
1830s and 1840s in this context of literature and science. Instead, present research tends to 
focus on the relationship between Romantic literature and science5 or the relationship 
between Goethe’s literature and science.6 Additionally, a significant amount of scholarship 
examines the trend towards objective empiricism around 1850 and its significance for nature 
discourse in Realist literature.7 In part because scholars tend to confine their analysis to 
traditional period boundaries, such as “Realism,” “Romanticism,” and “The Age of Goethe,” 
the transitional period of the 1830s and 1840s is often pigeonholed into one era or 
overlooked altogether.   
 Even those works that try to track nature discourse through the long 19th century tend 
to brush over the period in question. Robert Richards’s seminal work The Romantic 
                                                
5 See: Nicholas Saul, Die deutsche literarische Romantik und die Wissenschaften, Munich, Iudicium, 1991; 
Helmut Müller-Sievers, Self-Generation: Biology, Philosophy, and Literature Around 1800, Stanford, CA, 
Stanford UP, 1997; Robert J. Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of 
Goethe, Chicago, U Chicago P, 2002; Michel Chaouli, The Laboratory of Poetry. Chemistry and Poetics in the 
Work of Friedrich Schlegel, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins UP, 2002; Noah Heringman, Romantic Rocks, 
Aesthetic Geology, Ithaca, NY, Cornell UP, 2004; Jocelyn Holland, German Romanticism and Science: The 
Procreative Poetics of Goethe, Novalis, and Ritter, New York, Routledge, 2009.  
 
6 To give just a sample of the scholarship on Goethe and science over the last 25 years: Karl Fin, Goethe’s 
History of Science, New York, Cambridge UP, 1991; Otto Krätz, Goethe und die Naturwissenschaften, Munich, 
Callwey, 1992; Roger Stephenson, Goethe’s Conception of Knowledge and Science, Edinburgh, Edinburgh UP, 
1995; Frederick Amrine, Goethe in the History of Science, New York, Lang, 1996; David Seamon, Goethe’s 
Way of Science: A Phenomenology of Nature, New York, SUNY, 1998; Rudolf Steiner, John Barnes, and 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Nature’s Open Secret: Introductions to Goethe’s Scientific Writings, Great 
Barrington, MA: Anthroposophic Press, 2000; Aekav Ishihara, Goethes Buch Der Natur: Ein Beispiel der 
Rezeption Naturwissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse und Methoden in der Literatur seiner Zeit, Würzburg, 
Königshausen & Neumann, 2005; Olaf Breidbach, Goethes Naturverständnis, Munich, Fink, 2011. 
 
7 See: Mark Lehrer, Intellektuelle Aporien und literarische Originalität: Wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Studien 
zum deutschen Realismus: Keller, Raabe und Fontane, New York, Peter Lang, 1991; Thomas L. Buckley, 
Nature, Science, Realism: A Re-Examination of Programmatic Realism and the Works of Adalbert Stifter and 
Gottfried Keller, New York, Peter Lang, 1995; Lutz Danneberg and Friedrich Vollhardt, eds., Wissen in 
Literatur im 19. Jahrhundert, Tübingen, Niemeyer, 2002. 
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Conception of Life, for instance, does attempt to trace the scientific legacy of Romantic 
thought beyond its apparent demise in the middle decades of the 19th century.8 However, he 
confines his main analysis to influential thinkers in “the age of Goethe” and ultimately 
identifies Charles Darwin as a late inheritor of this tradition. In doing so, he declines to 
consider how Romantically inflected conceptions of nature and natural inquiry might have 
been carried on in literature in the decades after Goethe’s death. As Jutta Müller-Tamm 
points out, the first half of the 19th century is a period of rich exchange between science and 
literature: “Ideen, von einer wissenschaftlichen Disziplin verabschiedet, werden in der 
Literatur tradiert, von wo aus sie gegebenfalls in den wissenschaftlichen Diskurs 
zurückkehen.”9 Because of this interplay, literature was able to adopt and preserve 
conceptions of nature and natural inquiry that had fallen out of favor in the sciences. Ideas 
that seemed unfashionable in the sciences were thus able to survive in literature, much of 
which articulated a desire for retaining some aspects of Romantic thought in modern science. 
Yet, the important work of this era’s literature generally remains unnoticed. Even those 
scholars who have identified a Romantic afterlife in early 20th century conceptions of nature 
typically fail to acknowledge how the literature of these transitional decades between 
Romanticism and Realism helped make that afterlife possible. 
Because the very concept of science was so deeply in flux over the course of the 19th 
century, it is impossible to give a comprehensive account of the scientific context of the 
literature examined in this project. Denise Phillips points out that the concept of “natural 
science” carried out by natural scientists (Naturwissenschaftler) was virtually non-existent in 
                                                
8 Richards. 
 
9 Jutta Müller-Tamm, Kunst als Gipfel der Wissenschaft: ästhetische und wissenschaftliche Weltaneignung bei 
Carl Gustav Carus, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1995: 1. 
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the 18th century; instead, naturalists (Naturforscher) pursued the “study of nature.” The latter 
was a much broader concept that was not confined to a single epistemic category but 
included philosophy, physics, natural history, and aesthetic contemplation.10 As the “study of 
nature” was becoming institutionalized in universities as distinct bodies of knowledge in the 
first half of the 19th century, the natural sciences began to emerge as individual disciplines 
with more streamlined methodologies. This dissertation project examines a number of 
instances where literature and aesthetic discourse are involved in the continued negotiation of 
how the natural sciences should look and what values they should reflect. As Lorraine 
Daston and Peter Galison have made clear, perspectives on these values shift enormously 
over the course of the 19th century, as the concept of the involved scientific self seeking the 
“true ideas” behind nature is replaced by the detached scientific self aspiring to mechanical 
objectivity in his recording of data and images.11  
Finally, not only was the concept of science itself changing but ideas of nature were 
undergoing crucial transformations at this time as well. A great deal of this change can be 
attributed to science itself—to new discoveries and theories such as deep time and cell 
theory, for instance. But philosophical and aesthetic models for understanding the human-
nature relationship played a critical role in shaping nature discourse, not only in reaction to 
developments in science but often in productive cooperation with it as well. Richards’s 
monograph and Cunningham and Jardine’s compendium of essays show, for instance, how 
certain ideas propounded by Friedrich Schelling’s Naturphilosophie were particularly fruitful 
                                                
10 Denise Phillips, Acolytes of Nature: Defining Natural Science in Germany, 1770-1850, Chicago, U of 
Chicago P, 2012: 30ff. 
 
11 Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity, New York, Zone Books, 2007. 
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in aiding scientific discovery.12 Despite the fact that some of the more problematic tenets of 
the philosophy have long vanished, Schelling’s emphasis on the developmental history of the 
earth and its creatures, as well as the idea of the unity of all of nature, have had a lasting 
impact on science, particularly within geology and evolutionary biology. Moreover, due in 
part to increased interest in the life sciences, the holistic-organic model of understanding 
nature reflected in Romantic Naturphilosophie pervaded nature discourse in the first decades 
of the 19th century. As Caroline Welsh points out, the notion of Gemütsstimmung 
(mood/attunement) in landscape aesthetics also significantly influenced scientific and 
popular conceptions of nature, providing an appealing model for understanding the invisible 
coordination of parts within an organic system.13 However, in the late 1830s and 1840s, a 
number of literary works begin to register a sense of stasis and division rather than a dynamic 
holism, both within nature itself and between humans and their natural environments. In the 
chapters to follow, I will examine this shift in nature discourse within those literary works 
and their complex scientific contexts. 
 
Chapter Overview 
The aim of the first chapter of this project is to set the stage for the literary analysis 
presented in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 by introducing a number of thinkers and ideas that shaped 
the early 19th century scientific-aesthetic discourse that would be so influential for literary 
conceptions of nature in subsequent decades. Opening with observations about the Romantic 
scientist and philosopher Lorenz Oken (1779–1851) and his popular journal Isis, the chapter 
                                                
12 Richards; Andrew Cunningham and Nicholas Jardine, eds., Romanticism and the Sciences, Cambridge, 
Cambridge UP, 1990. 
 
13 Caroline Welsh, “Nerven-Saiten-Stimmung: Zum Wandel einer Denkfigur zwischen Musik und Wissenschaft 
1750-1850,” in Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte 31 (2008): 116; 122f. 
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shows how Oken’s writing and his work in general reflect the realities of what many 
historians of science call the “second scientific revolution.” This revolution entailed the 
emergence of disciplinarity and the separation of natural science from other modes of natural 
inquiry, such as philosophy and poetry. Scholars often refer to those figures who remained 
loyal to the notion of unity between different modes of knowledge (i.e., science, philosophy, 
and poetry) during this time “Romantic scientists.” However, because this label is used in 
scholarship fairly loosely and often without an attempt to define the term, this chapter 
outlines and elaborates on a handful of common values that appear to constitute Romantic 
science. It then gives a brief overview of key ideas from influential thinkers such as 
Schelling, Goethe, Humboldt, and Carus. In reconstructing early 19th century scientific-
aesthetic discourse, this chapter enables a productive discussion of the legacy of those 
discourses as they are negotiated in the literature of subsequent decades. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the Westphalian author and nature enthusiast Annette von 
Droste-Hülshoff (1797–1848), exploring the idea of nature presented in her essay 
“Westfälische Schilderungen aus einer westfälischen Feder” and her lyric poems “Die 
Mergelgrube” and “Der Hünenstein.” Many scholars have claimed that Droste’s view of 
nature was conflicted and ambivalent because of tensions between her religiosity and her 
interest in science. This chapter shows that large shifts within science and nature discourse 
themselves contribute greatly to this sense of ambivalence, and to her attraction to “threshold 
spaces” in her literary portrayals of nature. The analysis presented here shows how influential 
the concept of physiognomic reading was, not only as an (admittedly problematic) practice 
for reading and categorizing human facial features, but also as a practice for reading the 
“faces” of nature. Determining the physiognomic character of landscapes was a popular 
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notion in geography and landscape aesthetics, and it also appears in Droste’s essay 
“Westfälische Schilderungen” as a way of understanding the relationship between humans 
and nature in particular geographic regions.  
The second half of the chapter turns to two of Droste’s lyric poems. A reading of 
“Die Mergelgrube” uses the poem’s geological and paleontological references to shed light 
on Droste’s fascination with the rock and fossil evidence of the Earth’s deep history and the 
many contradictions within science and nature discourses as this complex history was being 
untangled. The poem “Der Hünenstein,” a poem about a poet’s encounter with a megalithic 
tomb at twilight reflects a lament about the gradual death of the Romantic idea of nature as 
dynamic and able to affect the human spirit. Both poems suggest an ambivalence toward 
current scientific practices and toward the way modern trends in science were changing 
nature itself and thus also the human capacity to be moved by it. Both poems advocate for 
poetic vision and contemplation alongside scientific inquiry and reflect concern about the 
strained relationship between humans and their natural environments. 
Chapter 3 draws from the observation with which I began this introduction—the 
imagery of eroded limestone in Adalbert Stifter’s Kalkstein. The chapter begins with an 
image of a landscape painting drawn by Stifter (1805–1868) and explores his interest in the 
possibility of movement and dynamism within inorganic nature as referenced in the painting. 
Before moving into an analysis of Stifter’s prose tale Kalkstein, it explores the 
interdependence between scientific and aesthetic vision as reflected in the landscape 
paintings and landscape painting theories of Stifter and Carl Gustav Carus (1789–1869). As 
Stifter’s painting journal and Carus’s Neun Briefe über Landschaftsmalerei show, 
Gemütsstimmung plays an important role in the nature conception of some late and post-
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Romantic thinkers who are still trying to capture the dynamism and power of nature within 
the visual arts. They seek to make movement visible and depict the natural world in such a 
way that it might move the viewer as an actual landscape would.   
The second half of the chapter examines the landscape described in Kalkstein and 
recognizes various ways in which Romantic conceptions of science and nature (embodied in 
the priest figure) collide and come into productive contact with objective-empirical 
conceptions of science and nature (embodied in the surveyor figure). As with Droste’s 
poetry, Stifter’s prose highlights a desire for reconciliation between conflicting modes of 
knowledge, and it often identifies older, Romantic values as a corrective to the newer 
technology-mediated and data-driven approach to science. Despite Stifter’s sober, realistic 
tone, the story is richly allegorical and emphasizes unity and codependence—between 
humans and nature, the organic and inorganic realms, and old and new ways of knowing 
nature.  
Chapter 4 is the final chapter, and it examines the scientific and literary work of 
probably the most obvious intermediary figure in this context: Georg Büchner (1813–1837). 
Because Büchner’s own voice is so difficult to extract from the voices of his literary 
characters (and sometimes even his scientific writing), the analysis here focuses on drawing 
out and examining some of the key contradictions that his literary and scientific works bring 
to light. A brief look at Büchner’s dissertation, Mémoire sur le Système Nerveux du Barbeaux 
shows how his work as a comparative anatomist in the 1830s combines detail-oriented 
empirical study with the Romantically inflected genetic-morphological approach, as Oken 
and Goethe often had done in their work.   
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The chapter then moves to a reading of the prose piece Lenz and examines the 
protagonist Lenz’s schizophrenic behavior, which appears to hinge on a kind of 
schizophrenia toward nature that is also present in the drama Woyzeck. The reading explores 
ways in which this pathology towards nature also resonates with other instances of schisms in 
Büchner’s writing, specifically as he explores the implications of different scientific selves 
(i.e., in his dissertation and in Woyzeck) and different poetic selves (i.e., in the 
“Kunstgespräch” in Lenz). The final section of this chapter returns to Büchner’s scientific 
writing by presenting a reading of his trial lecture “Über Schädelnerven.” This lecture praises 
the genetic-morphological method of scientific inquiry and explains how it can be used to 
hypothesize the origin of cranial nerves by tracing their development back to the spinal 
marrow. Though his tone in this lecture (essentially a “job talk”) reflects confidence in this 
scientific approach and its productive potential, the radical doubt surrounding scientific 
discourse in his literature lingers and thus challenges the reliability of Büchner’s stated 
position in this scientific text. 
The writing of these various literary and scientific thinkers reflects a strong central 
theme: that the threat of irreconcilable tensions in science and nature discourse is felt acutely 
in the first half of the 19th century, but all the more so in the 1830s and 1840s as important 
Romantic values were reaching the brink of extinction. Both the specific problems of this 
great shift and its potential solutions are incorporated into the literary worlds of this era. The 
result is a rich conversation about the confluence of science, nature, and aesthetics that 
deserves a legacy of its own.
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Lorenz Oken’s Isis: Defending Romantic Values at the Dawn of Disciplinarity 
 
 
 
            When Lorenz Oken (1779-1851) founded the journal Isis: oder Encyclopädische 
Zeitung in 1816, he was already beginning to receive significant acclaim in and around 
German-speaking Europe for his important contributions to science. His prolific, inspiring 
work in biology and comparative anatomy was praised by a number of budding scientific 
figures of the 19th century. One such figure was the Baltic German embryologist Karl Ernst 
von Baer, who later cited Oken as a key influence for his own work. In 1828, von Baer 
described Oken’s developmental perspective on biology as an important turning point that 
had made it possible for von Baer himself to make his famous discovery of the mammalian 
ovum in 1827. He wrote that many of Oken’s writings “haben […] die Erkenntniss der 
Entwickelungsgeschichte dadurch unendlich gefördert dass sie die Naturforscher zu einem 
deutlichern Bewusstseyn brachten.”14 As Robert Richards has pointed out in his seminal 
work The Romantic Conception of Nature: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe, von 
Baer disapproved of the more blatantly speculative aspects of Oken’s writing—for instance, 
                                                
14 Karl Ernst von Baer, Über entwickelungsgeschichte der Thiere (2 vols.), vol. 1, Königsberg, Bornträger, 
1828-1837: xvii-xviii. Accessed on 12-20-2014: 
https://books.google.com/books?id=ev7OAAAAMAAJ&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false 
 
Note: The term Entwicklung at this time was broader in scope than the notion of evolution and was used to refer 
to both ontgeny (the origination and development of an individual organism) and phylogeny (the origination 
and development of a species). 
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his ideas on recapitulation.15 However, the new historical-developmental view of nature 
advocated by Oken and other proponents of Naturphilosophie nonetheless struck a chord 
with von Baer, as it did with many others in the scientific community. This chord would 
continue to resonate throughout German culture long after the demise of Naturphilosophie 
around mid-century. In Das Ende der Naturgeschichte, Wolf Lepenies explains how the new 
historical-developmental view of nature had a crucial impact on the range of scientific 
discovery possible in the 19th century.16 For decades, Romantic philosophers like Friedrich 
Schelling articulated and rearticulated the notion that science should seek to uncover the 
often invisible deep history of the earth and trace the development of all of its living and non-
living forms; however, it was scientists like Oken, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, and Carl 
Gustav Carus who integrated this new kind of vision into the actual day-to-day scientific 
practice. 
Oken’s prolific scientific publications but also the very founding of his journal project 
Isis stand as testaments to the complex scientific Zeitgeist of the first half of the 19th century 
in Germany—the historical context that serves as the backbone of this dissertation. Oken’s 
long legacy speaks to the lasting relevance of his scientific and political vision for German 
society, which for him were deeply intertwined. This was a period of scientific discovery that 
brought momentous changes in the way that humans viewed nature and their own place 
within the realm of nature. From the discovery and mainstream acceptance of geological 
“deep time” to modern cell theory and embryology, to morphological theories that paved the 
way for theories of evolution, early 19th century science was rapidly reconstructing the 
                                                
15 Richards 494. 
 
16 Wolf Lepenies, Das Ende der Naturgeschichte: Wandel kultureller Selbstverständlichkeiten in den 
Wissenschaften des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1978. 
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worldviews of the Western hemisphere. It was, however, by no means a monolithic 
movement without tensions and conflict. The frequent dissonance between old and new 
values and ideologies was inevitable, and it posed conspicuous challenges that were 
frequently explored in both the literary and scientific writing of this era. Chapters two, three, 
and four will focus primarily on literary responses to some of these tensions, particularly as 
they relate to the relationship between science and aesthetics. The present chapter, on the 
other hand, will begin with a section exploring one way that the public—literary authors 
included—might have been exposed to debates about scientific and aesthetic discourse in the 
first place: through science-oriented periodicals. Although Lorenz Oken is perhaps the least 
poetically inclined figure covered in this project, his influence on many important figures 
who bridged the science-art divide was far-reaching. Moreover, his journal Isis sheds light on 
specific tensions within scientific discourse during this era and showcases some of the 
reasons why this was such a complex and transitional period for the relationship between 
science and aesthetics. 
 
The Isis: oder Encyclopädische Zeitung  
 In 1816, during his tenure as professor of anatomy at Jena (1807-1819), Oken 
founded the biweekly journal Isis: oder Encyclopädische Zeitung and established himself as 
its editor. The reputation of the Isis was tenuous in the early years due to the radical tone of 
some of the essays it published in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, and Oken was dismissed 
from his post in Jena in 1819 as a result. However, in spite of—or, rather, perhaps because 
of—state efforts to censor the publication in Jena, both Oken himself and the Isis remained 
popular throughout the German speaking lands. 
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 While the Isis was less geared toward the enlightenment of the general public than 
Oken’s 13-volume Allgemeine Naturgeschichte für alle Stände (1833-1841), he nonetheless 
intended to use the journal to promote a broader dissemination of knowledge, especially 
among the educated classes. In the inaugural issue of the Isis, Oken states that the Isis will 
serve to collect and present valuable information in a variety of forms, particularly in the 
areas of natural science and travel, but also in history, technology, art, and poetry. 
Ultimately, the journal, he says, is meant to present a forum in which 
nach und nach eine Einsicht in das große Räderwerk der Natur hervorgehen kann. 
Wir hoffen hirinn [sic] dem wissenschaftlichen Mann wissenschaftlich brauchbare 
Gegenstände an die Hand zu geben, so daß er sich in unserem Blatt über alle 
Entdeckungen, treuen, glaubwürdigen Raths erholen kann, während wir die 
Darstellung so einzurichten trachten, daß jeder Gebildete daran freundlichen 
Antheil nehmen mag.17 
 
Moreover, while one of the journal’s clear goals is to promote broader collaboration and 
sharing of information in the natural sciences, Oken emphasizes the importance of poetic 
reflection as a necessary complement to the journal’s scientific pursuits: 
Die Kunst […] steh[t] bei uns in geziemender Verehrung. Jeder Gebildete ist ihr 
hold. Sie erfreut das Leben, erhebt das Gemüth, löst die geheimsten Räthsel der 
Philosophie auf Sinnliche, fast greifbare Weise, und ist ein heiliges Mittelglied 
zwischen Leben und Wissen, zwischen Genießen und Glauben, zwischen Welt 
und Gott.18  
 
Like many of the great polymaths of his era—such as Humboldt, Goethe, and Carus—Oken 
insists upon the interdependence between aesthetic and scientific sensibilities when 
investigating the natural world. The Isis is thus often perceived and even referred to in 
scholarship as one of the first truly “interdisciplinary” periodicals in the German tradition. 
                                                
17 Lorenz Oken, ed., Isis: oder encyclopädische Zeitung, vol 1.1.1 (1817): 5. http://zs.thulb.uni-jena.de/. 
Accessed 12/20/2014. See also: Denise Phillips, Acolytes of Nature: Defining Natural Science in Germany, 
1770-1850, Chicago, U of Chicago P, 2012: 129. 
 
18 Ibid. 6. 
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Indeed, contributions included “long articles from every possible field of natural science, 
philosophy, philology, and politics; short reports of discoveries; designs for new engines and 
machines, […] poems; long literary reviews; farm reports, brief notices of successful surgical 
operations; and innumerable reviews of books from every field.”19 The breadth of the 
journal’s content was unprecedented. 
 However, the label of “interdisciplinarity” is, in reality, a misnomer for the journal, 
since disciplinarity itself is a modern phenomenon that was only just beginning to take shape 
during the first few decades of the 19th century. In spite of programmatic efforts on the part 
of Friedrich Schelling and other Romantic Naturphilosophen to maintain a harmonic 
synthesis of all modes of knowledge,20 the institutionalization of knowledge at a growing 
number of universities throughout Europe led to an increasingly strict differentiation between 
academic fields and their corresponding modes of inquiry. This meant that the natural 
sciences themselves were increasingly defined against one another (i.e., the earth sciences 
versus the life sciences) and that they often fell into competition with one another for 
resources and precedence. Andrew Cunningham and Nicholas Jardine refer to this 
phenomenon as the “second revolution” in the history of science—namely, the period around 
1800 during which the constellation of disciplines that we call “science” was formed.21 Over 
the past few decades, historians of science have lent increasing scholarly attention to the 
                                                
19 Helmut Müller-Sievers, “Skullduggery: Goethe and Oken, Natural Philosophy and Freedom of the Press,” 
Modern Language Quarterly 59.2 (June 1998): 253. 
 
20 For further elaboration Schelling’s Wissensystem, see S. R. Morgan, “Schelling and the Origins of his 
Naturphilosophie,” Romanticism and the Sciences, Andrew Cunningham and Nicholas Jardine, eds., 
Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1990: 41. Schelling’s work set out “a system based on the relation of the self’s 
modes of self-perception regarded and formulated as formal bodies of knowledge, as disciplines.” 
 
21 Andrew Cunningham and Nicholas Jardine, eds., Romanticism and the Sciences, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 
1990: 1. 
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significance of this second revolution. However, what is more important for this project is 
perhaps the fact that the arts and the sciences were also becoming wedged apart in a way that 
would have been unimaginable before 1800. In her monograph Kunst als Gipfel der 
Wissenschaft, Jutta Müller-Tamm observes: 
Während die Wissenschaft durch instrumentenvermittelte Beobachtung, 
experimentelle Verfahrensweisen und theoretische Konstruktion nach objektiver 
Naturerkenntnis strebt, wird die Kunst als eigengesetzlich begriffen und aus ihrer 
religiösen, gesellschaftlichen und beschreibend-didaktischen Funktionsbindung 
entlassen. Mit der Spaltung von exaktem Wissen und lebensweltlicher Erfahrung, 
von Rationalität und freiem Schöpfertum, von objektiver Naturerkenntnis und 
ganzheitlichem Naturerleben treten Wissenschaft und Kunst als autonome 
Sphären auseinander.22 
 
Science-oriented poets like Goethe, and aesthetics-minded scientists like Humboldt, Carus, 
and Oken still belonged to older generations that took the intermingling of art and science for 
granted. However, the emergence of new trends and values in the sciences—such as 
objective empiricism and analytical-experimental methods—were leading more and more to 
the exclusion of aesthetic contemplation and its “ganzheitliches Naturerleben” from the 
domain of the natural sciences. 
 In some ways, the fact that Oken felt the need to establish a journal project like the 
Isis thus highlights his own concern about the modern trend toward disciplinarity and the 
restrictive discursive norms that were beginning to govern the distinct academic disciplines 
forming at this time. A few years prior to his decision to establish the journal Isis, Oken had 
submitted a paper to Wilhelm von Humboldt titled “Über den Werth der Naturgeschichte 
besonders für die Bildung der Deutschen.”23 The paper was intended as a speech for the 1810 
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inaugural ceremony of the University of Berlin, and while Oken never delivered it, it 
nonetheless captures his perspective on disciplinarity—particularly within the natural 
sciences, which he refers to here collectively as “natural history.” He asks,  
Kann wohl etwas die Flucht alles wahrhaft gelehrten Sinnes, alles 
wissenschaftlichen Geistes mehr beurkunden, als das Unterfangen, einzelne 
Bruchstücke aus der Naturgeschichte herauszureissen, und sie als eine 
selbstständige Wissenschaft zu behandeln! […] Mit diesem Vereinzeln der 
Naturgeschichte geht aller wissenschaftliche Zusammenhang und der Sinn dafür 
verloren, und nur Wucher und Habsucht missbraucht die einzelnen, lockern 
Kenntnisse.24 
 
Very much in the spirit of Humboldt’s Menschenbildung,25 Oken elaborates in this essay on 
the importance of universal education for shaping ideal citizens, regardless of their 
profession—as scholars, tradesmen, physicians, theologians, jurists, philologists, 
metaphysicians, or whatever else their vocation may be. Integral to this educational process 
is the notion of the human as a creative being who is intimately familiar with and connected 
to the created, creative world around him: “[J]eder soll Schöpfer in seinem Fache sein, jeder 
soll den Schatz aller Menschenbildung in sich tragen […] Es ist jedem Menschen die 
Naturkenntniss ein Bedürfniss.”26 For Oken, a broad education in the sciences is crucial for 
all professions, in the higher and lower social classes, and an aesthetic education also plays a 
role in helping one acquire “klare Erkenntniss seines eignen Wesens als Mensch und der 
Mitmenschen, des Wesens der Thiere, Pflanzen und Erden, und ihres Verhältnisses unter sich 
und gegen den Menschen und die gesammte geistige Welt, überhaupt Bildung zur ernsten 
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Humanist.”27 For him, this global approach to education was therefore also deeply rooted in 
politics: he understood it as a critical step toward fostering a German society capable of 
competing internationally. In the closing paragraph of this essay, he states: “Diese 
Wissenschaften [… ] dürfen nicht allein bleiben; der Kopf, die Seele, die ihnen allen fehlt, 
muss hinzukommen, […] wenn ein Mittelpunct der Bildung entstehen soll, durch den das 
Verständniss aller Stände vermittelt wird.”28 Maintaining a unification of the sciences—and a 
holistic, interdependent relationship between science and the arts—was the key to building 
up a unified German society. 
 Beyond this essay, which was composed in 1809, the opening issue of Isis cited 
above also clearly articulates Oken’s desire to maintain a sense of radical inclusiveness 
among different modes of knowledge. The journal pledged that it would exclude “keine 
Betrachtung, welche bleibenden, befördernden Werth hat.”29 In fact, Helmut Müller-Sievers 
argues that Oken’s editorial policy in the Isis was so radically open to public contribution 
that it was even too extreme for Goethe, insulting his “sphere of poetic science” by 
neglecting the value of individual authorship in favor of a public forum in the name of 
democracy. Still, the journal is, in other ways, just as conservative as it is radical, particularly 
when we consider its relationship to the idea of censorship. Oken certainly loathes political 
censorship, and this is why he allows the Isis to reach the level of controversy it does in 
1819. However, what he also seems to be combating with this “radical openness” is another, 
more subtle, kind of censorship related to the state’s institutionalization of science: namely, 
excessively strict discursive boundaries. By allowing a plethora of subjects to comingle in the 
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same space with little or no editorial intervention, Oken is doing more than exhibiting the 
early Romantic “confusion of voices” or striving for Universalpoesie. He is provoking—and 
thus also drawing attention to—a kind of discursive censorship that reserves scientific 
writing for a narrow group of specialized experts. However irritating or radical it may have 
appeared to Goethe, Oken’s journal Isis was at least in part reactionary because it adamantly 
resisted the modern trend toward specialized, discipline-specific writing. It renounced 
restrictive rules for what could and could not be said and for what counted as science—as 
Wissenschaft. This strategy was apparently successful, as the journal had a relatively large 
readership and would continue to be published until 1848. 
 Oken’s position of openness is not surprising, considering his own approach to the 
practice of science, which was becoming less acceptable as the 19th century wore on and 
stricter methodological standards were introduced into German scientific communities. 
Grounded in Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, Oken’s scientific philosophy embraced the 
Romantic notion that scientific inquiry into nature should aim to restore the lost harmony 
between humans and their natural environments. However, in contrast with the prevailing 
models of Enlightenment-era science, such as mechanistic natural philosophy and descriptive 
natural history, Naturphilosophie especially espoused what Cunningham and Jardine have 
called “aesthetic modes of contemplation of nature” and “poetic modes of research into 
nature.”30 Particularly appealing for Oken was the way that Naturphilosophie conceptualized 
objects in nature as dynamic forms—as creative, generative, and historical rather than merely 
static, fixed, and subject to permanent categorization. Practicing scientists like Oken and the 
Danish thinker Henrik Steffens did use Naturphilosophie to try to overcome static 
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conceptions of nature and the overly analytical methodologies of their predecessors. But, as 
Cunningham and Jardine point out, “the dynamic and synthetic histories of the development 
of nature which [Oken and Steffens] set out, are proposed as complements to and 
complements of—not as replacements for—descriptive natural histories [and mechanical 
philosophies].”31 While some proponents of Naturphilosophie—including Schelling 
himself—often focused more on formulating an approach to scientific inquiry than actually 
carrying it out, Oken and Steffens were constantly trying to reconcile speculative aspects of 
Naturphilosophie with their own rigorous empirical observations. Perhaps it is due to the fact 
that Oken was intent on proving these philosophies and methods to be complementary rather 
than contradictory that he was able to thrive for many years in the European scientific 
community despite criticism of his more speculative assumptions. It also explains how he 
could have been so influential for a scientist with a very different scientific outlook—such as 
von Baer—despite Oken’s own reputation as a “Romantic scientist.” 
  
Romantic Science and its Values 
 
 In the introduction, I acknowledged the challenges of using the labels “Romantic 
scientist” and “Romantic science,” which appear frequently in scholarship and will also 
appear frequently throughout this dissertation. The intersection between Romantic 
metaphysics and Romantic scientific practices can be quite difficult to pin down, largely 
because history of science research over the past two centuries has recognized such a diverse 
spectrum of 19th century speculative thinkers as “Romantic scientists.” There are, however, 
some core values that are fairly consistent within this context, and they reflect a 
confrontation with the more troubling aspects of the prevailing scientific philosophies and 
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practices of this era, whether traditional or newly emerging. As I have elaborated above, 
Lorenz Oken was one of the most famous and influential but also one of the most 
controversial figures working within this milieu. A brief look at his journal Isis has given us 
some initial insight into the discursive boundaries he resisted, as well as the political 
implications he understood to be closely intertwined with producing and sharing scientific 
knowledge. Ironically, despite his sometimes divisive editorial decisions, one of Oken’s most 
consistent messages—both politically and in his philosophy of science—was that of unity 
and reconciliation. For him, the possibility of a strong German political union was utterly 
dependent upon a superior educational infrastructure, and the educational ideal that he 
espoused trumpeted the merits of a broad humanistic education. One could only lift up a 
weak and divided Germany with well-rounded citizens, and this was only possible if 
education aimed to train all of the human faculties in tandem with one another.32 Oken’s 
articulation of this idea echoes Schelling’s description of the various academic disciplines as 
interrelated parts of one organic, harmonious whole in his Vorlesungen über die Methode des 
akademischen Studiums.33   
 But the common theme of unity also extends further, and it is one of the values that 
ensures the longevity of the Romantic tradition’s influence within German science, despite 
Romantic science’s apparent defeat by proponents of objective empiricism. The idea of a 
necessary, underlying unity—between subject and object, and between humans and nature—
pervades all of Naturphilosophie and thus also underpins Oken’s view of nature. As noted 
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above, most Romantic scientists do not understand empirical study to be a practice that is 
inconsistent with their own philosophical framework. On the contrary: taking Schelling’s 
lead, they tend to subscribe to the idea that nature contains within itself a history of the path 
to consciousness that must be explored and uncovered through empirical scientific inquiry, 
and that their empirical findings about the natural world will necessarily reflect the 
metaphysics worked out in Schelling’s Naturphilosophie because nature and the reflective 
mind are two sides of the same coin. The basic cosmology that grounds this perspective 
appropriates several elements of Biblical creation mythology, including the idea of an 
original “Fall” or rift. S. R. Morgan describes this old story of the Fall now cast in the new 
philosophical language as a “separation of the spirit [consciousness] from its own product 
[nature], and thus the creation of subject and object.”34 The notion of a subject-object 
division also reinforces the Romantics’ skepticism toward mechanistic and descriptive 
approaches to science at the metaphorical level, as if the rift itself could be understood as the 
culmination of the disjunctive operations of analysis and categorization. 
 There are many iterations of this postlapsarian rift in the Romantic idealist 
philosophical tradition, including the notion that humans and nature have become estranged 
from one another and can only be reunited through a special kind of poetic-scientific 
interaction.35 This brand of mythology was, perhaps unsurprisingly, also remarkably 
compatible with some of the prevailing scientific pursuits of the day. With increased public 
acceptance of geological “deep time”—the notion that the earth’s history extended far 
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beyond the 6,000 years supposedly accounted for in the Bible—there emerged a new 
fascination with the history of the physical earth and the fossils buried within it that 
represented often mysterious life forms from long ago. A broadening public interest in 
collecting rocks, fossils, and other natural specimens from the late 18th century on only 
served to fuel the Romantic historical-developmental conception of nature and to encourage 
further reflection about the literal, rather than merely metaphysical, possibility of common 
origins among nature’s diverse forms. 
 The study of morphology, for instance—a discipline in which not only Oken but also 
Goethe was heavily invested—drew in many ways from the philosophical framework 
outlined above while also relying on empirical study. By examining physiological and 
anatomical features found in nature (both recent and fossilized), morphologists hoped to use 
educated intuition to uncover the original “types” or “ideas” underlying nature’s various 
forms. Within this Neoplatonic framework, the now-defunct discipline also worked to bring a 
sense of unity to different specimens by theorizing common points of origin and common 
courses of development that eventually diverged from one another to result in the variety and 
complexity now found in nature. The morphological approach is thus also often referred to as 
the “genetic method” because it attempts, through intuition, to trace the history of these 
natural forms—whether at the ontogenetic or phylogenetic level—back to the moment of 
genesis or least complexity. The historical, dynamic understanding of nature that morphology 
requires thus also aligns well with the creation mythology and anthropological assumptions 
of Naturphilosophie because one could, theoretically, use it to uncover past moments in the 
history of nature in which humans were more closely related to other species.  
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 Morphology would eventually prove to be problematic as a science because it 
required a great degree of subjective interpretation via analogical and intuitive leaps. 
However, as Denise Phillips points out, Naturphilosophen firmly believed that the use of 
metaphor and analogy could “gesture toward fundamental, ideal connections that could not 
be represented directly.”36 Nonetheless, as noted previously, even the more intuition-driven 
work of Oken and Goethe always began with careful empirical study. The idealist notion that 
the diversity of natural forms on Earth were generated by one guiding “spirit” (Geist) or 
“idea” (Idee) simply reinforced their trust in analogy. Because the value of underlying unity 
was a given for the Naturphilosophen, the binary oppositions that science would increasingly 
superimpose upon nature—such as human/non-human, subject/object, organic/inorganic, and 
even living/non-living—were therefore often found to be problematic and worthy of 
resistance. For the Naturphilosophen, everything in nature simply presented a different 
manifestation of the same spirit or idea. Nature as a whole was to be seen as one large living 
organism whose many different parts were held together and coordinated by a common inner 
force. 
 This insistence on unity, reconciliation, and organic harmony is just one set of values 
that Romantically inclined scientists generally sought to uphold. These values served largely 
as a counterbalance to many disjunctive paradigms for understanding the natural world (i.e., 
via mechanistic or analytical models) and human knowledge and education (i.e., via stricter 
disciplinarity). Another way to think about this resistance to division and separation is 
through the important concept of “synthesis.” That is, even when Romantic approaches to 
scientific inquiry involved the analysis and categorization of individual components of a 
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system outside of their context, it was always necessary to revisit the context of the whole 
after collecting individual observations. By relating insights about the individual parts back 
to the operation of the entire corpus, one could better understand the significance of 
individual functions (i.e., of organs, bones, etc.) as well as the overall function of the whole. 
The synthetic perspective was also influential for the Romantics’ early ecological thinking, 
insofar as it required that individual forms or phenomena in nature be examined not only in 
isolation but also in their greater environmental context. This general approach thus required 
the scientific observer to examine features of the part and the whole simultaneously. 
Especially Humboldt and Carus emphasize this latter step of synthetic, macro-level vision 
when understanding natural landscapes, for instance. For them, the operation of synthesis 
required an aesthetically trained eye and a certain degree of subjective imagination in 
addition to close-range empirical observation skills.   
 Closely related to the privileging of unity and synthesis is the way that this era of 
scientists valued the role of subjective participation as a particularly important element of 
responsible and adequate scientific inquiry. This epistemological value is reflected in the 
practice of morphology, for instance, in which the observing scientist compares multiple 
specimens in an attempt to “intuit” the common archetype from which they are all derived. 
Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison point out that it was common in the early 19th to value the 
practice of intuiting “perfect” or “true” forms in nature, particularly if one was trying to 
create representations of nature for teaching purposes, as scientific atlas makers often did: 
“Not only the [scientific] atlas makers themselves but also their artists were supposed to be 
familiar with a broad range of exemplars, so that each image would be the distillation of not 
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one but many individuals carefully observed—Goethe’s idea in the observation.”37 Because 
this idea of subjective or imaginative intuition (Anschauung) cannot be disentangled from the 
Goethean approach to poetics and science—at least in the German tradition—I will explore it 
in more depth in the section in this chapter on Goethe and in chapter 3. In general, however, 
many important scientific thinkers of this era firmly believed in a necessary codependence 
between science and aesthetics; this perspective is also reflected in the critical attitude toward 
discourse differentiation and disciplinarity that we witness, for instance, in Oken’s tone. If 
the scientific and aesthetic realms were no longer permitted to overlap, then empirical and 
poetic-subjective modes of observation would also eventually stand to become disentangled 
from one another. But precisely the combination of these two modes of vision is what 
constituted the unique, synthesizing approach to science that served the Romantics so well. 
We will see in later chapters that many literary authors and artists in the later decades try to 
hold onto the idea that empirical and aesthetic vision are compatible, even after the scientific 
community at large has rejected this notion. As will be discussed throughout this project, the 
discrepancy stems largely from a shift in the interpretation of empiricism toward objective 
empiricism, by which scientists attempted to remove all subjective influence from scientific 
observation.  
 The final characteristic that defines this transitional era of science and aesthetics is, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, the tendency to theorize models that allow scientific and aesthetic 
perception to comingle and profit from one another. A very prominent example of this can be 
found in the early 19th century concept of Stimmung (roughly translated as “attunement”), 
which is elaborated in the work of many important thinkers from this era who traverse the 
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art-science boundary. Although the term Stimmung was not always explicitly cited, a number 
of writers paraphrase the concept in their own cosmologies and aesthetic-scientific programs. 
It appears frequently in the context of landscape painting theories, such as that of Carl Gustav 
Carus, who emphasized the necessity of both scientific accuracy and the aesthetic 
Totaleindruck for success in landscape painting. Drawing on the notion of a special capacity 
for “attunement” between humans and nature, Stimmung provided not only an appealing 
ontological model for human-nature relations but also a model of scientific-aesthetic 
contemplation that reinforced the authority of the Goethean and Humboldtian approaches to 
science. In large part, it did so by emphasizing the importance of acquiring knowledge about 
nature through human sensitivity to and participation in nature’s processes, rather than 
objective distance. It is thus important to recognize the role of Stimmung-oriented landscape 
discourse within scientific discourses of this era. The connection between Stimmung and 
science will be discussed further in the section in this chapter on Carus, but also in each of 
the subsequent chapters, all of which identify the lingering presence of Stimmung discourse 
in German literary depictions of nature in the 1830s and 1840s.  
 Within the German context, then, it is clear that aesthetic-intuitive attention to nature 
was seen as an important complement—perhaps even a corrective—to empirical attention, 
and that it provided a unique opportunity to grasp the complex dynamics of a particular 
natural environment. For many scientific thinkers of this period, divorcing aesthetic “big 
picture” contemplation from the realm of science also meant that science could no longer 
appropriately understand or represent something like an ecosystem with many interrelated 
parts. Perhaps worse, the epistemic value of objectivity—and likewise, the human distance it 
entailed—tended to lead to the misperception that humans are above or in control of nature. 
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As we will see in the literary works explored later in this project, this proves to be a 
particularly short-sighted and naïve assumption, because, as authors like Droste, Stifter, and 
Büchner well knew, nature is by no means static or without a power and agency of its own. 
  
 
Scientific-Aesthetic Discourse around 1800 
  
 The key themes outlined above show that “Romantic science” often displayed a 
tendency to resist other trends, values, and epistemic virtues—whether these were remnants 
of older traditions or components of newer movements. As suggested before, this resistance 
was often directed toward models that were divisive in one way or another: whether those 
models opposed the fragmentation of knowledge (disciplinarity), the separation of art and 
science, or the strict division of nature into separate categories, such as human/non-human, 
organic/inorganic, living/non-living and so forth. Ever the proponents of global, holistic 
models of understanding, Romantic scientists were especially drawn to the life sciences 
because a living organism itself is an intricately connected system that has many individual 
parts but must also be grasped as a whole. The various branches of the life sciences 
necessitated models of understanding that could address and represent, to the extent possible, 
the dynamic qualities and developmental processes of living organisms. Cell theory, for 
instance, also reinforced the concept of unity so central to the Romantic imagination: “it 
provided the common source—the ‘Urtypus’—of all life, the point of unity in diversity, 
which Romanticism supposed and demanded.”38 At the same time, one must also remember 
that the life sciences, quite simply, represented extraordinarily popular areas of study in the 
first decades of the 19th century. This era witnessed the coining of biology and its birth as a 
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discipline (1800), the discovery of the mammalian ovum (1827), the formulation of modern 
cell theory (1838-39), and more generally, a massive surge in interest in subjects like 
anatomy, physiology, evolutionary and developmental biology (i.e., morphology and 
embryology), and even neurology.39 Perhaps what is even more fascinating, then, is the way 
that scientists versed in Naturphilosophie tended to project biological models of 
understanding onto other, non-animal forms in nature, such as plants and geological 
formations. Due in large part to the monistic holism of Naturphilosophie, the definition of 
“life” was thus often extended to all of nature through the logic and language of analogy.  
 While most contemporary scholars who write about Romantic scientists focus on 
their biological research and corresponding influence in areas like evolutionary theory, this 
project seeks to show how a selection of influential early 19th century thinkers left behind a 
broader, and equally important, legacy of Romantic science: namely, a tendency to challenge 
the very assumptions and parameters of scientific inquiry and to uphold their own values 
within it a rapidly changing cultural environment. They knew, for instance, that altering or 
restricting the definition of “legitimate” natural inquiry also meant altering or restricting the 
human perception of nature itself, for better or for worse. And despite their keen interest in 
biology, they also knew that elevating humans and other organic forms above the rest of 
nature risked destroying the holistic, ecological conception of nature that underpinned their 
worldview. Finally, they recognized the interdependence of the natural sciences and other 
ways of knowing and promoted a careful balance between them. 
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  Especially in the early decades of the 19th century, there were a number of 
scientifically inclined thinkers who traversed the border of science and aesthetics—a border 
that was much more permeable around 1800 than it was by even 1830 or 1840. Their work 
and legacies bound the realms of science and aesthetics together in a way that made the two 
difficult to ever disentangle completely. Indeed, the fact that the relationship between science 
and aesthetics was so intensive and enthusiastically represented around 1800, just as 
disciplinarity was emerging, makes for a situation that is somewhat unique to the German 
tradition. The conceptions of and epistemologies of nature advanced by these influential 
“border-crossers” left their marks on science; equally important, however, is the fact that 
their models of natural inquiry were adopted in literature and landscape painting. The 
interchange between science and aesthetics during this era was so rich that literature often, by 
default, ended up preserving the Romantic values that science would soon cast aside as 
illegitimate, in the name of objectivity, materialism, positivism, or some other watchword of 
the day. Idealistic conceptions of nature, poetic epistemologies, and the possibility of 
reconciliation between humans and nature and different modes of natural inquiry are thus 
concerns that preoccupy German literature through the end of the 19th century and beyond.    
 Beyond Lorenz Oken, the figures whose work was the most impactful in this context 
include Friedrich Schelling, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Alexander von Humboldt, and 
Carl Gustav Carus. Their works that have a very specific influence on the literature discussed 
in this project will be introduced in the corresponding chapters. However, I will first take a 
moment here to introduce these figures’ broader influence on science, aesthetics, and culture 
in general in the early 19th century German cultural context. 
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Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854) 
 Unlike the other major thinkers elaborated here, Friedrich Schelling was not a 
practitioner of scientific study, nor did he produce much in the way of poetry and art. 
Nonetheless, his Naturphilosophie had an unrivaled impact on the sciences and the arts in the 
early 19th century. According to Richards, this magnetic “philosopher king” of the Jena 
Romantics “reworked Kant’s aesthetic doctrine so that artistic genius and scientific genius 
would become a Janus-like individual, with one heart animating the two approaches to 
nature.”40 On the one hand, Schelling was troubled by the mechanistic-deterministic 
worldview that was so dominant earlier in the 18th century because it grounded knowledge in 
a dead, fixed object world (categorizable by the Linnean natural historical model); with its 
reduction of human life to mechanical clockwork, this model also ultimately excluded the 
possibility of human free will. On the other hand, Schelling considered Kantian dualism—a 
subject-object dichotomy whereby the capacities of freedom and agency were attributed to 
human subjects alone—a problematic categorization for the non-human “object” world 
because it left nature without subject status or a creative capacity. Schelling’s solution was to 
extend the notion of human subjectivity to the rest of nature. He did so by proposing an 
organic metaphysical system whereby human consciousness was generated from nature itself 
through a self-objectifying impulse; in turn, all of nature’s forms were generated from this 
same path to consciousness. According to Schelling’s paradigm, both man and nature had 
subject as well as object status: that is, both could be the originators of action but were also 
subject to the laws of mechanics and could be acted upon by external forces. Humans and 
nature, in other words, had the same origins and were two sides of the same coin. Each 
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played the role of both producer and product—in contrast to earlier and now re-emerging 
paradigms, in which the human (subject) world and the natural (object) world were distinctly 
isolated from one another. Most importantly for Schelling, because human consciousness 
was generated from nature itself, one could begin to unlock the structures and processes of 
human consciousness through the close, empirical study of the structures and processes of 
nature. 
  There were two significant consequences of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie for both 
aesthetic and scientific representations of nature during the Romantic era and beyond. First, 
not only the human world but also the nonhuman world was now cast into a temporal model 
of generation and fluctuation rather than a static model of order. Because the keystone of 
Schelling’s philosophy was the emergence of the human consciousness from nature, the 
natural world was increasingly viewed as a site into which human history and the earth’s 
history were recorded, or written, together. Secondly, the non-human world, now conceived 
as actively generative rather than a finished work of God’s creation—natura naturans rather 
than nature naturata—was imbued with vibrancy and creativity. 
As indicated previously, despite his primary preoccupation with the metaphysical side 
of these questions, Schelling’s characterization of humans and nature as productive and 
creative was profoundly influential for the sciences. His (and other Romantics’) conception 
of the origin of consciousness as an organically occurring process had a particularly strong 
bearing on the emerging field of biology, as Richards points out. For Richards, the influence 
of Romantic thought on developments in the early 19th century life sciences are crucially 
underplayed and overlooked in scholarship. He maintains that advancements in biology, for 
one, proceeded in the direction that they did largely due to the far-reaching influence of the 
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organic model of development that underpinned Romantic philosophy. In particular, 
Schelling’s emphasis on a historical reading of nature reinforced the morphological approach 
that would be so crucial to the scientific work of Goethe, Oken, and Büchner and also 
encourage aesthetic representations of nature as moving and dynamic. Because it presented 
humans and nature as products of the same organizing principle, Schelling’s 
Naturphilosophie also reinforced the idea of a fundamental unity between humans and 
nature. It likewise lent new energy to the ancient notion that the same patterns reproduce 
themselves throughout different levels of the cosmos, resulting in parallels between 
macrocosm and microcosm. 
As briefly noted above, Schelling was also a champion of integrating academic 
disciplines to produce universally educated minds. Not only did Schelling envision organic 
unity and codependence between humans and nature but he also believed that this 
codependence extended to the various faculties of the mind. Different modes of knowledge 
(increasingly known as academic disciplines) were complementary to and necessary for one 
another, which meant that the empirical study of nature was unfathomable without a 
philosophical engagement with nature, and vice versa.41 
 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832) 
  
 It would be difficult to overestimate the influence of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe in 
this confluence of early 19th century science and aesthetics, particularly when considering the 
impact of this era’s complicated scientific-aesthetic discourse on 19th century German 
literature. Goethe himself was in many ways the ideal Naturphilosoph, combining poetic 
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reflection and empirical observation in his prolific literary and scientific writings. Because of 
his legacy as the great German poet, he is an especially important figure in the context of this 
project’s exploration of late and post-Romantic literary conception of nature. Although 
Humboldt, Oken, and Carus often reflect on aesthetics and praise the arts, Goethe is the one 
among them who actually embodies the convergence of science and poetry.  
 Goethe has numerous reflections and concrete contributions to scientific-aesthetic 
discourse that could be mentioned here. However, two stand out as particularly relevant for 
the conceptions of nature presented in the literature of Droste-Hülshoff, Stifter, and Büchner 
and for the approaches to natural inquiry espoused by Humboldt, Oken, and Carus. The first 
contribution is an epistemological stance that concerns the subject-object relationship at the 
basis of natural inquiry. Despite increasing pressure toward objectivity over the course of the 
19th century, Goethe clung to the notion that science could—indeed, must—draw from a 
closer, more intimate encounter—one in which the human observer was actually a participant 
in the natural process being examined. It was important that the scientist himself be shaped 
and changed by this encounter in order to fully grasp the process or object at hand. This 
phenomenological approach to natural inquiry is most famously articulated in Goethe’s 
Metamorphose der Pflanzen from 1790, which was later republished as an article in a series 
of writings called Zur Morphologie in 1817. This notion of an “entangled,” participatory 
human subject is key to understanding the epistemological uncertainty that surrounds human-
nature encounters in Droste, Stifter, and Büchner. Goethe’s epistemology leans on empirical 
observation, which provides an intimate familiarity with the particularities of the object’s 
form; however, it also requires aesthetic attention to the dynamic qualities of the object as a 
whole, which can only occur through subjective openness and self-immersion in the moment. 
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Only by first understanding the import of this Goethean epistemological paradigm can one 
come to understand why objectivity as an increasingly valued epistemic virtue in 19th century 
Europe is perceived by many Naturforscher as one-sided and hollow. Without the entangled 
relationship between human subject and natural object—a relationship that, in some ways, 
dissolved that very subject/object boundary—it seemed impossible to access the deep “truth” 
of nature. Thus, although Goethe recognizes the value of empirical observation for his work, 
this step only goes as far as what he calls a “zarte Empirie.” In other words, this “gentle” 
version of empiricism is not exclusively based on the principle of subjective distance and 
objectivity. 
 Coinciding with this epistemological paradigm was the general shift toward a 
historical-developmental concept of nature and away from Linnean classification and purely 
mechanistic-materialist explanations of movement and change. This new metaphysical 
framework, advanced in large part by the Romantic movement, was a good fit for the 
epistemological paradigm elaborated above: if scientists wanted to grasp nature’s dynamic 
relationships and the process of development behind the variety of living forms on earth, this 
task could not be achieved by merely assigning categories and identifying a chain of 
mechanical causes and effects.  
 The second of Goethe’s important contributions, then, is his role in the popularization 
of the morphological-genetic method of natural inquiry through ideas like the Urpflanze that 
is expounded in his Metamorphose der Pflanzen. Goethe believed that forms in nature 
resulted from an interplay between the material world and the ideas or archetypes guiding the 
development of individual natural forms. As a result, his approach to natural inquiry required 
empirical attention to detail but also saw the practice of morphological study as an inherently 
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creative or productive process on the part of the human observer. It required the observer to 
use his or her imagination to conceptualize the “idea in the observation” or the archetype 
behind the individual specimen being observed.42 This emphasis on deriving archetypes 
through a careful combination of empirical attention and creative reflection is described by 
Daston and Galison as the pursuit of “truth” in nature as opposed to the newer trend toward 
disinterested objectivity. The tension between these two very different “epistemic virtues” 
over the course of the 19th century would eventually dissolve in favor of objectivity within 
the realm of European science. However, thanks in large part to the Goethean cultural legacy 
in Germany, this “truth to nature” idealism remains an important—albeit contentious—value 
in literary configurations of the natural world for decades to come. As Droste’s and Stifter’s 
literature in particular will show, this is the case even when objectivity and the material 
world appear to be at the center of their aesthetic programs.  
 
Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859) 
 
 Born in Berlin in 1769, the geographer, naturalist, and passionate explorer Alexander 
von Humboldt became one of the most influential European thinkers of the 19th century. His 
work left a distinct mark on the realms of science and aesthetics and deeply inspired natural 
scientists, explorers, philosophers, and poets from Europe to the Americas. Some of the most 
famous of these include Ernst Haeckel and Charles Darwin, as well as Ralph Waldo Emerson 
and Henry David Thoreau—not to mention the many literary and scientific authors explored 
in this dissertation project. In the late 1790s, Humboldt spent time in Jena with his brother, 
Wilhelm, and came into contact with Goethe, Schiller, and the “Jena Romantics” Schlegel 
and Schelling. He would later write to Schelling in praise of his Naturphilosophie, although 
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he began to resent the more speculative proponents of Schelling’s philosophy in his later 
years.43 The time spent in Jena was clearly formative for Humboldt, and many of his 
publications over the next few years bore the stamp of the unique perspective on science and 
aesthetics that emanated from this late 18th century cultural milieu.  
 Earlier influences also had an impact on Humboldt’s perspective on natural inquiry, 
however. Malcolm Nicolson cites Georg Forster’s 1790 Ansichten vom Niederrhein as one 
important example of the scientific travelogues that would shape Humboldt’s own writing 
during his scientific expeditions to the Americas (1799-1804) and Russia and northern Asia 
(1829).44 This literary and scientific account of Forster’s journey with Captain Cook from 
Germany to England received great acclaim in intellectual circles for its ability to harmonize 
scientific inquiry and aesthetic sensitivity. As such, it served as a model for future naturalist-
explorers like Humboldt. Another crucial influence was Immanuel Kant’s lectures on 
physical geography, which presented a critique of arbitrary taxonomic categories within 
geographic study.45 Kant advocated, instead, for a more holistic view that organized 
geographical characteristics by the way that they actually coexisted in nature; such a model 
of geography should seek to collect knowledge not just about the individual forms and 
phenomena observed but also about the interrelations among them.46 Johann Gottfried 
Herder’s Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit (1784-1791) was another important influence, 
as it presented an attractive anthropological perspective that Humboldt could draw from 
during his expeditions. In this four-part masterwork, Herder claimed that individual cultures 
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must also be studied in relation to their specific natural environments, because the 
development of these cultures is intricately bound up with the characteristics of the local 
climate and natural landscape. Understanding human culture as an advanced phase in the 
history of nature, Herder thus believed the history of the terrestrial earth to be deeply 
intertwined with the history of human civilization in general. 
 Within this intellectual context, Humboldt turned his own focus largely toward the 
geography of plants. He followed Kant in renouncing the Linnean paradigm of descriptive 
taxonomy and nomenclature: rather than focusing on the outward appearance of individual 
species, Humboldt redefined plant geography as a holistic practice that should elucidate the 
connections among different plants but also between plants and their specific geological and 
atmospheric habitats.47 This position was articulated in a number of his works but perhaps 
most clearly in his 1806 Ideen zu einer Physiognomik der Gewächse and his 1807 Ansichten 
der Natur. Such a holistic approach to plant geography was important to Humboldt because 
he believed the total impression (Totaleindruck) of a landscape to have a significant moral 
influence on humans. For him, the unique character or “physiognomy” of a landscape was 
primarily determined by its vegetative cover, and this overall impression had the capacity to 
shape the (inner and outer) character of its human inhabitants. Humboldt’s use of the concept 
of “physiognomy” to describe the “character” of a specific vegetative landscape and relate it 
to an analogous human “character” will be explored further in the chapter on Annette von 
Droste-Hülshoff. Even though he does not often employ the term Stimmung in his writing, it 
is worth noting that this model for understanding human-nature relations bears many 
similarities to the mechanisms of aesthetic attunement captured in the concept of Stimmung. 
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Stimmung is thus a theme that recurs throughout this historical period in many forms of both 
literary and scientific writing.  
 As much as Humboldt subscribed to the values of holism and aesthetic unity, he did 
not, however, by any means deny the necessity of collecting meticulous empirical data. On 
the contrary: he made extensive use of measuring instruments on his many journeys. 
Nicolson points out, for example, that 
[t]he azure of the sky […] was not only to be appreciated aesthetically: it had to 
be quantified. Virtually everything that could be measured was measured. The 
readings were tabulated and compared between sites. The physical data were then 
correlated with the occurrence of the various types of vegetation. Such 
correlations would, it was hoped, aid in the discernment of the laws which 
governed the distribution of vegetation.48  
 
Humboldt is, in fact, well known for his talent in combining “rigorous empiricism and 
experimentalism with idealism and holism” to promote a conception of nature that honored 
both aesthetic and scientific values.49 His own kind of radical inclusiveness is reflected both 
in his actual approach to natural inquiry described above and his attempt to formulate a new 
kind of science. This new science was to provide a fairly exhaustive “physical description of 
the world” that could represent the terrestrial earth and human culture in all of its 
interconnectedness. This was the goal of his great, unfinished multi-volume work of popular 
science, Kosmos. Though the concept behind Kosmos made it difficult to implement—and 
notoriously difficult to read—Humboldt’s ambitions to provide an all-encompassing, holistic 
view of nature were well received and secured him a long legacy in the German cultural 
tradition. 
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Carl Gustav Carus (1789-1869) 
 
 A less well-known figure with a nonetheless significant influence on early 19th 
century scientific and aesthetic discourse is the Saxon physician, anatomist, painter, and 
aesthetic theorist Carl Gustav Carus. Carus’s own oeuvre reflects, in some ways, Lorenz 
Oken’s program of discursive inclusiveness seen in the Isis: with almost 70 titles to his name, 
Carus was incredibly prolific and, though primarily a research scientist, he wrote on topics 
ranging from medical education to travel reflections to the aesthetics of landscape painting. 
His impressive versatility as a thinker was, in fact, even recognized by Goethe himself, who 
once wrote to Carus: “Fürwahr! Sie vereinigen soviel Eigenschaften, Fähigkeiten und 
Fertigkeiten, deren innigst lebendige Verbindung teilnehmendes Bewundern erregt.”50 As 
with other Romantically inclined scientists, the values of unity and harmony—among 
different modes of understanding and between man and nature—was crucial. Accordingly, 
his scientific philosophy was grounded in the notion that seemingly contradictory approaches 
and methodologies not only could be compatible but that they were necessarily compatible 
and often had to be used in tandem with one another.51 However, because Carus was 
significantly younger than Goethe and Humboldt, the ideal of a harmonic synthesis between 
art and the sciences was becoming a challenging notion to defend already during his 
formative years. His writing thus often directly criticizes the isolation of different modes of 
knowledge from one another, whether art and science or different scientific disciplines. 
Accordingly, his style also tends to be fairly urgent and programmatic. However, just as 
often as Carus emphasizes the importance of aesthetic vision as a complement to scientific 
research, he also recognizes that the reverse is equally true. Müller-Tamm thus paraphrases 
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his perspective as such: “Muß die Wissenschaft um nicht bloße Faktensammlung zu bleiben, 
ästhetische und subjektive Moment in sich aufnehmen, so kann umgekehrt die Kunst nur 
durch ihre wissenschaftliche Fundierung den Ansprüchen der Gegenwart standhalten.”52 
Carus, like Humboldt and Goethe, was likewise critical of purely deductive speculation that 
sought no empirical foundation or confirmation. 
 Carus’s approach to scientific study was very much influenced by Goethe’s seminal 
morphological treatise Metamorphose der Pflanzen. The genetic method, especially as it was 
set out by Goethe in this work, spoke to Carus’s desire to grasp the individual development 
of a natural form all at once when observing it—by holding a “temporal unity” of that form 
in the mind’s eye. Because this approach to natural inquiry required not only sharp empirical 
observation and significant experience viewing natural forms but also a skillful 
“künstlerische Betätigung,”53 it was especially appealing to him. Applied to his own research, 
which primarily fell into the area of zootomy, genetic analysis began with a first step of 
“descriptive anatomy,” in which the actual form of the animal or skeleton was examined and 
described. The “genetic” step then used this information to map out the interconnectedness of 
the development of individual parts within body and the life phases of the organism as a 
whole over time. Often there was also a next step, comparative anatomy, which involved the 
comparison of this organism’s specific phases of development and the relation of its 
components to those of other species throughout the animal kingdom. The ultimate goal was 
to uncover common developmental tendencies or laws throughout nature and identify 
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homologous anatomical structures among species.54 This process is very similar to the 
approach that we see in the anatomical research of Oken, Goethe, and also Georg Büchner.  
 The practice of physiognomy was also alluring for Carus because it provided another 
possible interpretive framework for understanding how diverse particularity could have 
resulted from the existence of fundamental underlying types in nature.55 Although this 
“discipline” would eventually prove very problematic, the mere attempt to use aesthetic-
holistic vision to synthesize individual features into an image of the “character” of the whole, 
and then correlate that character with an underlying “type,” reflects a similar operation of 
logic to that of morphology. That is, it takes an empirical account of the physical world and 
tries to intuitively trace that material manifestation back to some invisible essence or point of 
origin. Physiognomy is thus in many ways a product of the complex intersection of scientific, 
aesthetic, and philosophical discourses of this particular era. It stems from the drive to unite 
empirical data with the monistic unity underpinning Naturphilosophie. Ironically, then, the 
development of physiognomy as a practice was, to some extent, fueled by the desire to locate 
unity (or unities) within nature’s chaotic diversity. 
 Not unlike Humboldt’s concept of plant physiognomy, Carus’s tendency toward 
“physiognomic reading” also extended to his theories of landscape aesthetics. In particular, 
his concept of “Gemütsstimmung” outlined in Neun Brief über Landschaftsmalerei (1819-
1824) emphasized the importance of aesthetic perception for identifying the specific 
character reflected in the geological, vegetative, and atmospheric qualities that together 
comprise the overall impression of a landscape. As I outlined previously, Carus and other 
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55 For more on Carus’s involvement in the practice of physiognomy, see: Richard T. Gray, About Face: German 
Physiognomic Thought from Lavater to Auschwitz, Detroit, Wayne State UP, 2004. 
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proponents of Stimmung correlated the distinct individual “character” of a landscape with a 
corresponding affective response in the humans. For Carus—perhaps more than any of the 
other thinkers introduced in this project—the genetic method was thus to be extended to all 
of nature, including the inorganic realm. This is also where his influence on German literary 
conceptions of nature seem most conspicuous and most fascinating, particularly when read 
alongside the works of Adalbert Stifter. Carus’s later volume 12 Briefe über das Erdleben 
(1841) reinforces this position: in it, he insists upon the interdependence of all of nature and 
reiterates the necessity of maintaining a unity of organic and inorganic nature under the 
concept of one living whole. 
    48 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
Reading the Face of Nature:  
Geology, Biology, and Physiognomy in Annette von Droste-Hülshoff's Lyric Poetry 
 
 
 
  As is evident in much of Annette von Droste-Hülshoff’s writing, Germany’s most 
distinguished female poet of the 19th century possessed a remarkable, even encyclopedic, 
breadth of knowledge about objects of natural history. Indeed, in Die geistige Welt der 
Dichterin Annette von Droste zu Hülshoff, the most comprehensive account of Droste’s 
extraliterary influences, author Josephine Nettesheim suggests that the presence of somewhat 
obscure scientific references in many of Droste’s lyric poems renders them cryptic, if not 
illegible, for readers unaware of the scientific context of Droste’s time.56 This phenomenon is 
most clearly the case for the poems “Der Hünenstein” and “Die Mergelgrube,” both of which 
were written in the spring of 1842 at Meersburg on Lake Constance and later published under 
the subheading “Haidebilder” in her 1844 volume Gedichte.57 According to Nettesheim, these 
two poems in particular are “eng mit der erregenden Auseinandersetzung vor den 
wissenschaflichen Problemkreisen verbunden und gehören zu den aktuellsten Themen der 
Literatur und der Dichtung der Droste-Zeit.”58 And although it would certainly be misleading 
to characterize Droste as a scientist herself, her work bears witness to the fact that she was 
                                                
 56 Josefine Nettesheim, Die Geistige Welt der Dichterin Annette Droste zu Hülshoff, Münster, Regensberg, 
1967: 18. 
 
 57 Roger Paulin, “Annette von Droste-Hülshoff,” Landmarks in German Women’s Writing, ed. Hilary Brown, 
Bern, Peter Lang, 2007: 84ff. 
 
58 Nettesheim 75. 
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both acquainted with many of the leading scientific theories of her day and deeply moved by 
their broader implications. Moreover, as many scholars have pointed out, works like “Die 
Mergelgrube” quite overtly thematize the broad dissemination and popularization of new 
scientific knowledge that seized the attention of early 19th century society.59 Towards the end 
of “Die Mergelgrube,” for instance, the lyrical subject encounters a shepherd figure outside 
the eponymous marl pit and asks, “Bertuchs Naturgeschichte; les’t Ihr das?” As the question 
implies, the shepherd has been reading a copy of Friedrich Justin Bertuch’s Bilderbuch für 
Kinder, a series of pedagogically oriented natural history encyclopedias published between 
1792 and 1830 and often acquired by wealthy families at the time. The Hülshoff family did, 
in fact, own the second edition of this series, and it is said to have spent a great deal of time 
in the hands of Droste herself as she was growing up.60 Although “Die Mergelgrube” does 
not include the subtitle of Bertuch’s work, it is also worthy of mention because it very clearly 
exemplifies the mania for naming and collecting objects of nature that took the general 
population by storm during Droste’s lifetime: “Eine angenehme Sammlung von Thieren, 
Pflanzen, Blumen, Früchten, Mineralien, Trachten und allerhand andern unterrichtenden 
Gegenständen aus dem Reiche der Natur, der Künste und Wissenschaften.”61   
 The emphasis on natural history in Droste’s poetry thus demonstrates both her own 
sense of “Wissbegier” and her commitment to the brand of Enlightenment knowledge 
                                                
59 Thomas Pittrof, “‘Bertuchs Naturgeschichte’; Les’t Ihr Das? Annette Von Droste-Hülshoff: ‘Die 
Mergelgrube.’ Naturgeschichte, Poesie, Apokalypse,” Literaturwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch im Auftrage Der 
Görres-Gesellschaft 42, 2001. 
 
 60 Historisch-kritische Ausgabe 1,2: 162. According to this source, the family also likely owned Lorenz Oken’s 
Naturgeschichte für alle Stände, 1839-41. 
 
 61 Friedrich Justin Bertuch, Bilderbuch fu ̈r Kinder: enthaltend eine angenehme Sammlung von Thieren, 
Pflanzen, Blumen, Fru ̈chten, Mineralien, Trachten und allerhand andern unterrichtenden Gegensta ̈nden aus 
dem Reiche der Natur, der Ku ̈nste und Wissenschaften, Weimar, Verlag des Landes-Industrie-Comptoirs, 1798-
1830. http://www.biodiversitylibrary.org/bibliography/95815#/summary 
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imparted by Bertuch’s work and other popular household volumes such as Denis Diderot’s 
Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers (1751-1770), 
Baron D’Holbach’s Système de la Nature (1770), and Georges Cuvier’s Tableau élémentaire 
de l'histoire naturelle des animaux (1798). Materials such as these had been circulating 
through Europe since the late 18th century and were intended to elevate the education of the 
general population and simultaneously rein in superstition and folk belief in the name of 
Volksaufklärung. Many of these works were compiled primarily with a readership of women 
and children in mind. It is, therefore, not surprising that Droste’s careful attention to nature in 
her poetry often appears to be just as preoccupied with naming (as these books encouraged) 
as it is with actually describing nature. The extraordinary range of terminology that Droste 
employs in the process attests to her enthusiasm as an avid collector and categorizer of 
objects of natural history. What is perhaps more striking about her work, however, is the fact 
that her poetic treatment of these natural objects also reveals an astounding level of 
familiarity with key theories from a broad range of scientific discourses emerging in the early 
19th century. For instance, “Die Mergelgrube” includes references to the theory of glacial 
erratics (Findlinge), theories of the origins of the earth, and paleontological explanations for 
unidentifiable species. Moreover, “Der Hünenstein” reveals a familiarity with historical and 
anthropological theories about megalithic tombs. As a number of scholars have pointed out, 
several of Droste’s poems explore the key sources of dissonance between Biblical and 
scientific narratives of the Earth’s history. Thomas Pittrof’s article on “Die Mergelgrube,” for 
example, illuminates the poem’s stance toward theories of Catastrophism developed within 
the scope of geological and paleontological discovery.62 Beyond that, Nettesheim outlines a 
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number of ways in which Droste incorporates elements of magnetism, mesmerism, 
galvanism, and homeopathy into several of her lyric and prose pieces.63  
 While it is useful (and often crucial for an informed reading) to unravel Droste’s 
various references to contemporary scientific discourse, scholars tend to use these insights 
primarily as evidence of the sense of crisis she experienced as scientifically and religiously 
informed worldviews began colliding with ever increasing intensity. Both Droste’s 
commitment to her Catholic faith and her struggle to maintain that faith in an increasingly 
secularized world have certainly been widely acknowledged, most notably in scholarship that 
examines her lyric cycle Das Geistliche Jahr. In this chapter, however, I would like to 
challenge traditional readings by demonstrating that science itself was by no means a stable 
or monolithic mode of inquiry from Droste’s perspective and that the attempt to establish 
early 19th century science and religion as diametrical opposites runs the risk of obscuring 
other important epistemological tensions and oppositions. Thus, while the relationship 
between scientific and other important ways of knowing at this time certainly justifies 
analysis, one must also keep in mind that the question of what it meant to perform 
“Wissenschaft” was in the midst of a dramatic transition over the span of Droste’s lifetime, 
as Romantic and objective-empirical modes of scientific inquiry collided with one another.  
  
Science and Nature in Droste’s Lyric: Inhabiting the Threshold  
 
 One of the most prominent problems emerging in this context is nature as an object of 
scientific study. In this chapter, I will show that, like the work of many other authors during 
this period, Droste’s lyric often grapples with the question of how different approaches to 
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scientific (as well as poetic) inquiry foster different ways of understanding nature and the 
relationship between humans and nature. This picture is complicated by the fact that, not only 
were competing models of science existent at this time, but the “nature” of nature itself was 
subject to a great deal of scrutiny. At least two very different ways of understanding nature 
prevailed at this time, and I locate moments in Droste’s work that reflect an ambivalent 
oscillation between these conceptions. The first, a static, mechanistic conception of nature, 
proceeds from the assumption that the earth became fully formed within a relatively short, 
finite period (i.e., during God’s act of creation). This model—often associated with Carl 
Linnaeus and Linnaean classification—clearly had theological significance and was also an 
important premise for the development of modern empirical science because it presented the 
natural world as constant and categorizable. The second, a dynamic, developmental 
conception of nature, became more influential as the 19th century’s fascination with historical 
modes of understanding grew. This fascination was intensified by Idealist speculation (e.g., 
Naturphilosophie) as well as geological and biological discovery suggesting the instability of 
organic and inorganic forms. A great deal of scholarship has focused on the challenge posed 
by these conflicting conceptions of nature, especially as explored by Goethe and the 
Romantics; however, few scholars carry the analysis through to include post-Romantic 
authors such as Droste, as they are often already characterized as proto-Realists. Yet, as we 
will see, these two models of nature often become juxtaposed in very compelling ways in her 
work, particularly when they collide with shifting perspectives on science itself.  
 One particularly remarkable feature about Droste’s approach to depicting nature, 
and—as some have noted—about late or post-Romantic representations of nature in general, 
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is the tendency to explore very different aspects and qualities of nature from those that the 
Romantics foregrounded. Nettesheim notes, for instance:  
statt der Rose wird die Distel oder die verborgene bescheidene Christrose 
besungen, statt der Nachtigall die unerotische Lerche, der asketisch geistige, 
beschiedene Vogel oder das sich opfernde Rotkehlchen mit der blutenden Brust. 
Nicht die satte paradiesiche Blumenlandschaft wird mehr lyrisch ausgesagt, 
sondern “the barren landscape”: Wüste, Steppe, Heide, Moor (bekanntlich 
durchaus nicht nur in Westfalen!). Nicht Heroen und Olympier gilt es mehr zu 
feiern, sondern die “Unbesungenen” […] (18) 
 
Nettesheim associates this shift in focus with the era’s general preoccupation with the 
miniscule and the invisible, due in part to a rising interest in microscopic observation in 
science.64 According to Nettesheim’s reading, the memory of revolutionary political 
atmosphere prior to the Congress of Vienna in 1815, along with the rise of the bourgeoisie 
during this period also contributed to dramatic shifts in poetic symbology. These political 
conditions meant, for instance, that the low and the lowly featured increasingly prominently 
in literature: “man singt statt des Königsliedes das Lied vom Bettler.”65 Moreover, in 
emphasizing the turn towards a sober, even ascetic treatment of nature during Droste’s era, 
Nettesheim touches on a characteristic that literary scholars frequently identify with a 
Biedermeier or proto-Realist aesthetic—namely a clear sense of the growing 
demythologization and disenchantment of nature. Some scholars, such as Ritchie Robertson, 
suggest that Droste’s work, with what he sees as a penchant for objective vision, is even 
complicit in this process of demythologization, as she “rejects the Romantic attempt to 
elevate nature into a religious substitute, evoking many desolate landscapes and scenes of 
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suffering.”66 Pittrof addresses the persistence of these barren landscapes as well and notes 
that Droste’s emphasis on inorganic aspects of nature such as stone and sand has been 
examined in relation to Paul Celan’s poetry and hence deemed an early reflection of 
Modernism because it rejects beauty and harmony for a world perceived as decrepit and 
falling into ruin.  
 Like Pittrof, I will resist the urge to investigate the ways in which Droste’s work 
might hold up as a prescient form of Modernism and, instead, seize the opportunity to 
examine it as a testimony to the pressing questions of her own historical moment. Her 
attention to inorganic nature and geology are particularly interesting for this analysis; 
however, I believe that they cannot be examined in a vacuum. Stones, sand, barren 
landscapes have a large role in her conception of nature, and yet, they are almost always 
explored through their relationship to organic, living nature. In this context, fossils assume a 
particularly interesting role because they represent an intermediate form between the living 
and the non-living. Moreover, Droste’s depictions of inorganic elements are almost always 
coupled with an investigation of the various ways in which they do indeed have a kind of 
animation or force, whether through the aesthetic effect of an arrangement of stones, the 
earth’s transformation of once-living bodies into rock, or the dynamic entanglement of 
humans and their native landscapes. And while Droste does often rein in fantastical vision to 
return to the sober present moment in her texts, it would be an exaggeration to say that she 
welcomed a disenchantment of nature simply because her landscapes tend toward desolation 
and barrenness. Droste’s nature, regardless how destitute, always struggles to retain its 
vibrancy and power in an anthropocentric world that tries to contain and control it. The 
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frequent position of her nature poetics at this threshold, I would argue, attests to her deep-
seated need to observe and understand the relationship between humans and nature and how 
they move, arrest, animate, and transform one another in the rapidly changing world in which 
she finds herself.  
  
Physiognomics and Ecological Reading 
  
 As I mentioned in the opening of this chapter, two of the most interesting encounters 
with inorganic nature in Droste’s lyrical work appear in the poems “Die Mergelgrube” and 
“Der Hünenstein.“ Before turning to those pieces directly, however, I would like to attempt 
to establish a better sense of Droste’s perception of nature and her understanding of the 
relationship between humans and the natural world, particularly regarding the relationship 
between biological and geological forms. I believe that her lesser known non-fictional work 
titled Westfälische Schilderungen aus einer westfälischen Feder67 provides some crucial 
insight into the way she envisioned humans (organic bodies) and natural landscapes 
(inorganic bodies) as participants in a mutually dependent system. Droste sent this piece to 
her friend Levin Schücking in June of 1842 as a contribution to a planned collection of 
“historical” descriptions of local culture titled Das malerische und romantische Deutschland 
im 19. Jahrhundert. Droste was charged with the task of presenting a picture of life in 
Westphalia and drew a significant amount of material for this contribution from a literary 
“genre piece” about Westphalia that she had been working on since 1838. The latter was 
                                                
67 This essay is not to be confused with “Bilder aus Westphalen” (1842), which is referenced, for instance, in: 
Josephine Donovan, European Local-Color Literature: National Tales, Dorfgeschichten, Romans Champetres, 
London, Continuum, 2010, 120. The author addresses Dorfliteratur and Dorfbilder as precursors to Blut und 
Boden discourse. However, this genre of literature also reflects a struggle with larger questions of science, 
nature, religion, environment, and rapid societal change—and the related task of trying to reconcile a number of 
conflicting worldviews. 
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inspired by her veneration for the work of the American writer Washington Irving. The 
publication of this volume did not proceed as intended, however, and, instead, Droste’s piece 
was published anonymously in 1844 in the “Historisch-politische Blätter für das katholische 
Deutschland.”68 The piece elicited a fair amount of controversy because of its occasionally 
derogatory depiction of Paderborn and the Sauerland vis-à-vis the Münsterland. However, it 
also occasionally received high praise. For instance, nearly 10 years after her death in 1848, 
the journal Europa included a pre-publication announcement of Droste’s Letzte Gabe that 
failed to mention Die Judenbuche but characterized her “Westfälische Schilderungen“ as "die 
meisterhaften Skizzen über Westfalen."69 Although Droste correctly predicted the criticism 
that would result from the publication of this work in a broadly circulated periodical and 
regretted the upheaval that it provoked, she did not disavow it. On the contrary, she 
considered it important historical work that should have been published as a contribution to a 
volume that would demand “strenge Wahrheit […]” and would be read “nur von ernsten 
Männern.“70 Likewise, she associated the negative reaction with the inappropriateness of the 
publication genre in which it appeared. Journals were, namely, also accessible to “alle Laffen 
und Weiber“ and published material that was easily perceived as sensationalized.71 
  
 The essay assumes the tone of a travel narrative, and the narrator very clearly makes 
an effort to present the material in a neutral, sober manner, while simultaneously indicating a 
                                                
68 A journal edited by Guido Görres. The eventual publication of Droste’s piece proceeded to some extent 
against her will. After the failure of the Schücking/Bauer volume to crystallize, Droste noted in a letter to 
Schücking that her contribution was perhaps “zu scharf” and would bring her “tausend Feinde und Verdruß” 
(5,2: 508). She eventually relented under the condition that it be published anonymously. 
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deep level of familiarity with the region. It also employs the authoritative but inclusive “we” 
perspective that, for instance, also features as a prominent voice in many of Adalbert Stifter’s 
narratives. The piece is divided into three chapters. The first primarily presents a general 
overview of the landscape features of Westphalia and its different regions, but it also 
introduces a number of reflections on the customs and moral character of the each 
subregion’s inhabitants. Chapters two and three focus increasingly on aspects of the 
Westphalians’ everyday life as well as local cultural traditions and celebratory practices. My 
analysis will focus primarily on the first section, as its attention to the relationship between 
the region’s inhabitants and their environments opens up key insights into Droste’s 
conception of nature. This perspective will help us gain a more nuanced understanding of the 
function of nature in her lyric poetry. In addition, the intersection between the conception of 
nature that she presents here and the “scientific” gaze that she attempts to adopt when 
characterizing the people and the landscapes of Westphalia represents a very important 
tension that resonates with much of the rest of her work.  
  It is evident already in the very first lines of this piece that Droste’s conception of 
nature and her understanding of the relationship between humans and nature are significantly 
influenced by the concept of physiognomy and by Romantic philosophy. At first glance, 
these qualities may only seem coincidental, but the case builds as the narrative progresses. 
She begins: 
Wenn wir von Westphalen reden, so begreifen wir darunter einen großen, sehr 
verschiedenen Landstrich, verschieden nicht nur den weit auseinander liegenden 
Stammwurzeln seiner Bevölkerung nach, sondern auch in Allem, was die 
Physiognomie des Landes bildet, oder wesentlich darauf zurückwirkt, in Clima, 
Naturform, Erwerbsquellen, und, als Folge dessen, in Cultur, Sitten, Charakter, 
und selbst Körperbildung seiner Bewohner […] (45) 
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Her usage of the term “physiognomy” here lends significant insight into Droste’s attempt to 
provide an accurate, authoritative account of Westphalia. One might tend to read past it as a 
descriptive metaphor simply employed to refer to the surface appearance of the land; 
however, both the term itself and the manner in which it foregrounds the relationship 
between humans and nature resonates with the work of some very significant thinkers 
addressing the notion of physiognomy during the early 19th century.   
 Although the term “physiognomics” tends to evoke associations with the abusive 
racial policies that developed towards the end of the 19th century and first half of the 20th 
century in Germany, its earlier forms were less misanthropic, though certainly no less 
problematic as an alleged model of reliable scientific inquiry. “Physiognomy”—that is, the 
evaluation of a person’s inner character based on an interpretation of the body’s external 
features—is an ancient notion that had long been dismissed as an occultist practice. 
However, in the wake of the Enlightenment, which provoked an urgent preoccupation with 
the question of human nature, the concept was set to gain new vitality. In his monograph on 
the history of physiognomics, Richard Gray traces the concept’s primary avenue of influence 
in Enlightenment Germany through the Swiss pastor Johann Caspar Lavater, who published 
the four-volume work Physiognomische Fragmente zur Beförderung der Menschenkenntnis 
und Menschenliebe from 1775 to 1778. In the course of establishing this genealogy, Gray 
reflects further on reasons for the surprisingly broad appeal of Lavater’s work: 
One of the commonplaces among scholars studying the history of modern 
physiognomics is the recognition that it thrives in particular during times of social 
and political disorientation. The transition from the absolutist state to civil society 
marked a period of particular disorientation with regard to the self-understanding 
and self-definition of the individual.72 
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Yet, rather than explore the rising popularity of physiognomy primarily in relation to 
questions of governance, I would like to point to its significance for another disorienting shift 
that is a pervasive theme throughout Droste’s work—namely, that of science. Physiognomic 
logic represented a model of inquiry that, for many, seemed to hold unique potential in the 
realm of science because, rather than examining phenomena in isolation as a mechanistic 
approach would, it read them as expressions of a greater signifying system. This approach 
was eventually used as an attempt not only to reveal knowledge about the nature of 
individual humans, but also to explore the “nature” of specific regions of nature itself. We 
will also see in Westfälische Schilderungen how Droste uses this logic to paint a picture of a 
world in which the features manifested in both humans and natural landscapes can be read 
within the same system.  
 While it is not my intent to assert physiognomics as an exclusively Romantic 
scientific practice, it is indeed interesting to note how attractive this idea became for some 
thinkers who were attracted Romantic philosophy. Many of these figures—Carl Gustav 
Carus in particular and Alexander von Humboldt as a “less Romantic” representative—were 
also instrumental in shaping the scientific discourse that appears to have had such a 
significant effect on Droste’s literary work. According to Gray, the affinity between 
physiognomy and Romantic theories of science existed because both physiognomics and 
Schelling’s Naturphilosophie propose a system of metaphysics in which material form is 
considered a legible expression, or a concrete manifestation, of an invisible but 
corresponding force or quality. Thus, the key task in both physiognomy and 
Naturphilosophie was to study the visible surface world in order to glean knowledge about its 
invisible, animating content. For physiognomy, this was the character and intellectual 
  
 60 
capacity of the individual; for Naturphilosophie, the Weltseele was considered the organizing 
principle of nature. Schelling’s system relied on the idea that there was a correspondence 
between the soul/mind and nature, nature became the site of this hermeneutic investigation; 
in like manner, proponents of physiognomics, such as Lavater and his successor Carl Gustav 
Carus, took human faces and bodies as their prime objects of study, presuming a 
correspondence between the expressed features of the human body and the qualities of that 
individual’s soul/mind.73 The study of physiognomy was apparently also particularly 
amenable to the holistic premises propounded by Naturphilosophie; consequently, the body 
as an object of physiognomic study came to be viewed increasingly as an organic totality 
throughout the early 19th century, in a way similar to the conception of nature as an organism 
within Naturphilosophie. Gray notes, for instance, how Carus’s mid-19th century adaptation 
of Lavater’s physiognomics “emphasize[d] [the body’s] aesthetic character, the harmonious 
relation of each part to every other part to and to the somatic structure as a whole.”74 Finally, 
both Lavater and Carus believed that the interpretive practice of physiognomics required a 
special aesthetic sensibility or talent—an act of hermeneutic work that combined objective 
observation with a kind of imaginative work resembling a “poetic feeling.”75 Thus, even 
though physiognomics and Naturphilosophie emerged out of different philosophical contexts 
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and had, in many ways, different assumptions and different aims, they do bear similarities 
insofar as they both resist Newtonian mechanistic interpretations of the world.  
 The aspects they do share often rendered them in many ways commensurable for 
Romantically inclined minds. One such thinker was the explorer and biogeographer 
Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859), whose work shared characteristics of both Lavaterian 
physiognomics and Naturphilosophie but applied them in a rather idiosyncratic manner. 
Humboldt’s own “physiognomic” thinking furthered his achievements in the field of 
descriptive geography and generated its own influential legacy in the realm of natural 
description.76 In his essay “Ideen zur Physiognomie der Gewächse,” published in Ansichten 
der Natur in 1807, Humboldt introduced his version of physiognomy to improve upon the 
fragmenting gaze of Linnaean classification. He outlined a new scientific approach to 
understanding nature by documenting the overall vegetation patterns of specific geographical 
regions. In this essay, he articulates his interest in investigating how these patterns overlay 
geological forms to lend a distinctive “face” to individual landscapes; however, what is less 
often recognized is that this essay also reflects his desire to understand the complex 
relationship between organic and inorganic life and how they appear to animate one another. 
Plants, for Humboldt, are crucial because they play a mediating role in this relationship: 
“Unablässig sind sie bemüht den rohen Stoff der Erde organisch aneinander zu reihen und 
vorbereitend durch lebendige Kraft zu mischen, was nach tausend Umwandlungen zur 
regsamen Nervenfaser veredelt wird.”77 Reflections such as these speak to his dedication to 
                                                
 76 See: Bettina Hey’l, Das Ganze der Natur und die Differenzierung des Wissens: Alexander von Humboldt als 
Schriftsteller, Berlin, Walter De Gruyter, 2007; Catherine E. Rigby, Topographies of the Sacred: The Poetics of 
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modes of inquiry that attempt to understand nature as a whole. These reflections also set the 
stage for his later work, such as the renowned Kosmos, while also leaving a lasting 
impression on other explorers, scientists, philosophers, and artists. Indeed, Humboldt’s 
steadfast study of the relationship between living and non-living components of regional 
environments often earns him credit as the world’s first ecologist, even though the term 
“ecology” was not coined until 1866 by Ernst Haeckel. 
 When examining Humboldt’s contributions within the broader history of the idea of 
physiognomics, scholars tend to emphasize the ways that Humboldt’s work diverged from 
Lavater’s work rather than characteristics that they shared. For instance, Humboldt was 
primarily interested in the physiognomy of landscapes rather than that of human subjects. 
Furthermore, he was much more interested in reading to determine the Gesamteindruck (total 
impression) imparted on humans by particular landscapes than deciphering which inherent 
qualities that landscape might be expressing. His goal was to understand the regional 
landscape’s unique effect on the moral character of its inhabitants rather than to try to deduce 
the inherent moral character of humans based on their physical features. For Humboldt, the 
practice of reading landscape physiognomy allowed one to read the “Naturcharakter 
verschiedener Weltgegenden” as intimately related with “der Geschichte des 
Menschengeschlechtes und mit der seiner Kultur.”78 Emphasizing the role of the environment 
in influencing the direction of human history, he notes: 
Denn wenn auch der Anfang dieser Kultur nicht durch physische Einflüsse allein 
bestimmt wird, so hängt doch die Richtung derselben, so hängen Volkscharakter 
                                                                                                                                                  
Stuttgart and Tübingen, J.G. Cott’scher Verlag, 1849: 173. Accessed 11/20/2012. 
http://books.google.com/books?id=EHEfx9uyA_0C&pg=PA176&dq=%22jede+zone+hat,%22+humboldt&hl=
en&sa=X&ei=a1DXUIioCYzy9gTB7YCwBA&ved=0CEQQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
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düstere oder heitere Stimmung der Menschheit großenteils von klimatischen 
Verhältnissen ab.79  
  
Rather than risking Humboldt’s humanist reputation by putting him in dialogue with 
Lavaterian physiognomics, scholars have mostly examined this approach to reading nature 
alongside Goethean optics and morphology, which are “concerned with the way in which 
natural phenomena disclose or […] ‘give’ themselves to a perceiving subject, who is, in turn, 
subtly altered in the encounter.”80  
Humboldt’s idea of physiognomy also draws on a particularly Romantically inflected 
notion of Stimmung, which posits a sense of attunement between humans and nature that is 
the result of a presumed primordial kinship between the two. The lingering sense of 
attunement allows nature to “speak” to humans by stirring their emotions, but the humans 
also have to be attentive to nature for this “communication” to succeed. For the Romantics, 
true scientific inquiry involved this subject-entanglement. The scientific eye was like the eye 
of the painter, in that it required, as Rigby puts it, “that one immerse oneself in the ambience 
of a place, attending to the manner in which one thereby became attuned (gestimmt), 
physically and psychically, to the mode or mood (Stimmung) of its givenness.”81 Rigby thus 
views the Humboldtian engagement with the notion of physiognomy as a reworking of 
Schelling’s Weltseele, but one that reveals particular manifestations in particular local 
geographic regions.  
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 Despite stark differences in both assumption and intent between Lavater’s and 
Humboldt’s ideas of physiognomics, their ideas do bear some similarities that are significant 
for Droste’s aesthetic as well. For instance, both men were very invested in the notion of 
science as a process of reading and both operated under the assumption that humans and 
nature are “readable” objects of study in general. Whether or not the influence can be traced 
back to Lavater or Humboldt, readability plays a crucial role in Droste’s exploration of the 
topic of science and her approach to natural description in general. Furthermore, the 
emphasis on readability is particularly interesting in this scientific context because it further 
emphasizes the increasing sense of urgency over the first half of the 19th century for 
maintaining empiricism and holistic or ecological approaches as compatible.82 For instance, 
Lavater and Humboldt were, on the one hand, both dedicated to cataloging individual 
external features of their objects of study in a rigorous, empirical manner. On the other hand, 
their insistence on reading these details within the context of a broader system is significant 
because it resists a mechanistic understanding of cause and effect.83 Humboldt notes, for 
instance, the ways in which a “student of physiognomy” differs from a “systematizing 
botanist” schooled in the Linnaean tradition: 
Aber der botanische Systematiker trennt eine Menge von Pflanzengruppen welche 
der Physiognomiker sich gezwungen sieht, miteinander zu verbinden. Wo die 
Gewächse sich als Massen darstellen, fließen Umrisse und Verteilung der Blätter, 
Gestalt der Stämme und Zweige ineinander.84 
   
                                                
82 I am using “ecological” in the most general sense to denote the relationship between organisms and their 
environment. 
 
83  For Lavater, the physical characteristics of a human face were to be considered first individually, then in 
their entirety and thereby “evaluated” against an ideal. For Humboldt, the physiognomist was to document 
individual characteristics but not simply by identifying individual species.  
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As mentioned previously, this observation stems from the assumption that the scientist-as-
reader can be trained to acquire a particular attunement to the object of study (whether 
human or nature) in order to assess its character as a whole. It also relates in many ways to 
Romantic aesthetics, and indeed, Humboldt at times compares his work to that of a landscape 
painter.85  
 If we return to the opening passage of Droste’s Westfälische Schilderungen with this 
context in mind, we notice that her usage of physiognomy is primarily concerned with 
outlining the face of the Westphalian landscape in terms of its vegetative, mineral, and 
climatic patterns. Yet, these features are also bound up with the temperament, appearance, 
and activities of the people native to the region.86  
Wenn wir von Westphalen reden, so begreifen wir darunter einen großen, sehr 
verschiedenen Landstrich, verschieden nicht nur den weit auseinander liegenden 
Stammwurzeln seiner Bevölkerung nach, sondern auch in Allem, was die 
Physiognomie des Landes bildet, oder wesentlich darauf zurückwirkt, in Clima, 
Naturform, Erwerbsquellen, und, als Folge dessen, in Cultur, Sitten, Charakter, 
und selbst Körperbildung seiner Bewohner […]87 
 
She asserts that every local region has its own character, which is expressed not only in the 
arrangement of the landscape’s various elements but also in the organization and external 
appearance of the life forms that inhabit it. As such, her assumptions appear to very distinctly 
echo the Humboldt’s remarks in his Ideen zur Physiognomie der Gewächse: 
Jede Zone hat, außer den ihr eigenen Vorzügen, auch ihren eigentümlichen 
Charakter. Die urtiefe Kraft der Organisation fesselt, [...] alle tierische und 
vegetabilische Gestaltung an feste, ewig wiederkehrende Typen. Sowie man an 
einzelnen organischen Wesen eine bestimmte Physiognomie erkennt, wie 
                                                
85 Reminiscent of Carus’s landscape aesthetics, which will be addressed more thoroughly my chapter on Stifter.  
 
86 Droste calls her work “scientific-historical,” but it soon becomes clear that her work makes an attempt at what 
we would now call ethnographic work.  
 
87 Historisch-kritische Ausgabe 5,1: 45. 
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beschreibende Botanik und Zoologie, im engeren Sinne des Wortes, 
Zergliederung der Tier und Pflanzenformen sind, so gibt es auch eine 
Naturphysiognomie, welche jedem Himmelsstriche ausschließlich zukommt.88 
 
As we will see throughout Droste’s piece, in attempting to capture the uniqueness of each 
region of Westphalia, she too appears to be seeking out that “Naturphysiognomie, welche 
jedem Himmelsstriche ausschließlich zukommt.” Likewise, she appears to feel compelled to 
characterize each locale’s inhabitants as equally unique and distinctive, regardless of whether 
or not these observations hold up as “empirically” correct. It will also become clear that, not 
only does Droste identify the physical environment’s unique influence on the moral/psychic 
world of its inhabitants (as Humboldt might have89) but she also attempts, in a very 
methodical way, to draw connections between the external physical characteristics of the 
landscapes and the external physical appearances of its inhabitants. In Droste’s 
physiognomy, then, the surface appearances of both nature and humans are “readable,” and 
they are to be read together. This hermeneutic approach, however, often creates 
contradictions that riddle the text with subtle moments of dissonance. For instance, the 
bodies and faces of the native Westphalians themselves can be read in order to determine 
their presumptive moral characteristics, but Droste’s reading also occasionally changes 
direction and attempts to explain these moral characteristics by linking them to the affective 
capacity of the landscapes in which they live. Such a sense of confusion surrounding the 
mechanisms of cause and effect when addressing questions of nature and human nature 
indicate that she is grappling with the difficulties of mapping out an ecological web of 
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relations in an age that increasingly privileges mechanistic cause-and-effect explanations of 
the world.  
 After Droste’s opening paragraphs, in which her descriptions of human and natural 
elements present the two as largely entangled and interconnected, she claims to proceed to an 
examination of the landscape “unabhängig von ihren Bewohnern, in sofern die Einwirkung 
derselben (durch Cultur etc .) auf deren äußere Form dieses erlaubt.“90 With this statement, 
she briefly acknowledges the superficial alterations to the face of the land that have occurred 
through human influence, thus providing us a glimpse into a subtle environmental critique 
that occasionally surfaces throughout the piece. I will return to this issue at a later point in the 
chapter. What is important for the moment, however, is the paradox that, while humans 
indeed possess the ability to distort the natural shape of the landscape through their various 
economic activities, they are nonetheless perceived in many ways as natural extensions of 
that land that also become damaged when it is damaged and altered when it is altered.  
 Droste begins her attempt to capture the true character of the Westphalian landscape 
by describing the northwestern-most reach of region, namely the Dukedom of Cleve. She 
claims that it actually belongs to the Rhineland rather than Westphalia; but, regardless of this 
cartographical oversight, she begins here and characterizes it as “eine trostlose Gegend” with 
“unabsehbare Sandflächen, nur am Horizonte hier und dort von kleinen Waldungen und 
einzelnen Baumgruppen unterbrochen.“91 What at first appears to be a critical assessment, 
perhaps even an outright rejection of this area, surprisingly transitions into a less discrediting 
description: the landscape is not so much unattractive as it is sleepy and lethargic, moving 
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with so much effort that “[d]ie von Seewinden geschwängerte Luft scheint nur im Schlafe 
aufzuzucken.“92 Although Droste had proposed that she restrict herself to landscape 
description, she cannot help but include here a few observations about the temperament of 
the region’s inhabitants, which, remarkably, parallel her description of the land in many 
ways. Just as she describes the region as “lau” and “träumerisch,” for instance, she 
characterizes a shepherd she encounters “in halb somnambüler Beschaulichkeit” with his 
sheep and “gleichfalls somnambüler Hund.“93 The inert qualities of the landscape and climate 
appear to set the stage for the inhabitants and animals, who are equally unwilling or unable to 
move and interact: they pay her so little attention that she simply continues on with no hope 
for further interaction. However, not only do the people and animals populating this area 
behave in tandem with their environment, but they also appear to resemble it physically as 
well. In fact, it was “die aus den seltenen Hütten immer blonder und weicher 
hervorschauenden Kindergesichten“ that had signaled to her that she had crossed the border 
into Cleve in the first place. As the landscape is covered in sand, it too is blond, and the 
topography is described as bearing mild rather than sharp features. In the end, Droste reads 
the paleness and the mild features of both the people and the land as a quality of 
“jungfräulicher Einsamkeit.“94 Whatever this assessment might turn out to mean for her, the 
self-assured tone with which she aligns the physiognomy and the “temperament” of the land 
and its natives lends insight into her anthropological assumptions. For Droste, there is a 
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natural kinship between humans and their native regions in both physical appearance and 
demeanor.  
 This trend persists throughout the first section of the essay: landscapes are presented 
in terms of their various topographical features, and their inhabitants’ qualities are examined 
in relationship to them. Perhaps the most interesting observation with regard to this 
relationship, however, is revealed at the beginning of the second section, where Droste states 
that she will conclude dealing with the landscape itself and return to the question of the 
“Charakter der Eingeborenen” as well as the “gewöhnlich[en] Einfluss der Natur auf ihre 
Zöglinge.“95 Yet, what she elaborates here is not simply another description of homologous 
physiognomies of humans and nature, but, rather, a speculative explanation for an interesting 
incongruity that she discovers: Why, she asks, do the Paderbornians, native to the gently 
rolling landscape of northern Westphalia, seem to bear the “Stempel des Bergbewohners, 
sowohl moralisch als körperlich“, which one rightly ought to associate with the people of the 
mountainous Sauerland region?96 These observations contradict her entire method of reading 
thus far, which was based on the assumption of a natural, visible kinship and sense of 
belonging between humans and their respective “native“ regions. The Sauerlander’s true 
body form, she claims, is colossal in height and build, similar to the mountains from which 
he comes. His features are not “geschmeidig“ but sharp, like the jagged landscape in which 
he has grown up.97 Moreover, he exhibits an “eiserne Gesundheit,“ a metaphor that associates 
physiological health and strength with the abundance of iron ore resources in his 
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mountainous environment.98 The fact that the Paderbornians’ appearance represents these 
qualities more than that of the Sauerlanders presents a true puzzle; however, she quickly 
dismisses this inconsistency as an anomaly. She wonders if one can attribute it to the fact that 
the Sauerlanders are active tradesmen and thus spend a great deal of time outside their native 
landscape, or the fact that they receive many foreign (presumably, often Paderbornian) guests 
in their communities and tend to engage in “auswärtige Heirathen“ as well. Her lack of 
hesitation in placing two very different explanations alongside one another is fascinating: 
what changes the physical appearance of these people is either intermarriage or living in a 
different setting. This rhetorical detour sheds light on the urgency with which Droste is 
attempting to understand the puzzling relationship between humans and nature. Rather than 
conclude what one might expect—that the descendants of a particular tribe, identifiable by 
their shared familial features, simply left their home—she suggests that merely spending 
some time in other physical environments has caused their bodies to physically conform to 
those environments. This idea, once again, resonates with the notion of Stimmung—that 
humans “attune“ themselves to their natural environments psychically and emotionally—but 
it also adds a physical component: that changing one’s environment can also provoke 
physical changes.99  
 Surprisingly, the contradictory explanations Droste provides for these mismatched 
appearances—mixed blood and changed habitat—are combined into one very strange 
metaphorical image: rather than dwell on the phenomenon that this mountain clan’s blood 
“sich täglich mehr verdünn[t]” because they stray from their homeland, she notes that we 
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should perhaps be even more astonished at “die Kraft einer Ader […], die, von so vielen 
Quellen verwässert, doch noch durchgängig einen scharfen, festen Strich zeichnet, wie der 
Rhein durch den Bodensee.”100 This image, like so much of Droste’s work, reveals a startling 
association of biological and geological form that simultaneously naturalizes the human 
world and anthropomorphizes the non-human natural world. Here, the shape of the body is 
not only influenced by its native landscape, but the body itself is figured metaphorically like 
the ecology of a landscape, with its veins resembling rivers. For a moment, the two are 
superimposed in the imagination, lending further emphasis to the notion that humans and 
nature are reflections of one another. What is more, the rhetorical move in which she notes 
how surprising it is that the Sauerlander features have not been diluted further contributes to 
the naturalization of the physiognomic process: just like the Rhine is a distinct, legible border 
landmark created by nature, so too, are the “scharf[e], fest[e] Striche” of the Sauerlander 
natural signs that demarcate a distinct group and make it readable. 
 We can now return to the question of the dilemma presented by physiognomic 
readings: although the object of the reading is conceived of as part of an organic system, the 
information gleaned about that particular component within the system is often subject to 
individualized categorization nonetheless. Although Droste wholeheartedly subscribes to the 
notion of an organic model for understanding the relationship between Westphalia and its 
people in this text, the moment she attempts to render them permanently legible and 
categorizable, contradictions begin to emerge. These tensions reflect her general ambivalence 
between static and dynamic conceptions of nature and anticipate similar discrepancies in her 
lyrical work. Perhaps more importantly, her emphasis on the distinct recognizability of 
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natural and human features sheds light on her reaction to the massive political, economic, and 
environmental changes looming at the horizon of her own era.101 The text itself is written for 
the purpose of capturing and thus “preserving” the distinctness of a region with its various 
local communities and cultures, all of which, she anticipates, will no longer be recognizable 
in 40 years. And while it is easy to dismiss her anxiety regarding the “dilution” of the 
Sauerlanders’ blood as a form of racism, it contributes to a broader picture in which fears 
about homogenization in general are expressed. In this piece, it is not only regional 
populations but also landscapes that are being stripped of their peculiarities and thereby made 
homogeneous: as Droste is writing, deciduous forests all over Germany are being replaced 
with more profitable pines, and meadows are being converted to monocultural grain fields. 
These changes upset her not only because of her nostalgia, but also, apparently, because she 
imagines humans and nature to be so in tandem with one another that these drastic changes in 
environment will radically alter the people who live there and thus also their unique customs 
and culture. 
 
Die Mergelgrube 
 
  Droste’s poem “Die Mergelgrube,”102 written in 1842 and published in the Gedichte 
collection of 1844, provides a very different set of insights into nature and an approach to 
“reading” nature that bears little resemblance to the physiognomic method detailed above. 
The poem presents an intimate encounter with the natural world in which the lyrical subject 
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102 All citations of this poem are taken from: Historisch-kritische Ausgabe 1,1.  
 
  
 73 
enters into a cavernous marl pit103 and marvels at the “Trödelbude” of impressive stone 
deposits that the earth lays bare to her there. Caves such as these were popular destinations 
for fossil and stone enthusiasts throughout Droste’s lifetime. Purportedly, a number of pits 
and quarries existed near Rüschhaus, the Hülshoff family’s country estate near Münster, 
making it an ideal area for natural history enthusiasts like Droste herself to explore.104 Rather 
than providing us with a description of the surface topography of the region that she is 
traversing, as in the Westfälische Schilderungen, however, “Die Mergelgrube” presents a 
lyrical subject who descends into a subterranean realm with the intention of exploring its 
depths. Here, he105 can attempt to “read” the arrangement of the mineral deposits displayed 
inside the pit, in the way that a geologist might. While the lyrical voice does not make 
explicit note of any distinct layers present, he repeatedly calls attention to the great diversity 
of colors, textures, and patterns that nature has laid out in seemingly helter-skelter fashion: 
“Blau, gelb, zinnoberrot, als ob zur Gant […] Kein Pardelfell war je so bunt gefleckt / Kein 
Rebhuhn, keine Wachtel so gescheckt.” Yet, because he points out that such a marvelous 
display is made possible by inserting a spade “drei Spannen in den Sand” (about two feet 
down) and extracting a “Schnitt,” or cross section, of the earth, it is relatively clear that he 
has at least a superficial knowledge about stratigraphy, the process by which geologists 
                                                
103 Marl, or marlstone, is a fine-grained sedimentary rock containing clay, silt, and limestone. It was often 
excavated and used by farmers as a fertilizer and conditioner for lime-deficient soils. Note that the German 
word for marl, “Mergel,” is also the surname of the Paderbornian protagonist Friedrich Mergel of Die 
Judenbuche. The crime story was composed between 1837 and 1841 and published in its entirety for the first 
time in 1842. Droste allegedly changed the name of the poem from “Die Sandgrube” to “Die Mergelgrube” 
(Nettesheim 90-91).  
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examine patterns of rock layers to determine past geological events.106 It is not unlikely that 
Droste was familiar with the phenomenon of stratigraphical mapping, as these techniques had 
largely been developed in Thuringia and Saxony in the late 18th century as the mining 
industry there flourished and geology (then called “geognosy”) began to emerge as a distinct 
discipline. Likewise, Droste’s home region of Westphalia, particularly the Sauerland region, 
had a history of mining iron ore and other metals, as she mentions in Westfälische 
Schilderungen.107 It is likely that geological concerns were of large importance to the people 
inhabiting this area as well and thus presented material for literary reflection. While 
Westfälische Schilderungen exhibited a kind of horizontal-spatial reading privileging 
questions of ecology, “Die Mergelgrube” makes it immediately clear that Droste is also 
invested in exploring a vertical-temporal reading that concerns itself with questions of 
geology and deep history. 
 The second strophe of the poem opens with a survey of the different rocks present—
gneiss, feldspar, mica, porphyry, flint—a chaos of material that the lyrical subject can 
impressively identify and classify by name. However, mere naming does not appear to 
suffice; his next concern is one of legibility. How might he decipher the story that this 
arrangement of rocks wants to tell about the history of the earth? Appropriately, what follows 
the poetic cataloguing of rocks that initiates this strophe is a string of references to Abraham 
Werner’s theory of Neptunism. This theory maintained that the Earth’s present geological 
form had been created exclusively through a long process of precipitation and sedimentation 
                                                
 106 For an in-depth discussion of stratigraphy as an important literary motif in English and German 
Romanticism, see: Noah Heringman, Romantic Rocks, Aesthetic Geology, Ithaca, NY, Cornell UP, 2004. For 
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after a great universal flood (usually aligned with the Genesis flood narrative). A number of 
German writers and thinkers, including Goethe and Novalis, had studied under Werner at the 
Freiberg School of Mines in Saxony and had been fervent supporters of his theories. It is, 
therefore, not surprising that Droste would begin with the Neptunist interpretation of the 
earth’s history, particularly given her religiosity and the theory’s concordance with the 
creation narrative of Genesis. Proponents of Neptunism often believed that gravelly mineral 
deposits such as marl pits had been formed as flood waters carried sediment from other 
regions and released them haphazardly across the globe as the present-day continents built up 
from the floor of the prediluvial oceans.108 Likewise, in attempting to “read” the rocks’ 
history through their erratic placement, the lyrical subject of “Die Mergelgrube” cannot help 
but impose a Biblical narrative on the space: the “Schleusen” opened, dissolved the earth’s 
order as it had existed, and then, as Noah’s ark landed at Ararat: “eine fremde, üppige Natur, 
/ Ein neues Leben quoll aus neuen Stoffen.”109 This Biblical line of interpretation is also 
expressed in the latter part of the poem’s second strophe, which reflects on the rocks’ 
foreignness: “Nur wenige [von diesen Steinen] hat dieser Grund gezeugt.” To the lyrical 
subject, these stones do not appear to be “native species” to this area, but rather, migrant 
foundlings brought in by the “zorn’ge Welle.” Each stone, he asserts in the third strophe, is 
an orphan, “weil von der Brust / Der mütterlichen sie gerissen sind / In fremde Wiege, 
schlummernd unbewusst.” While the idea of a Findling is used here metaphorically to 
explore questions of origins, it is also a technical term (“erratic” in English) referring to 
stones whose lithology indicates that they originate from “parent bedrock” geographically 
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remote from their present location.110 Erratic rocks can range in size from the smaller 
fragments we learn about in “Die Mergelgrube,” to large blocks, such as the boulders that 
feature in her poem “Der Hünenstein”; however, the means by which these rocks were 
transported was the topic of much debate during most of Droste’s lifetime. Her usage of the 
term here and in other contexts strongly suggests that she had some level of familiarity with 
contemporary geological theories surrounding these questions. 
 The anthropomorphizing of the foundling rocks at the end of the third strophe of “Die 
Mergelgrube” also glimpses a momentary return to the physiognomic work of Westfälische 
Schilderungen, as this heathland “orphanage” contains foundlings from diverse origins: “Die 
Mohren, Blaßgesicht, und rote Haut / Gleichförmig mit dem braunen Kleide!” This strophe 
resonates with Westfälische Schilderungen because the rocks bear the mark of foreign origins 
and create a sense of visual dissonance for the observer by openly displaying their own 
alienness within these surroundings. The lyrical voice’s observation that these rocks are now 
embedded in a unifying medium of soil and thus clothed in the same uniform of a “braunen 
Kleide” reflects, on the one hand, concerns about the homogenization of unique regional 
cultures in favor of a national culture, as well as a sense of alarm about the increasing level 
of uniformity in the landscapes that these local communities inhabit. On the other hand, his 
lamenting speculation that these rocks’ dislocation was caused by a Biblical event points 
longingly to a moment of Biblical prehistory (whether pre-Flood or pre-Fall) in which the 
scattered rocks—and by extension, the scattered human races—enjoyed a state of unity. For 
the lyrical subject, then, it seems that this original unity is forever lost and no longer 
accessible. Despite this unresolved contradiction, which is representative of Droste’s 
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notorious ambivalence, it is significant to note that these human and geological histories are 
almost always presented as deeply intertwined, and—for poetic purposes—often 
interchangeable. 
 The idea of the Findling also resonates with another important layer of scientific 
discourse during the early 19th century that sought to determine not only how geological 
origins related to human origins but also how they related to the origins of other biological 
life forms. Geological and paleontological discoveries as well as new stratigraphical dating 
technologies were beginning to create obstacles for scientists who wished to adhere to 
religiously informed calculations of the timeline of the earth’s history. These scientists, often 
including Neptunists, were gradually forced to adopt a more flexible interpretation of the 
various events involved in the Genesis creation narrative in order to accommodate these 
scientific findings and the various theories that emerged out of them. For instance, the 
discovery of fossils belonging to large, monstrous creatures that no longer seemed to inhabit 
the earth had complicated both Neptunist and Biblical narratives; many scientists throughout 
the 18th century had assumed the bones belonged to mythic animals that had existed before 
the Deluge and had been intentionally wiped out by it. When the superficial gravel deposits 
in which many of these fossils were found to be too shallow to match estimations for the era 
of the Flood, scientists began searching for other extinction theories that could be reconciled 
with the Biblical reading of history. Scientists like the French comparative anatomist 
Georges Cuvier entertained theories that the earth’s history had been punctuated by a number 
of powerful local-scale catastrophes that may have caused these mysterious creatures to 
become extinct after the Flood.111 Glacial drift and ice age theories also began to gain new 
                                                
111 Georges Cuvier had formulated these theories to help explain extinction. 
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traction in this context, as they helped explain, for instance, why mammoth bones were 
discovered in relatively young gravel deposits. Crucially, these post-Flood disaster theories 
also contributed to the preservation of Biblical timelines of the earth’s history because the 
disappearance of these strange life forms could now be accounted for by more recent 
disasters.  
 According to Martin Rudwick in his important work The Meaning of Fossils, 
mammoth fossils, found throughout Siberia and Northern Europe during the 18th century, 
were a particularly interesting case in this context. Namely, these fossils sparked a debate 
about the possibility of extinction when Georges Cuvier determined in 1796 that they did, in 
fact, point to the existence of a separate species that no longer existed on earth.112 It appears 
to be no coincidence that Droste included a reference to mammoth fossils in “Die 
Mergelgrube,” as the mystery surrounding the mammoth’s existence was at the center of 
scientific debates concerning the progression of both biological and geological history. 
Cuvier’s work engaged scientists in a debate that dominated paleontology from the late 
1790s to the 1820s. In this context, three possible explanations for the disappearance of 
earlier animals forms were under review: they had either become extinct (as Cuvier 
believed), had undergone transmutation (as Jean-Baptiste Lamarck believed), or they existed 
in an obscure place on earth where they were yet to be discovered. The latter was deemed 
least likely, and no one suspected that the former two were mutually inclusive, and thus the 
great Cuvier-Lamarck debate emerged. Because Cuvier’s position was informed by an 
understanding of nature based on the fixity of species, he maintained that extinction was the 
only option.113 Although Cuvier is said to have disregarded the need to reconcile science with 
                                                
112 Rudwick 107. 
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religion, his theory was popular because his understanding of species as a “temporally stable 
unit of nature” corresponds with the notion of a static order of creative design.114 Lamarck, 
on the other hand, had an opposing view of nature that led him to believe that species 
division did not actually exist. Rather, he claimed, living organisms existed along a scale of 
higher and lower forms in a process of continual flux; his dynamic conception of nature, 
alongside Naturphilosophie, was often written off by Cuvier as unscientific.115 Both theories 
exhibit the fact that, for a time, paleontology—which informed the fields of biology and 
geology in crucial ways—continuously uncovered troubling contradictions in existing 
approaches to natural inquiry. “Die Mergelgrube” suggests that Droste’s passion for fossil 
collecting was not a mere hobby but, rather, a window into the kaleidoscopic new world of 
scientific knowledge that was emerging during her lifetime. 
 Although it is difficult to know to what extent Droste was aware of early 19th century 
biological discourse, it is clear that the petrified remains of past biological life forms 
provoked challenging questions about environments and environmental conditions that 
resonated throughout society. Both Cuvier and Lamarck realized that organisms and 
environments were closely attuned to one another and fit together like pieces of a puzzle. 
Because Cuvier believed in the fixity of species, organisms (in his interpretation) were 
constrained by their environments. Consequently, he believed that an alteration in the 
surrounding conditions of an organism would either cause it to perish or prompt it to migrate 
to more suitable conditions. Lamarck, on the other hand, thought that the specific conditions 
of an environment prompted organisms to “use or disuse” particular organs and thus adapt to 
                                                                                                                                                  
113 Rudwick 109. 
 
114 Rudwick 153-54. 
 
115 Ibid. 
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the conditions at hand. These altered traits were then believed to be passed on to their 
offspring. Each conception of biological development had interesting implications based on 
its assumptions and conclusions. In assuming the fixity of species, Cuvier’s explanations for 
displaced and anomalous fossils naturalized not only the idea of extinction but also the idea 
of migration in the case of environmental change. However, if organisms were not 
understood to be fixed to a species and were thus able mutate, as Lamarck contended, then 
adaptation, rather than migration, became naturalized.  
 The most crucial issue here is that, in both theories, it is the variability of the natural 
environment that provokes a reaction in organisms. If we project these ideas metaphorically 
onto the human realm, as I believe Droste was fond of doing, her fears about the extinction of 
regional culture become apparent, particularly if one recalls the section of Westfälische 
Schilderungen in which she tries to account for discrepancies in the physical appearance of 
the Sauerlanders and the Paderbornians. When used at a metaphorical level to explore the 
relationship between humans and their specific environments in an ethnographical way, these 
theories point to major consequences: because regional traditions are so anchored in a sense 
of place, if environments happen to change, either a migration or a shift in the regional 
culture is inevitable. For Droste, who often expressed her concern about the disappearance of 
local traditions, physical alterations to the place anchoring that tradition guaranteed either 
migration or a corresponding change in the nature of the people, both of which would 
undermine the stability of those long-held traditions. This is not surprising, considering that 
Droste’s lifespan coincided with the beginnings of a modern economy in Westphalia, 
including landscape-altering changes such as the introduction of railroad lines, engineered 
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forestry operations, and large-scale farming.116 These observations are supported by Droste’s 
impulse throughout Westfälische Schilderungen to condemn the environmental alterations 
occurring in Westphalia, such as replacing deciduous forests with more profitable pines, or 
expanding agriculture to “endlose Getreidseen.”117 Her message, even without considering 
this scientific discourse, seems to be clear: changing a landscape will necessarily change the 
people who inhabit it. 
  While the Findling discussion in earlier strophes of “Die Mergelgrube” seemed to 
lament the disintegration of nature and called upon science to reconstruct the story and 
reassemble the pieces, the image of nature that we encounter in the fourth strophe shows a 
sudden transformation. Nature is not simply scattered and silent, an elusive secret for humans 
to ponder: it is now also dynamic and communicative—but dying. This change in perspective 
is already announced by a rhetorical shift in which the lyrical subject begins referring to 
himself in the first person for the first time. Moreover, when he does, his position in the cave 
appears to represent an important threshold: 
  Tief ins Gebröckel, in die Mergelgrube 
  War ich gestiegen, denn der Wind zog scharf; 
  Dort saß ich seitwärts in der Höhlenstube, 
  Und horchte träumend auf der Luft Geharf. 
  Es waren Klänge, wie wenn Geisterhall 
  Melodisch schwinde im zerstörten All; 
 
He is sitting “seitwärts” in the cave, one side of his body turned towards the outside world, 
one towards the cave’s mysterious contents. Momentarily, his empirical eye refrains from 
scrutinizing the objects of his study, and his ear becomes the primary provider of sensory 
                                                
116 “Although the geometric, uniform forest was intended to facilitate management and extraction, it quickly 
became a powerful aesthetic as well. The visual sign of the well-managed forest, in Germany and in the many 
settings where scientific forestry took hold, came to be the regularity and neatness of its appearance. […] The 
more uniform the forest, the greater the possibilities for centralized management” (Scott 18). 
 
117 Droste 48.  
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information. What his senses convey is a vibrant, animated natural world outside the cave. 
He listens, “träumend auf der Luft Geharf,” an unambiguous Romantic trope pointing to 
nature’s capacity for vibrancy and animism as well as its ability to “speak to” humans by 
stirring emotions. His attunement to the wind here is reminiscent of the concept of Stimmung 
mentioned above, which, at least in the Romantic context, assumes that this capacity for 
attunement can be attributed to a common origin between man and nature, a primordial 
kinship. The Findling lament echoing from the opening strophes also has resonance in this 
context. That is, in the Romantic understanding of human-nature relations, humans have 
estranged themselves from nature by trying to become masters of it. By submitting it to a 
process of objectification, man has affirmed the subject-object divide and thus also nature’s 
alienness.  
 As mentioned before, the lyrical subject is lamenting more than the mere 
fragmentation of nature in this second phase of the poem. In increasing intensity, he 
introduces signs of its death. Nature speaks to him quite spiritedly in the beginning of this 
section through the wind. Throughout the strophe, however, the general sense of its animated 
presence fades. At the end of this episode, he is desperate to hear its message but receives no 
response: “Findlinge zog ich Stück auf Stück hervor / Und lauschte, lauschte mit 
berauschtem Ohr.” In his scientific pursuit to examine these fossilized remains, to classify 
them, call them by name, and possibly take them into his own possession (in the first section 
of the poem), he has cut himself off from them by asserting himself as master and knower. 
That part of nature still clinging to life now goes increasingly silent in his presence, drawing 
away from him and settling down into the ashes of its own demise: “Mir überm Haupt ein 
Rispeln und ein Schaffen, / Als scharre in der Asche man den Funken.”  
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 In the subsequent strophe, he characterizes the marlstone around him as a gray mass, 
“verödet” and “ausgebrannt.” With only the separation of a semicolon, he begins describing 
himself in similar terms, as if nature’s decline also necessarily reflects his own demise. He, 
too, ceases moving, just as the wind dies out and turns “lau.” For the lyrical subject, this 
moment of stillness thus also signals the decline of an era of enchanted nature and human 
attunement to that enchantment. Nature, severed from its kinship to humans through 
detached, objectifying science, now refuses to beckon them into the enchanted state that 
makes poetry possible. Here the lyrical subject lies, closed within himself in a hallucinatory 
state between life and death. He is separated from the animated nature that once spoke to him 
from the outside world; this older model, his poetic self, is now also poised to become a 
fossil in the graveyard of the earth’s past:  
Es ist gewiss, die alte Welt ist hin,   
Ich Petrefakt, ein Mammutsknochen drin! 
Und müde, müde sank ich an den Rand 
Der staub’gen Gruft; da rieselte der Grand  
Auf Haar und Kleider mir, ich ward so grau 
Wie eine Leich’ im Katakomben-Bau 
 
The only sign of hope in this passage resides in the fact that the last sparks (“Funken”) of life 
within the lyrical subject and within the ashes of nature have not yet completely died out. In 
particular, the reader is left with the vague sense that the lyrical subject is clinging to this last 
spark in himself: “Ich selber schien ein Funken mir, der doch / Erzittert in der toten Asche 
noch, / Ein Findling im zerfallnen Weltenbau.” Furthermore, the hypothetical similes 
introducing the events of this passage suggest that the impending moment of death has not 
actually set in but merely seems “as if” it has. A narrow possibility of hope for the poet may 
still exist. 
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   The lyrical subject’s insistence on dwelling at this threshold has a number of possible 
implications, even, perhaps, for a metalevel discussion of Droste’s work. That is, Droste 
appears to be urgently preoccupied with her own “categorization”—with the legibility of her 
own position within German literary history. To what generation of writers does she properly 
belong? This dilemma is perhaps most clearly articulated at the close of the previous strophe: 
“Wie Neues quoll und Altes sich zersetzte - / War ich der erste Mensch oder der Letzte?” Is 
she the last of the great generation of Romantic geniuses? The last of a generation for whom 
science and art were considered codependent? The last of a generation of scientific thinkers 
for whom knowledge could be gleaned without subjecting nature to the petrifying forces of 
the objective gaze?118 The lyrical subject’s position at this threshold seems, in some ways 
(but not all), to present a reversal of the Romantic trope of the cave, as exemplified in 
Tieck’s Bergwerke zu Falun. In Tieck’s work, the protagonist is drawn to his demise by the 
enchanting qualities of nature inside the cave, such as the stones’ mesmerizing beauty and a 
bewitching voice from below that activates his desire and beckons him to thrust himself into 
the womb of the earth. For the subject of “Die Mergelgrube,” at least in the initial three 
strophes, the pit is a place for scientific observation and fact. While some poetic speculation 
exists, it is informative and pedagogical, given in the second person. It is only when the wind 
stirs his imagination from outside that the poem transitions into the more subjective first-
person voice and he begins to imagine himself petrifacted and buried in the earth. Rather than 
bury himself in the past (alongside Romanticism), he regains his sobriety at the last moment 
and exits the cave. But it was the Wissbegier, that intense hunger for scientific knowledge 
                                                
118 The medusa head she references in the poem is particularly interesting for this question. While the “medusa 
fossil” represents a real paleontological finding--something like a prehistoric jellyfish--it also represents 
petrifaction as part of an aesthetic discourse: what does it mean to capture reality with art? Does art face the 
same dangers as science with regard to killing its subjects?  
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that brought him into the cave in the first place. The message is ambivalent: both succumbing 
to the unbridled imagination and devoting oneself to cold, distanced, empirical science can 
lead to one’s undoing, whether that includes a tragic fall into an unknown abyss or becoming 
sealed off from the world in a process of petrifaction. In this space, at this threshold, he had 
hoped to find a common ground where science and poetic reflection could co-exist, but in the 
end, as with all attempts at reconciliation in this poem, this hope for unity is just a dream. 
 As he awakens from his trance and reemerges into the outside world, he stumbles 
upon a knitting shepherd who has cast aside Bertuch’s Naturgeschichte in the moss beside 
him. When the lyrical subject asks, “Les’t ihr das?” the shepherd claims: “Der lügt mal, 
Herr!! doch das ist just der Spaß!”119 For him, science confounds his simple, literal 
understanding of the Bible because he believes, as many did, that the Flood could not have 
reigned over the earth long enough to transform snakes and bears into stone: “Man weiß ja 
doch, daß alles Vieh versoffen.” When the lyrical subject hands him the medusa fossil and 
says, “Schau, / Das war ein Tier,” he laughs long and hard. The final line is ambiguous 
because, in relaying that the shepherd thinks he is mad, the poem makes it unclear whether or 
not he is also admitting to his own insanity: “Daß ich verrückt sei, hätt’ er nicht gedacht! -” 
He longs, perhaps, for an era that did not have to concern itself with this influx of puzzling 
scientific evidence, before nature was so overdetermined, combed over, and picked apart. 
And although these final strophes of the poem return to the narrative that sets scientific and 
religious interpretations of the earth’s origins in dichotomous opposition to one another, it is 
clear from the poem’s internal episode that “science” by no means connotes a monolithic 
approach, nor does it appear to reveal a unified picture of nature. 
                                                
119 Athough the author herself is female, the lyrical subject is revealed right at the end as a male (Herr), and a 
similar revelation occurs in “Der Hünenstein.”  
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Der Hünenstein 
 
 The poem “Der Hünenstein,”120 composed contemporaneously with “Die 
Mergelgrube” and likewise published under the heading “Die Haidebilder” in the 1844 
Gedichte edition, presents yet another intimate encounter with nature that also involves an 
experience inside a grave.121 However, as the title suggests, the historical narrative that 
Droste maps onto the poem’s outdoor setting does not draw its vision from a Biblical 
tradition, but, rather, an interest in a pagan Germanic past. One feature that it does share with 
“Die Mergelgrube,” however, is its preoccupation with artifacts as hermeneutic keys to 
reading or reconstructing the past. Yet, rather than paleontological, the artifacts in “Der 
Hünenstein” are anthropological in nature. A “Hünenstein,” or “Hünengrab,”122 is a 
megalithic tomb, which is a group of very large stones that were arranged as a burial site 
towards the end of the prehistoric era.123 The term “Hüne” means “giant,” as megalithic 
tombs remained a mystery for centuries and were long alleged to have been built by 
                                                
120 All citations of this poem are taken from: Historisch-kritische Ausgabe 1,2. 
 
121 The choice of a megalithic tomb as a subject of reflection is somewhat reminiscent of Romantic landscapes: 
Caspar David Friedrich completed several “Hünengrab” paintings around 1807. 
 
122 Historisch-kritische Ausgabe 1,2. Droste proposed both terms as titles for the poem, but the editor chose 
“Der Hünenstein.” 
 
123 Interest in anthropology and human artifacts was also on the rise during Droste’s lifetime. Christian 
Jürgensen Thomsen (1788-1865), for instance, invented the method of “closed finds” for dating human artifacts, 
which involved associating artifacts only with others found in the same excavation area. This allowed scientists 
to learn more about human civilization during each period (i.e., the Stone Age, Bronze Age, or Iron Age). His 
results were published in the Ledetraad til Nordisk Oldkyndighed (Guideline to Scandinavian Antiquity) in 
1836 and were broadly influential. Droste herself is extremely interested in the topic of “instruments” and 
tracing human civilization through the advancing phases of human technology while also drawing attention to 
the coinciding shift in relationship between humans and nature. See, for instance: “Die Elemente,” the opening 
poem of the collection “Fels, Wald und See.” The cycle refers to each age of human civilization. 
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prehistoric giants.124 As Nettesheim points out, the origins and functions of these stones were 
a subject of great debate throughout the 1830s and 1840s, making them a timely topic for 
Droste to have contemplated.125 Nettesheim’s analysis shows that the lyrical subject’s 
understanding of the Hünenstein in the poem as both a sacrificial altar and a burial site attests 
to Droste’s nuanced familiarity with both sides of the debate. My analysis, however, is 
concerned with determining how the sudden appearance of the Hünengrab prompts Droste’s 
lyrical figure to read the natural space surrounding him. In exploring this question, I hope to 
uncover how the scientific discourses deemed important to Droste’s work thus far can shed 
new light on the poem.  
 “Der Hünenstein” presents the lyrical subject’s account of the events that led up to a 
strange encounter he experienced one evening while out on a walk. Briefly summarized: he 
leaves his house at twilight, preoccupied, distracted, and paying no regard to the landscape 
around him. He is completely lost in his own thoughts for quite some time, mentally 
composing and recomposing a piece of writing that has been frustrating him because he 
cannot seem to make any forward progress: “Entwürfe wurden aus Entwürfen reif, / Doch, 
wie die Schlange packt den eignen Schweif, / Fand ich mich immer auf derselben Stelle.” 
Suddenly, a beetle lands on his face, which startles him and causes him to fall to the ground. 
When he looks up, he finds himself surrounded by giant rocks and realizes he is in a 
megalithic tomb, which at once thrills him and terrifies him. After a period of contemplation 
about the potential rituals performed at such a site so long ago, a figure in the form of a 
“Riesenleib” draws near, and he scares it away. Precisely at this moment, his footman arrives 
with a light and an umbrella and leads him home to escape the approaching storm. As he 
                                                
124 Nettesheim 75ff. 
 
125 Ibid. 
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turns back to face the tomb one last time before leaving, his vision sobers, and he realizes it 
was just a conventional gravestone covered in dust. 
 The most striking aspect of the poem at second glance is the dissonance between the 
knowing hindsight of the lyrical voice telling the story and his oblivion as a character in the 
story as it unfolds. Namely, the narrating self relays everything that the narrated self fails to 
see as he strides pensively through the nighttime landscape. Perhaps of greatest significance 
is the fact that the lyrical voice describes the land in a state of decrepitude, ghostly and 
gasping for its last breath: “Als wie ein siecher Greis die Heide lag / Und ihr Gestöhn des 
Mooses Teppich regte, / Krankhafte Funken im verwirrten Haar[.]” This observation 
certainly resonates with the general picture of nature in “Die Mergelgrube” as falling into 
ruin. Here, it seems to be perishing because man, like the self-absorbed wandering poet, has 
completed forgotten to acknowledge its existence. Indeed, in his account, the lyrical voice 
notes all of the aspects that he had previously failed to see: the grasses bending in the wind, 
the warm light of the glowworms, the rising moon. It is as if nature in its weak state was 
desperately trying to win his attention, but could to nothing to reach him. In a final act of 
desperation, nature flung a beetle at his face, and it is certainly not a coincidence that it 
landed “[a]ns Auge mir[.]” Finally, his eyes were open.  
 Before examining the lines that follow, it is important to briefly explore the 
crumbling relationship between humans and nature that is presented here. If we follow the 
line of reasoning presented in Westfälische Schilderungen and “Die Mergelgrube,” it seems 
that nature is dying because man, often with the aid of science, has learned to contain its 
powers and subjugate it to his own will. In seeking to learn its secrets and rob it of all 
mystery, he has largely broken its spirit and thus all but laid it to rest. Because nature now 
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poses an increasingly diminishing obstacle on man’s path to omniscience and omnipotence, 
the latter begins to forget it exists, as is evident in the poem. The poem’s setting also seems 
to suggest that the natural setting has been altered for the benefit of man, as the wandering 
poet does not even need to open his eyes to his surroundings in order to traverse them: “Grad 
war der Weg, ganz sonder Steg und Bruch.” One problem persists, however. In this 
landscape, which seems to have lost its vivacity and also its unique character, the poet simply 
cannot produce the work he once presumably could. In the retelling, the lyrical voice 
suggests that, at this moment, he was not able escape a certain conventionality that one 
would associate with a “schlechtes Buch” or a “Pfennigs-Magazin.” He revisited a theme 
he’d tossed out ten different times, whittled away for a while, and discarded it again. This 
vicious cycle had gone on for some time until the beetle landed on his face and virtually 
thrust him at his muse. He looks up from the ground and thinks: 
  Seltsames Lager, das ich mir erkor! 
  Zur Rechten, Linken, schwoll Gestein empor, 
  Gewalt’ge Blöcke, rohe Porphyrborde; 
  Mir überm Haupte reckte sich der Bau, 
  Langhaar’ge Flechten rührten meine Brau’, 
  Und mir zu Füßen schwankt’ die Ginsterlode. 
 
  Ich wußte gleich, es war ein Hünengrab [...] 
    
His initial sense of wonder at this scene is reminiscent of a Romantic encounter with the 
sublime, showcasing a mixture of delight and terror. Moreover, there are signs that this 
moment presents a reunification of man and nature, as the descriptions of human and 
geological bodies begin to overlap once again: 
  Wollüstig saugend an des Graunes Süße 
  Bis es mit eis’gen Krallen mich gepackt, 
  Bis wie ein Gletscher-Bronn des Blutes Takt 
  Aufquoll und hämmert’ unterm Mantelvließe. 
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After this initial reaction, the poet finally begins to recognize the sad state in which nature 
finds itself. In fact, the Hünengrab appears to be a burial site for nature itself—and a site 
where nature is also mourning its own death. The stone cover is like a widow sunken at its 
spouse’s grave, with the moonlight shining down, pale and full of sorrow. Ashes are 
scattered around like cremated ruins, adding weight to another recurring trope in Droste’s 
lyric. With the poet’s attention finally in place, a lapwing screeches from amidst the moss 
and provokes in him a sudden explosion of the imagination. Now that he is attuned to the 
wind, it is “[a]ls bring’ er Kunde aus dem Geisterland[,]” and he is now poised to bring an 
imaginative, poetic eye to the scene in front of him.  
 In the strophe that follows, he speculates about the particulars of the tomb: who 
moved these stones and piled them so high? What did they look like? For what purpose did 
they arrange them like this? Now that the poet has entered into this meditative state, the 
scene also begins to transition from speculative and questioning to descriptive: he visualizes 
the location where the urn must be buried and imagines “ein wildes Herz” within it. He 
senses the wrathful gods and their “Wolkenlocken,” towering from above and rattling the 
stones in demand of their sacrifice. Through his newly activated imagination, the poet thus 
encounters the staging of a deeply polytheistic world—a visceral reminder of a long-gone era 
in which nature was very alive and, indeed, assigned great power and agency.  
 He also witnesses the danger it presents as the great ghostly figure in the sky 
suddenly begins to approach. Equipped with the talismanic properties of the “Kirchenduft in 
[s]einem Kleide,” he shouts: “Komm her, komm nieder - um ist deine Zeit!” With this 
command, the ominous cloud begins to lift away and fade off across the heath. Once again, 
Droste’s narrator appears to have narrowly escaped his peril, after which he promptly 
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awakens from his trancelike state and notes: “Noch einmal sah ich zum Gestein hinab: / Ach 
Gott, es war doch nur ein rohes Grab, / Das armen, ausgedorrten Staub bedeckte!” The 
subject’s sudden return to sober vision has transformed this spirited natural world back into 
dust and relegated it to its previous state of impoverishment and desiccation.  
 
 The quick reversal of perspective at the end of both “Der Hünenstein” and “Die 
Mergelgrube” seems to indicate that Droste perceives the balanced middle ground between 
the entangled subject and the detached observer as an increasingly impossible position. 
Furthermore, even though the lyrical subject’s entanglement with and attunement to nature is 
presented here as essential to the creation of worthy poetry—because nature stirs the 
imagination—this proximity to nature is simultaneously presented as potentially fatal. The 
danger, however, appears to be prompted by an attempt to reconcile Romantic and empirical 
positions. That is, a scientific (or poetic) approach that establishes humans as masters of the 
natural world can contain and control the forces of nature but, in so doing, it also renders 
nature lifeless. Yet, according to Droste’s ecological model, this trend toward an increasingly 
lifeless nature poses a risk, because this lifelessness will also eventually manifest itself in the 
humans who inhabit that nature. This dilemma might explain why Droste’s lyrical subjects 
become closer to encountering death the more closely they become intertwined with the 
nature that beckons them.  
 Finally, for Droste, nature—insofar as it compels man to mirror it—also has an 
important bearing on cultural production. As the landscapes of Europe were made 
increasingly rational and “legible” through new scientific technologies, spaces that were once 
untamed and dynamic underwent a number of physical transformations. Droste seems to 
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suggest that a natural world subjected to processes of standardization (e.g., through the 
draining of heaths or engineering of forests126) in turn changes the kind of art that can be 
produced within that world, because an alteration of nature necessarily elicits an alteration of 
the humans who create the art. Indeed, as the subject of “Der Hünenstein” observes, 
conventionalized surroundings only seem to lead to conventional art. Buried in this critique is 
a sense of anxiety about the fate of arguably less direct or “legible” literary forms like poetry. 
If a certain quality of nature is eradicated, might certain kinds of poetry one day become 
impossible or obsolete as well? For Droste, scientific approaches that privilege singular 
systems of legibility while renouncing aesthetic sensibility and other ways of knowing pose 
precisely this risk. 
                                                
126 The process of surveying in Stifter’s Kalkstein, the subject of the next chapter, is another example of this 
kind of standardization. Although it doesn’t literally alter the landscape, it “flattens” it by subjecting it to a 
standard scale that only measures select aspects and represents it in limited terms. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Training Scientific and Aesthetic Vision:  
Stimmung in the Work of Adalbert Stifter and Carl Gustav Carus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Adalbert Stifter, “Bewegung II” (Oil Study)127 
 
Denn wirklich ist ja von keinem Naturkörper ein absolutes Beharren zu denken und der 
scheinbar in größter Ruhe beharrende Stein durchfliegt mit der Erde in jeder Sekunde große 
Räume der Sonnenbahn und erfährt fortwährend unmerkliche chemische Aenderungen.  
      
-Carl Gustav Carus, Zwölf Briefe über das Erdleben128 
 
 
 Scholarship has not yet definitively determined to what extent, if at all, the renowned 
Austrian literary writer and amateur landscape painter Adalbert Stifter (1805-1868) would 
have been familiar with the work of Carl Gustav Carus (1789-1869) when he composed the 
                                                
127 Adalbert Stifter, “Bewegung II” (Oil Study), 1858, Wien, Adalbert-Stifter-Gesellschaft. 
 
128 Carl Gustav Carus, Zwölf Briefe über das Erdleben, ed. Ekkehard Meffert, Stuttgart, Freies Geistesleben, 
1986: 50. Hereafter referred to as Zwölf Briefe. 
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above-cited oil study “Bewegung II” in 1858.129 In some ways, it may even seem a bold 
gesture to suggest a link between Stifter and the Saxonian polymath at all, given their 
difference in age and home region, as well as scholarship’s tendency to associate them with 
contrasting aesthetic movements (Carus with Romanticism and Stifter with early Realism). 
For these reasons and others, only a handful of scholars have explored the possibility that 
Carus and his perspective on nature could have had a direct bearing on Stifter’s work.130 Yet, 
irrespective of traditional categories and whether or not direct lineages can be drawn, Carus’s 
status as a physician, naturalist, painter, and scientific and aesthetic theorist does make his 
work an excellent window into the precarious state of European scientific and aesthetic 
discourse in the early 19th century, particularly in the decades leading up to mid-century. As 
will become clear throughout the chapter, it is precisely this period of epistemological 
disorientation that so deeply informs Stifter’s development as a painter and literary writer. 
 As I indicated in the previous chapter, Romantic and analytical-empirical approaches 
to scientific inquiry were coming into increasing competition with one another during this 
era, particularly in the German-speaking realm, where Romantic Naturphilosophie had 
inspired a loyal following over the first few decades of the 19th century. Furthermore, 
developments in the institutionalization of knowledge also elicited widespread concern 
among many figures who considered themselves Wissenschaftler at a moment when 
Wissenschaft itself was being dissected and hierarchized into individual disciplines.131 
                                                
129 Karl Möseneder suggests the likelihood that Stifter knew of Carus’s Neun Briefe über die 
Landschaftsmalerei in: Möseneder, “Stimmung und Erdleben,” Adalbert Stifter. Dichter und Maler, 
Denkmalpfleger und Schulmann, Tübingen, Niemeyer, 1996: 32, especially 38f. 
 
130 Ibid. 25; See also Alfred Doppler, “Stifters Briefe als Dokumentierung der Selbstdarstellung,” Stifter und 
Stifterforschung im 21. Jahhundert, ed. Harmut Laufhütte et al, Tübingen, Niemeyer, 2007: 7. 
 
131 “Discipline” is, of course, an anachronistic term for this time period. Carus, for one, frequently tries to 
articulate the phenomenona of the differentiation of knowledge in general and scientific fields of study in 
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Historian Lynn Nyhart points out, for instance, that, throughout the first half of the 19th 
century, a discrepancy emerged with respect to the primary goals of different fields in many 
German universities, particularly between faculties representing the natural sciences and 
those representing the “human sciences,” such as art and philosophy. Within the 
philosophical faculties, she notes, “‘knowledge for its own sake’ became a watchword 
covering both research and teaching.”132 But, for instance, within the medical faculties, the 
pursuit of knowledge “for its own sake” or for the purpose of a student’s inner development 
(Bildung), was increasingly deemed insufficient and subordinated to an emphasis on practical 
skills development.133 Likewise, political sponsors of the universities were becoming 
increasingly wary of funding the pursuit of philosophical knowledge. This was especially the 
case within the life sciences, which were primarily housed in the medical faculties. Here, it 
was emphasized that professorial commitment to knowledge for its own sake “needed to be 
tempered with the sort of training that made good servants of the state.”134 
 Amidst this rush towards pragmatically oriented disciplinarity and the growing 
compartmentalization of “pure” and “practical” forms of knowledge acquisition, Carus 
became an important figure to address the increasingly fragile relationship between the 
emerging natural sciences and older, more philosophical modes of understanding nature, all 
which had largely been unified under the umbrella of “philosophia naturalis” until the late 
                                                                                                                                                  
particular with terms such as “Seiten der Wissenschaft,” “Zweige der Naturwissenschaft,” “Stückwerk,” 
“Verschiedenheit der Standpunkte der Wissenschaft.” Zwölf Briefe 14, 17, 20, 22.  
 
132 Lynn K. Nyhart, Biology Takes Form: Animal Morphology and the German Universities, 1800-1900, 
Chicago, U of Chicago P, 1995: 38. 
 
133 Ibid. 
 
134 Ibid. 51. See also: James C. Scott, Seeing Like State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed, New Haven, CT, Yale UP, 1998. Scott accounts for a turn towards technoscientific practices in 
several German states and particularly focuses on the establishment of Forstwissenschaft practices to increase 
lumber productivity. 
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18th century. Likewise, he insisted upon the function of art as an important complement to 
science. The growing separation of knowledge into stand-alone disciplines, often with their 
own practical ends, elicited a sense of anxiety: Was it still possible to practice art, 
philosophy, and natural science in tandem with one another, or might the natural sciences 
now begin to eclipse art and philosophy as more legitimate ways of knowing? Consistently 
throughout his work, Carus insists on the interdependence between all three. In his 1831 
aesthetic treatise Neun Briefe über Landschaftsmalerei, for instance, he frequently insists on 
the necessity of scientific training for landscape artists. At the same time, he asserts that 
detailed, empirical observation should be balanced with a philosophical and aesthetic sense 
for the whole, for artists and scientists alike.  
 These ideas reemerge with an emphasis on scientific conceptions of nature in his 
1841 work Zwölf Briefe über das Erdleben, in which he introduces the concept of the “earth-
life.” Among other things, this work attempted to reintegrate the Romantic notion of the earth 
as a living, organic body into the purview of the empirical natural scientist. Ekkehard 
Meffert’s 1986 edition of Zwölf Briefe acknowledges the foresight of this work and praises 
Carus’s persistent efforts to establish synthesis and balance between diverging modes of 
knowledge at the threshold of such a great epistemological paradigm shift: 
Die mit einem genialen Mut zur Synthese geschriebenen “Zwölf Briefe über das 
Erdleben” sind am Beginn des naturwissenschaftlichen Zeitalters der erste 
Versuch einer Gesamtschau der Erde und des Kosmos, noch vor dem Werk 
“Kosmos” (1844ff.) von Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859). Sie sprechen mit 
großem Weitblick den Gedanken aus, daß die Erde und ihr kosmischer Umkreis 
ein “lebendiger Organismus eigener Art” sind. Daher ist dieser große Ideenwurf 
von Carus weit mehr als bloß ein historisches Relikt des frühen 19. Jahrhunderts, 
sondern eine noch zu ergreifende und zu realisiernde Erkenntnisaufgabe.135  
 
                                                
135 Ekkehard Meffert, “Vorwort. Zur Intention der Neuherausgabe,” In: Zwölf Briefe 10. 
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Due to Carus’s association with Romantic landscape painting, and his occupation as a 
physician and zoologist, it is not surprisingly that he was personally invested in the 
relationship between art and science.136 Beyond the two monographs mentioned, his 
numerous essays and compilations reflecting on the status of art and science between roughly 
1820 and 1860 suggest that he was one of the earliest and most dedicated figures to recognize 
and grapple seriously with the increasingly strained relationship between art and science, 
even though his appeals seem to have fallen on deaf ears at times.137 Moreover, his work 
brought him into contact with some of the most influential German intellectuals of his day—
most notably, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Alexander von Humboldt,138 who had 
indeed seemed to strike a fine balance in their scientific studies between the detail-oriented 
empirical study of nature and holistic-aesthetic vision, which Humboldt called the 
Totaleindruck.139 Carus was therefore one of the most prolific thinkers to assert the 
                                                
 
136 Carus’s work as a physician and zoologist also explains in part why the model of the organic body is central 
to his understanding of landscape. 
 
137 Otto Bätschmann, “Carl Gustav Carus (1789-1869): Physician, Naturalist, Painter, and Theoretician of 
Landscape Painting,” in: Carl Gustav Carus, Nine Letters on Landscape Painting: Nine Letters on Landscape 
Painting, Written in the Years 1815-1824; with a Letter from Goethe by Way of Introduction, Los Angeles, CA, 
Getty, 2002: 32f. Bätschmann surmises that Carus’s attempt to intervene in landscape painting discourse with 
an essay on “earth-life painting” (essentially, Letter VIII) was ignored by the editors of the Munich Kunst-Blatt 
in the late 1820s. However, Möseneder points out that the “Morgenblatt für gebildete Stände” published a 
discussion on Neun Briefe in 1835 (38). 
 
138 Bätschmann 7ff.: Carus first established correspondence with Goethe when he sent him drafts of his 
Lehrbuch der Zootomie in 1818. In 1822, he sent him drafts of the letters I, II, III, V of Neun Briefe, together 
with 4 of his scientific illustrations. Goethe encouraged him to publish them and also promised to send him his 
next fascicle of his Morphologie (since Goethe had enjoyed Carus’s work on zootomy). Carus’s acquaintance 
with Humboldt started in 1826 and he was particularly fascinated with Humboldt’s Ansichten der Natur (1807-
1808), which also presented a conception of the earth as a living body with a physiognomy. 
 
139 Humboldt drew this concept from earlier art theoreticians such as Sulzer, Semler, and Fernow. See: 
Möseneder 38.  
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codependence of aesthetic theory and scientific methodology in the era immediately 
following the golden age of Goethean and Humboldtian science.140  
 Because Adalbert Stifter, 16 years Carus’s junior, emerged as a promising writer 
precisely at the height of this scientific and aesthetic disorientation, a number of Carus’s 
reflections can be taken up as useful starting points for understanding the nuances of the 
central questions probed in Stifter’s paintings and prose. Reading these two writers in tandem 
reveals a number of shared thoughts and similar turns of phrase that can sharpen our 
understanding of how (and why) Stifter wrestled with the future of the relationship between 
science and art within his own milieu. And while Stifter’s detail-obsessed vision has 
traditionally led scholars to associate him with the dawn of a general cultural shift away from 
Romantic speculative philosophy and towards scientific empiricism and literary realism, a 
comparative consideration of Carus’s and Stifter’s work suggests a common reluctance 
towards this shift for the sake of what it threatens to leave behind. For one, both figures 
hesitate to embrace a severed relationship between art and science. They also hesitate to 
embrace any approach to art or science that seeks to grasp the material world without explicit 
concern for the inherent limits of that approach, especially the limits of human perception. 
Empirical science and empirical aesthetic vision, despite their goals of disinterested 
objectivity, are thus often exposed by both Carus and Stifter as insufficient stand-alone 
sources of authority on the nature of reality. In fact, both thinkers frequently use “vision” as a 
metaphor for exploring and explaining the many competing ways of knowing that were 
diverging during their lifetimes and would soon be taken for granted as separate and distinct. 
                                                
140 Goethe’s death in 1832 could be one marker of the end of this era. Humboldt lived on until 1859; however, 
his five-volume masterpiece Kosmos, though published between 1844 and 1862, was based on a series of 
lectures he gave in Berlin in 1826 and was originally scheduled for publication in 1829. The immense 
popularity of Humboldt’s work may be partly attributable to a general nostalgia for this kind of big-picture 
speculative-scientific thinking after it had started to fall out of practice. 
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 As the two citations at the opening of this chapter suggest, the final and perhaps most 
striking commonality between Carus and Stifter is their shared tendency to address the 
relationship between art and science through an investigation of the natural world. As it 
happens, they often explore this constellation of concerns in a very similar way. For instance, 
while both of them use some form of the written word to explore what it means to know 
nature, they are both just as deeply invested in exploring the merits of landscape painting and 
cultivating their own abilities as landscape painters. Indeed, Carus’s own theories on 
landscape painting in Neun Briefe über Landschaftsmalerei and Zwölf Briefe über das 
Erdleben resonate strongly with Stifter’s conception of nature as presented in both his 
painted and written work. Thus, just as the above-cited epigraph by Carus will prove to shed 
light on Stifter’s painting “Bewegung II” (and its curious title), other insights from Carus will 
serve to sharpen my reading of Stifter’s literary work. Beyond the painting “Bewegung II,” 
this chapter will acknowledge key themes in a number of written works, such as Der 
Nachsommer, Brigitta, and Granit, but it will specifically focus on the novella Kalkstein 
from the Bunte Steine collection and the famous “Vorrede” to this volume. However, because 
many of the insights that I present in this chapter necessarily lead back to the unique 
capacities of landscape painting as a genre of art and a specific form of interaction with 
nature, I will begin there and then move on to the literature. 
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PART ONE — Dynamic Entanglement: Stimmung as a Model of Human-Nature 
Relations 
 
 
The Stimmungslandschaft in Carus and Stifter 
 
 For Carus and Stifter, the task of the landscape painter involves a special kind of 
trained vision that is able to grasp nature simultaneously in a scientific way (i.e., by 
examining individual forms) and in an aesthetic way (i.e., by capturing the whole). Carus 
claims, in perhaps his most direct acknowledgment of the interdependability of science and 
art, that “[d]ie Darstellung der Wissenschaft kann daher nie ohne Kunst (ohne kunstgemäße 
Ordnung der Gedanken und Worte) gelingen, und die Erzeugung des Kunstwerks 
hinwiederum wird ohne Wissenschaft [...] unmöglich bleiben.”141 Stifter, by contrast, more 
often lets this perspective emerge through the experiences and reflections of his narrators and 
fictional characters. Heinrich Drendorf, the protagonist of Stifter’s novel Der Nachsommer, 
is perhaps the most widely recognizable representative of this perspective—that “die 
Wissenschaft und Kunst keine Gegensätze bilden, sondern einander als Erkenntnis- bzw. 
Darstellungsweisen ergänzen.”142 Through a process of cultural education that very much 
echoes the training that Carus advocates in Neun Briefe, Stifter’s fictional character Heinrich 
must learn to approach landscape painting—and nature in general—in a way that integrates 
empirically oriented and aesthetically oriented vision.  
                                                
141 Carl Gustav Carus, Neun Briefe über Landschaftsmalerei: geschrieben in den Jahren 1815 - 1824. Zuvor ein 
Brief von Goethe als Einleitung, Leipzig, Fleischer, 1831: 36. 
 
142 Möseneder 37. Both Möseneder and Sean Ireton present evidence that Heinrich Drendorf’s character is based 
on the Austrian geologist Friedrich Simony, a friend of Stifter’s. Simony believed that landscape art could 
significantly contribute to geological insight and saw it as “nicht bloße Illustration, also Mittel zum Zweck, 
sondern Endziel, in dem sich empirische Beobachtung objektivierte” (Ibid.). See also: Sean Moore Ireton, 
“Geology, Mountaineering, and Self-Formation in Adalbert Stifter’s Der Nachsommer,” In: Heights of 
Reflection: Mountains in the German Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Twenty-First Century, eds. 
Caroline Schaumann and Sean Moore Ireton, Rochester, NY, Camden House, 2012: 193–209. 
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 “Vision” is, admittedly, somewhat of a misnomer for the Naturverständnis that is 
most ardently advocated by Carus and Stifter, despite the important role of visual perception 
in scientific and aesthetic discourses of this era. Instead, the power of landscape painting 
derives from a web of relation and attraction within nature, and the binding forces within this 
system are remarkable precisely because they are largely invisible. This network of inherent 
relations is best captured by the German concept of Stimmung, whose history David 
Wellbery details in the Historisches Wörterbuch ästhetischer Grundbegriffe.143 Wellbery 
does not explore the late and post-Romantic generations in his history of the term; however, 
Stimmung as he describes it—an “innere Stimmigkeit,” a “Zugehörigkeit der Gegenstände,” 
and an “einheitlich gefärbten Beziehungsflecht”—is nonetheless a central notion for many 
landscape painters of this era.144 The model of Stimmung that grounds their conception of 
nature involves multiple layers of relation and attraction: among the individual elements 
within a natural landscape; between the observer/painter’s mood and the landscape’s overall 
effect; and between the landscape painting as a work of art and the viewer of that work.  
 Karl Möseneder has used Stifter’s painting journals to suggest the importance of the 
Stimmung concept for Stifter’s own study of landscapes and landscape painting.145 
Furthermore, an excerpt from the first page of Stifter’s 1847 tale Brigitta suggests that Stifter 
used the Stimmung model to understand not only the landscape of the earth but also the 
                                                
143 David Wellbery, “Stimmung,” In: Historisches Wörterbuch ästhetischer Grundbegriffe, vol. 5, ed. Karlheinz 
Barck et al., Stuttgart, Metzler, 2003: 703-33. 
 
144 Wellbery 705. Notably, as Eric Downing points out, Wellbery moves from Enlightenment and early 
Romantic thinkers (Kant, Schiller, Goethe, Humboldt, Fichte) to early 19th century Modernism (Hofmannsthal) 
and fails to include the centrality of Stimmung to the rest of 19th century art and philosophy. See: Eric Downing, 
“Painting Magic in Keller’s Der Grüne Heinrich,” forthcoming. 
 
145 Möseneder 18ff. 
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landscape of the human body.146 Thus, while this passage in particular refers the landscape of 
a human body and the mechanisms of Stimmung operating within and around it, it also lends 
insight into his perception of natural landscapes and the invisible forces of relation and 
attraction operating within and around them. According to the narrator of Brigitta, an 
intangible force organizes the body’s various parts and motions to produce an idiosyncratic 
and mysteriously coordinated set of mannerisms—a Totaleffekt, whose “Grund wir nicht in 
Schnelligkeit hervor zu ziehen vermögen.” From time to time, the narrator says, such an 
effect attracts us and opens our souls up to a kind of an inner beauty in this person, even if 
the external appearance happens to be ugly in a conventional sense. Ultimately, then, what 
provokes a moment of attraction between the viewer and the face or body of the person 
observed is a particular arrangement of inner and outer “Dinge und Beziehungen” that 
“wirken […] mit einem gewissen schönen und sanften Reize des Geheimnißvollen auf unsere 
Seele.”147 The aesthetic-emotive resonance fueling human-human attraction that Stifter’s 
narrator describes here is almost identical to the model of human-nature attraction evoked by 
a Stimmungslandschaft. This passage in Brigitta resonates especially well with Carus’s 
understanding of Stimmung.  
 Carus addresses the power of Stimmung in the third letter of his earlier work Neun 
Briefe with a section called “Von dem Entsprechen zwischen Gemütsstimmungen und 
Naturzustanden.” In it, he places particular emphasis on one set of relations within this 
system of Stimmung: a form of correspondence between humans and nature that fuels the 
                                                
146 Stifter appears to have viewed the earth as a body—or, as Carus might have termed it, an “Erdleben.” For a 
discussion of Adalbert Stifter and discourse of the body, see: Silke Brodersen, “Physiologische 
Körperfigurationen Bei Adalbert Stifter,” Organismus und Gesellschaft: Der Körper in der deutschsprachigen 
Literatur des Realismus (1830-1930), eds. Christiane Arndt and Silke Broderson, Bielefeld, transcript, 2011, 
23–47. 
 
147 Adalbert Stifter, Brigitta. Studien 1842-1845, Prague, Vitalis, 2005: 123. 
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human impulse to create landscape paintings.148 This process begins with the painter’s 
willingness to be open and receptive to nature, which, in turn, makes it possible for the 
landscape to evoke within him a “veränderten inneren Zustand,” often a specific emotion or 
“Gemüt” that corresponds in some way to the landscape’s current state. Now an 
“angeschlagene Saite,” the painter is brought into attunement with the particular moment of 
the overall scene.149 Such a moment of attunement allows the painter to simultaneously 
experience himself as an individual form separate from the landscape but also as “Theil eines 
größern, ja unendlichen Ganzen.” It is through this process that his “Ich” is coordinated with 
“einem neuen Kreise der Außenwelt.”150 The individual elements of the landscape are thus 
taken up into the painter’s own feeling of oneness with the universe, and that sense of unity is 
then communicated further through the palpable Stimmung of the painted landscape 
experienced by the viewer. By this model, then, the human capacity to be affected by art rests 
upon the human capacity to be affected by nature. Likewise, an encounter with nature should 
be akin to an encounter with art: the human observer must show a willingness to be 
vulnerable and a readiness to be changed. 
 It is here that scientific encounters with nature begin to conflict with the aesthetic 
ideal described above. The increasing dominance of the empirical approach to conducting 
science, with its emphasis on objectivity and distance, threatens to sever this subjective-
emotive connection between humans and nature. As a consequence, art—specifically, 
                                                
148 Neun Briefe 43. 
 
149 Neun Briefe 47. Carus identifies the fundamental emotions as “Das Gefühl des Aufstrebens, der 
Ermuthigung, der Entwickelung, das Gefühl wahrer innerer Klarheit und Ruhe, das Gefühl des Hinwelkens, der 
Schwermuth und die Fühllosigkeit, Apathie” (46-47). Stifter was very interested in the emotions a landscape 
could evoke—chief among them, angenehm-heiter, romantisch, feierlich, and sanft-melancholisch (Möseneder 
22). 
 
150 Neun Briefe 43. 
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landscape painting—is also in danger of losing its power in the face of an increasingly 
positivist paradigm that rejects non-empirical knowledge. It is, therefore, precisely these 
moments of Gestimmtheit, of feeling unified and attuned with nature, that Carus and Stifter 
long for and persistently attempt to recover within the shifting scientific paradigm of their 
time. One passage in Stifter’s Der Nachsommer expresses this desire for unity amidst 
fragmentation very lucidly, and so I would like to present it briefly before moving on to the 
central works of my analysis. In it, protagonist Heinrich Drendorf reports that he once 
happened upon a heap of gravel one day and found himself trying to imagine a time when 
each piece was still part of a bigger whole: 
[ich war] einmal bei einem Haufen von Geschiebe stehen geblieben, das man aus 
einem Flußbette genommen und an der Straße aufgeschüttet hatte […] Ich 
erkannte in den roten, weißen, grauen, schwarzgelben und gesprenkelten Steinen, 
welche lauter plattgerundete Gestalten hatten, die Boten von unserem Gebirge, ich 
erkannte jeden aus seiner Felsenstadt, von der er sich losgetrennt hatte und von 
der er ausgesendet worden war. Hier lag er unter Kameraden, deren Geburtsstätte 
oft viele Meilen von der seinigen entfernt ist, alle waren sie an Gestalt gleich 
geworden, und alle harrten, daß sie zerschlagen und zu der Straße verwendet 
würden.  
 
Besonders kamen mir die Gedanken, wozu dann alles da sei, wie es entstanden 
sei, wie es zusammenhänge, und wie es zu unserem Herzen spreche.151  
 
The fact that the final reflection of this passage is isolated as a stand-alone paragraph 
reinforces the centrality of these questions to Drendorf’s inquiry into the natural world; 
likewise, it seems to sum up Stifter’s most pressing questions, many of which are pursued by 
Carus as well. Contemplating this motley, haphazard heap of stones, Drendorf longs to 
understand their histories and their relations to one another; but above all, he wants their 
overall arrangement to speak to his heart—to stir his emotions, like the face of a landscape 
                                                
151 Stifter, Der Nachsommer. Eine Erzählung, Frankfurt a.M., 2008: 306. Note also the similarity here between 
Drendorf’s description of the scattered rocks of many colors and Droste’s reflections on the orphaned rocks in 
“Die Mergelgrube” explored in the previous chapter. 
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would. In other words, he is trying to recover a sense of the whole that they once constituted, 
and thereby also recover the potential for Stimmung within this heap. However, within the 
current scientific paradigm, nature is in danger of becoming precisely the opposite: an 
unorganized, disconnected pile of data that no longer has any sense of cohesion or 
connection to humans.  
  At the same time, the orphan status of each of these scattered stones—also reflected 
in the title of Stifter’s 1853 collection Bunte Steine—suggests a critique of the fragmentation 
of knowledge into increasingly isolated disciplines throughout the first half of the 19th 
century. Formerly constituting one large, unified body, the now-scattered pebbles bear a 
shared history that is increasingly hidden from view. Much like the diverse branches of 
knowledge now emerging as separate disciplines, these pebbles’ future relations are also 
uncertain, and it is not clear how or even whether they will ever be reunited. In his 1854 
essay “Gelegentliche Betrachtungen über den Charakter des gegenwärtigen Standes der 
Naturwissenschaft,” Carus presents a similar perspective on the increasing “Verschiedenheit 
der Standpunkte der Wissenschaft” over the previous half century:  
So kommt es denn, daß, wer so ziemlich ein halbes Jahrhundert den Gang dieser 
Wissenschaften ruhig teilnehmend beobachtete, bei all dergleichen 
Widersprüchen und Schwankungen wohl von Zeit zu Zeit sich versucht fühlen 
muß […] einige Resultate aus dem bunten Chaos dieses ewig verschiedenen und 
wechselnden Treibens in Gedanken zu befestigen und gelegentlich 
auszusprechen.152 
 
The recurring theme, then, is one of reconciliation: how can one overcome the boundaries 
that have been drawn, both within the realm of nature (i.e., human/nonhuman, 
organic/inorganic) but also within the realm of knowledge (i.e., science/philosophy/art, life 
                                                
152 Carus, Carl Gustav, “Gelegentliche Betrachtungen über den Charakter des gegenwärtigen Standes der 
Naturwissenschaft,” Zwölf Briefe über das Erdleben, ed. Ekkehard Meffert, Stuttgart, Freies Geistesleben, 
1986: 21f (my emphasis). 
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science/earth science)? As this chapter progresses, I will use Carus’s work to open up new 
insights into Stifter’s resistance to such boundaries. In particular, I will show how a number 
of moments within Stifter’s painting, prose, and essays reflect a desire to overcome these 
boundaries and to overturn the hierarchies that result from them. Rather than privileging 
humans over nature and science over art and thus robbing them of their power, Stifter, like 
Carus, insists upon models that recognize alikeness rather than difference and integration 
rather than segregation. Critical to Stifter’s dissolution of boundaries is, on the one hand, an 
understanding of nature as Stimmung-oriented and, on the other, an assertion of non-
empirical, non-positivist ways of knowing as necessary complements to scientific inquiry. 
 
“Bewegung II”: Erosion and the Dynamic Power of the Inorganic 
 The first work I’d like to turn to in this context is Stifter’s painting “Bewegung II” 
(featured above). This painting seeks to reveal creative, active properties within nature, 
especially within the ostensibly nonliving inorganic realm of nature. Insights from Carus 
suggest that this tendency on Stifter’s part is reflective of a broader trend propounded by 
followers of Romantic Naturphilosophie. 
 The painting journal Stifter kept between the years of 1854 and 1867 allows us to place 
his painting “Bewegung II” within the context of a broader project described as “Bewegung, 
strömendes Wasser,” which also includes an unfinished oil painting of a creek bed in the 
foreground of a canyon (“Bewegung I”) and an ink sketch of the larger context of 
“Bewegung II.”153 Although “strömendes Wasser” suggests that the notion of movement is 
directed at the water, Möseneder points out that the water in these scenes is much calmer and 
more shallow than the rivers and creeks in a number of Stifter’s earlier paintings. Möseneder 
                                                
153 Möseneder 18f. 
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concludes that the mirror-like calm of the water invites the viewer to reflect and that this 
didactic quality also functions as a warning about the “zwar potentiell gefahrvollen, nun aber 
friedlichen Wassers am Fuße eines Bergmassivs.”154 While these observations have merit, I 
would like to present an alternative emphasis: namely that the movement announced by the 
title refers not so much to the water as it does to the rock. This claim will first be explored 
via insights gleaned from Carl Gustav Carus’s Zwölf Briefe über das Erdleben and, 
subsequently, by Stifter’s own novella Kalkstein. 
 When we consider “Bewegung II” alongside the excerpt from Carus’s Zwölf Briefe, a 
striking correspondence between the two emerges. Both Stifter and Carus turn their attention 
to a rock—that is, to the inorganic realm—to reflect on phenomena of movement and change. 
In doing so, both commit to acknowledging natural processes that are virtually untraceable 
by the naked human eye. Carus marvels, for instance, at how an apparently static and 
unyielding (“beharrend”) rock, is, on a planetary scale, actually soaring through the universe 
as a constituent part of the Earth in its orbit around the sun. The second part of his claim 
explores the idea that the rock is also “moving” insofar as it is being altered through constant 
chemical activity that is invisible to us, or “unmerkliche chemische Aenderungen.”155 From 
Carus’s view, then, some phenomena appear static to the human eye merely because we 
cannot get close or distant enough to detect the movement. What he means by the phrase 
“chemische Aenderungen” in the second statement is not initially clear; however other 
passages in Zwölf Briefe point toward the phenomenon of erosion. The seventh letter, for 
instance, presents a description of the sandstone cliffs of Rathen southeast of Dresden and 
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calls attention to the “chemisch auflösende Kraft von Luft und Feuchtigkeit” for some kinds 
of rock, leading to the “Verwitterung ihrer Kanten.”156 For Carus, then, a rock does in fact 
“move” and change, but only on a microscopic or a cosmic scale for which unaided or 
untrained human perception is inadequate. His reference to erosion as one of the undetectable 
microscopic processes of nature also implies that human perception falls short not only in 
terms of spatial-visual scope but also temporal scope. That is, certain phenomena may be too 
large or small to witness, but also too fast or—in this case—too slow.  
 Stifter’s painting appears to foreground the phenomenon of erosion as well. It is a 
portrait of a rock, but by also displaying its gleaming surface, the light above it, and the 
presence of moving water directly behind it, this likeness also tells a story. Yet, it is up to the 
viewer to collect the evidence—the rock’s current form and the erosive forces surrounding 
it—and assemble the story of how these events unfolded over time.157 The painting itself can 
neither capture nor prove the actual process of erosion, but it can invite the viewer to 
envision the process and marvel at how nature has laid out the evidence to tell its own story. 
And although a painting arrests time and thus displays precisely the opposite of movement 
(let alone the microscopic advancement of erosion), it is precisely its status as art, as the 
reproduction of nature, that brings the viewer to contemplate this phenomenon. Erosion 
itself, then, serves as a symbol for both the deficiencies of actual human perception and for 
the problem of human reliance on empirical science alone to understand nature; in turn, the 
painting brings to the fore those deficiencies just as much as it does the actual objects 
depicted. 
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 Further exploration of Carus’s preoccupation with erosion in Zwölf Briefe can help us 
gain additional insight into why the phenomenon of erosion is so important for Stifter. The 
broader context of Carus’s first letter in Zwölf Briefe, for instance, suggests that his reasons 
for addressing the phenomena of movement and interactivity within the inorganic realm 
reach far beyond the passage cited and also beyond questions of scale and scope. The table of 
contents for Zwölf Briefe summarizes the “Erster Brief” as follows: 
Erster Brief. 
Einleitung. --- Fremdsein der meisten Menschen in der Natur. --- Begriff der 
Natur. --- Das Werdende. --- Nichtigkeit des angenommenen Unterschiedes einer 
organischen und unorganischen Natur. --- Es gibt keine todte Natur. ---158 
 
As is indicated in this introductory outline, the first letter as a whole reveals a number of 
potential motivations for Carus’s fixation on the figure of the rock in particular and the 
inorganic realm more generally. Most importantly, he spends a number of pages within this 
section refuting the scientific classification of organic and inorganic nature as fundamentally 
different from one another. His concern is not particularly surprising given the pervasive 
presence of “theory of life” debates within the sciences throughout his lifetime, which 
attempted uncover the basis of life and thereby establish criteria for living versus non-living 
nature. The concept of “Bewegung” is not irrelevant in this context, as the properties of 
movement and activity (versus stasis and passivity) for the definition of life were some of the 
earlier criteria proposed.159 Furthermore, the development of the “life sciences” (i.e., biology) 
as an exclusive area of study separate from the study of the nonliving world slowly began to 
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emerge around 1800 as well.160 As Shirley A. Roe points out in her contribution to the 18th 
century science volume of the Cambridge History of Science, thinkers like Michel Foucault 
and Francois Jacob have illuminated the significance of this shift:  
life as a category of existence having a completely different character from 
existence in the inorganic realm was not a basic premise [in the 18th century]. This 
is not to say that animists and vitalists did not object to the overuse of mechanism 
in explaining the phenomena of living beings or that those materialists who 
wished to place life in matter itself did not imbue matter with qualities mechanists 
would have had little use for. But there is a difference between the organism of 
the 19th century and the organized being of the 18th century.161 
 
For Carus, however, the organic and inorganic realms—though now increasingly 
distinguished from one another within the natural sciences—must be viewed as mutual 
participants in the same dynamic system. Moreover, what he finds most troubling within the 
emerging paradigm surrounding the definition of life is the notion that inorganic nature must 
necessarily be considered “dead.” He believes that this misconception is a consequence of 
misguided belief in human superiority within scientific thought, which necessarily prevents 
scientists from conceiving of humans and their natural environments—animal, vegetable, or 
mineral—as interrelated components of the same organic system. He thus resents the fact that 
nature is, “wunderlicher Weise,” so often viewed in terms of 
zweierlei Naturen neben einander bestehend […], von denen die eine belebt, die 
andre unbelebt sei, zu deren einer, der belebten, Menschen, Thiere und Pflanzen 
gerechnet wurden, während zu der andern, der unbelebten, Erd und Himmel mit 
ihren Erscheinungen, als etwas durchaus Heterogenes, gezählt wurde. Es ist 
dieses jedoch eine Unterscheidung, welche ich durch nichts gerechtfertigt wüßte, 
es müßte denn der engherzige und beschränkte Standpunkt sein, welchen ein 
Mensch annimmt, der sein Auge für das große und allgemeine Naturleben 
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deßhalb verschließt, weil er egoistisch nur für Das, was ganz zunächst sein 
eigenes Leben angeht, Sinn hat.162 
 
The perspective Carus offers here is deeply rooted in an organic model of nature and clearly 
reveals his lingering loyalty to early Romantic modes of understanding, which tended to 
explain individual components of nature primarily in relation to the whole rather than 
mechanistically and in isolation.163  
 Furthermore, this passage, among others, meditates on the kinship between humans and 
nature in a way that is very much resonant with Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, of which 
Carus was a known proponent to some degree. In particular, Naturphilosophie claimed that a 
thorough empirical investigation of the natural world would ultimately be able to reveal the 
cosmic unity present in all objects of nature (humans included). All of nature, whether 
organic or inorganic was thought to be moved by the same divine spirit that had simply 
organized itself to a greater and lesser extent, thus exhibiting different levels of development. 
Within this framework, Schelling proposed that the organic (more highly organized) realm 
and the inorganic (less organized) realm differed only in terms of degree along a spectrum, 
not in kind.164 Considering the inherent kinship that Carus thus presumes to be present in all 
of nature, it is easy to imagine why he might advocate for a more holistic perspective that 
maintains the “freudigen Ueberblick des großen und freien Naturlebens.”165 Indeed, a number 
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of Carus’s forerunners—figures like Humboldt and Goethe, who were immensely influential 
for budding scientists all throughout Europe—also emphasized the importance of reconciling 
details gleaned from scientific observation with serious contemplation of their overall 
connectedness, even if that contemplation entailed some level of philosophical musing or 
aesthetic imagination.  
 Carus certainly feared that the exclusion of the inorganic from a more highly developed 
and thus superior realm of “living” nature (culminating in the human) was a slippery slope 
that would only lead to increasing alienation between humans and nature in general. This 
tone abounds in the first letter, in which he urges also the reader to seriously consider the 
consequences of the increasingly troubling level of “Fremdsein der meisten Menschen in der 
Natur.” However, the air of mysticism here should not strike us as unusual, as it accompanies 
a great deal of Romantically inflected writing on nature. Perhaps more noteworthy, then, is 
the letter’s implied concern with metaphysical questions regarding the inorganic realm. 
Namely, Carus’s remarks about the rock and its invisible movement draw attention to 
problems of ontology within an increasingly divisive scientific paradigm. By focusing on the 
distinction between the “living” and the “nonliving,” scientific discourse seemed to be 
implying that the inorganic realm was not only “dead,” but inconsequential, lacking any 
force or power of its own. Yet, as Carus points out, there are many moments in which 
inorganic nature seems to exert its own power and force. He points, for example, to an 
anecdote in which glacial ice cycles had repeatedly “lifted” large rocks and animals bones to 
the surface, in one instance even bringing nearly an entire skeleton of a horse back to the 
surface two years after it had tumbled down a ravine. He concludes, “In solchen 
Betrachtungen empfindet man nun freilich sogleich die innere Lebensthätigkeit des scheinbar 
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Todten und Unorganischen.”166 Here, Carus refers to such instances—that is, moments during 
which the earth appears to move and “act” with purpose—as manifestations of “Erdleben.”167 
Though elaborated to a great extent in Zwölf Briefe, the notion of the “earth-life” had already 
been coined at least a decade earlier in the section of Neun Briefe discussed above. Here, 
Carus often described such moments of vitality as individual Gemüthsstimmungen of the 
earth—precisely the qualities that Romantic painters such as Caspar David Friedrich and 
Carus himself strived to capture: 
Welches sind nun aber die besondern in den mannichfaltigen Vewandlungen der 
landschaftlichen Natur ausgsprochenen Stimmungen? — Wenn wir erwägen, daß 
alle diese Verwandlungen nichts Anderes sind als Formen des Naturlebens, so 
können auch die verschiedenen in denselben ausgesprochenen Stimmungen nichts 
Anderes als Lebenszustände, Stadien des Naturlebens, bezeichnen.168 
 
For Carus, nature possesses an inner unity that drives the development of the earth as one 
gigantic organism; each “metamorphosis” that occurs in nature is therefore just one miniscule 
movement in the overall development of the whole. In this earlier work, curiously, he does 
not once make reference to a distinction between “organic” and “inorganic” nature—neither 
preemptively or defensively—which suggests that the degree to which this distinction is 
employed in the sciences has escalated by the time he addresses it in Zwölf Briefe a decade or 
so later. 
 Carus’s urgent insistence on to the potency and vitality of inorganic nature in Zwölf 
Briefe sheds some light on Stifter’s painting as well, highlighting the latter’s frequent attempt 
to capture vitality and meaning in nature that might otherwise appear “dead” and 
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inconsequential, both in his painting and his prose. Möseneder points out that Stifter’s 
“Bewegung” project was planned around the concept of “strömendes Wasser” and that Stifter 
considered water the prime agent of vitality in nature, at times describing it in organic terms 
as “das bewegte Leben des Erdkörpers.”169 Yet, as I argue above, this painting is above all 
else a portrait of a weathered rock, thus featuring most prominently its face/body and the 
reality of its formation and development. With it, Stifter is moving beyond the age-old trope 
of flowing water to investigate the phenomena of movement and change in nature insofar as 
he acknowledges various “nonliving” agents and recipients of change across a broad 
spectrum. Like Carus, his keen eye recognizes the small actions and reactions within 
inorganic nature and wants to do them justice. He therefore attempts to capture in his art 
what science has begun to render a contradiction, namely, what Möseneder calls 
“geologische Bewegung”: 
also das transitorische Moment auch im scheinbar Starren und Festen […]. Denn 
die Taleinschnitte, Rinnen und Furchen der Felsabhänge, die durch Sonne, 
Niederschläge, Frost und Wind abgesprengten Blöcke und die Geröllströme—
sind sie nicht ebenso Resultate einer fortwährenden Bewegung wie die durch 
Wasserkraft transportieren und dabei abgeschliffenen Steine und der feinrieselnde 
Sand?170 
 
A number of scholars have characterized Stifter’s attention to these processes as a 
commitment to a “cyclical” conception of nature and thus also a yearning for tradition and 
natural order in the face of social revolution. Frequently, it is reduced to a reflection of his 
reverence for the ostensibly “small” processes in nature, as proclaimed in the “Vorrede” to 
Bunte Steine. Yet, as his painting suggests and his novella Kalkstein will show, it is plausible 
that this conservatism is also aimed at preserving a kind of vision—and by extension, a way 
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of knowing—that is soon to be lost as the “nonliving” world is subordinated to that of the 
living as a class of inert objects. Time and again, both Carus and Stifter nudge their readers 
to reconsider the properties of inorganic nature that suggest a kind of vitality, or potential 
“subject” status: Might there be a hidden or latent form of power that inorganic materials 
such as light, wind, water, and rock possess? And to what extent do they “move” humans and 
influence our actions? In other words: are these presumably “dead” materials, in some way, 
imbued with life after all? And if so, what is the danger to us (and them) if we cast them 
aside, disregarding their participation in the phenomenon of life on earth? For both Carus and 
Stifter, the modern empirical approach to science, with its foundations in Cartesian dualism 
and objectivity, has turned a blind eye to these questions. Investigating them thus becomes a 
task that falls to art and philosophy.
 
 
PART TWO — Seeing Stimmung: Models of Scientific and Aesthetic Vision 
 
 
Carus and “der freudige Überblick”171  
 For Carus, an attempt to contradict the specious divide between organic and inorganic 
nature within science must necessarily begin with a consideration, both literal and figurative, 
of perspective and scope—in other words, a consideration of vision. The steady advancement 
of positivism throughout Europe over the course of the 19th century meant that truth claims 
were increasingly held to the standards of visually ascertained, empirical evidence. Terms 
like science and knowledge, Wissenschaft and Wissen, thus increasingly denoted information 
that could be observed and recorded in the here and now, rather than intuited, imagined, or 
concluded through speculation. This shift in the definition of science itself, though taken for 
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granted from our contemporary perspective, put reconcilers like Carus, who strived to 
maintain both “empirische und spekulative Gesichtspunkte in der Naturbetrachtung,” in a 
difficult position; for, as Jutta Müller-Tamm points out, “die Einheit der Natur ist empirisch 
wie theoretisch unableitbar.”172 Moreover, a great deal of Carus’s writing, like that of many 
of his contemporaries, is anchored in a Romantic outlook that accepted speculation within the 
realm of scientific thinking and writing. And although Carus did publish several volumes 
dedicated to systematic scientific observation, he did not always feel the need to restrain 
himself from conjecture. In the words of one Carus scholar, “Like Schubert or Steffens, 
Carus has no compunction in combining precise observations of detail with remarkably free-
ranging and unsubstantiated speculations about the universe.”173 Yet, his hesitation regarding 
the new direction of scientific inquiry is not only motivated by his cohort’s declining 
legitimacy within the sciences. What Carus insists on reminding his readership is that, 
despite its advantages, empirical science’s heavy reliance on visually acquired data for 
making knowledge claims is deficient from the start, due to the inherently limited capacities 
of human scope and perspective that necessarily distort reality. “Es wäre vergeblich, [...]” he 
notes “Beweise zu häufen, welche notwendig fruchtlos bleiben müssen, wo das Organ sie zu 
fassen mangelt.”174 Epistemological concerns related to vision in particular and the bounds of 
human perception in general are thus critical motivations for Carus’s invective against what 
he sees as a misguided ostracism of inorganic nature within scientific study. Zwölf Briefe 
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bears witness to his desire for a way of knowing that can properly acknowledge inorganic 
beings as crucial participants in a living, dynamic system.  
 As briefly noted above, one of the ways that Carus tries to reframe scientific vision is 
through the assertion of what he calls the Überblick, the holistic-aesthetic conception of 
nature that played such a critical role in German scientific inquiry of previous decades, 
particularly for Goethe and Humboldt. Carus’s desire to retain the Überblick beyond this 
period also in some ways anticipates evolutionary discourse within the German-speaking 
realm. For instance, Ernst Haeckel’s term “Ökologie,” coined several decades later in 1866, 
resonates with Carus’s concerns. Bearing in mind that Haeckel’s acknowledgment of the 
inorganic always serves his primary focus—the study of organic, living form—similarities 
between the two abound:  
Unter Oecologie verstehen wir die gesammte Wissenschaft von den Beziehungen 
der Organismen zur umgebenden Aussenwelt, wohin wir im weiteren Sinne alle 
Existenz-Bedingungen rechnen können. Diese sind theils organischer, theils 
anorganischer Natur.175 
 
The Überblick is thus a precursor to “ecological” vision insofar as it examines systems 
holistically—the part in relation to the whole—rather than examining the components of the 
system in relation only to one another. The study of forms and phenomena in isolation, as the 
emerging scientific paradigm tended to do, necessarily involved a “fragmenting” scientific 
gaze that destroyed or at least obstructed this vision of the whole. For Carus, then, the 
necessity of overview-oriented vision lies precisely in its capacity to preserve the big picture, 
by seeking to understand forms and phenomena through a varied constellation of contributing 
factors and by acknowledging multiple, non-linear connections within a system. In other 
words, Carus’s resistance to elevating living nature above nonliving nature was anchored in 
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an instinct about the great power and significance of a living organism’s environment. 
Considering his passion for landscape painting, which by definition is invested in examining 
questions of atmosphere, environment, and inorganic form, this sense of alarm should not be 
surprising. 
 Moreover, Carus’s dedication to this ecological, big-picture thinking must have felt 
particularly pressing in an era characterized by a mania for “small-picture” data collection 
microscopic analysis within the natural sciences. And while a heightened interest in 
microscopic study is not exclusively associated with the proliferation of biological study and 
its relentless attempts to define life, the two phenomena are certainly related. For one, the 
discovery of the mammalian ovum by Karl Ernst Baer in 1827 threatened to end a number of 
philosophical explanations for procreation and generation, and thus fueled more extensive 
study within embryology and microbiology.176 Just a few years later, in 1830, British opticist 
Joseph Lister proposed important corrections to improve the function of the compound 
microscope with achromatic lenses; this modification was rapidly implemented across 
Europe and widely available as “the indispensable tool of all microscopists” by 1840.177 Such 
key developments contributed to major improvements in microbiological research and paved 
the way for Theodor Schwann and Matthias Schleiden’s 1839 articulation of the first two 
tenets of modern cell theory: that all living organisms consist of cells and that cells are the 
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basic units of life.178 In many ways, then, scientific advancements around 1830 proved that 
small-scale observations can have colossal significance. 
 Indeed, despite Carus’s hesitance toward the glorification of the life sciences, he does 
at times show great interest in microscopic scale, as we see in the above citation’s reference 
to chemical erosion; in his praise of the cataloging of landscape flora that Humboldt 
promotes in Ansichten der Natur; and in his insistence in Neun Briefe that landscape painters 
undergo scientific training to understand the natural laws guiding the individual forms that 
they seek to represent. These are just a handful of the many examples suggesting that Carus 
does not dismiss detailed-oriented, microscopic-level study wholesale or consider it 
incompatible with the Überblick. Rather, he fears that the two are in danger of becoming 
mutually exclusive within the practices of scientific inquiry. Indeed, his two-fold description 
of the rock cited at the beginning of this chapter demonstrates the necessity of observation 
and reflection of both the macro and micro scale, and much of his other writing seeks a 
reconciliation of the “inner” and “outer” eye to promote a more nuanced understanding 
nature’s basic patterns of operation. As Müller-Tamm points out, in order to prevent 
becoming “bloße Faktensammlung” with no subjective perspective to anchor it, Carus 
believes that the emphasis on microscopic data within science needs to be tempered with an 
effort “ästhetische und subjektive Momente in sich auf[zu]nehmen.”179 
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Knowing Nature in Stifter’s Kalkstein: From “Beobachtung” to “Betrachtung”  
 To speak of themes of vision, perspective, and scope in the works of Adalbert Stifter 
is hardly a new endeavor, particularly because Stifter’s prose is so well known for its rich 
visual detail and imagery.180 Yet, a look at his novella Kalkstein suggests that these themes 
function not only as reflections on literary aesthetics but also as interventions in broader 
discourses, including the adequacy of empirical vision and representation and the fraught 
relationship between organic and inorganic nature.181 Kalkstein thus confronts a similar 
constellation of concerns expressed by Carus in his Neun Briefe of 1831 and Zwölf Briefe of 
1841. Bearing in mind Carus’s call for a scientific approach that could successfully integrate 
microsopic detail and the ecological Überblick, Stifter’s choice of a geological surveyor as 
the primary narrator for Kalkstein is compelling. For, at least upon first consideration, the 
integration of these perspectives is precisely what a surveyor strives to achieve: to gather 
detailed measurements about the land surrounding him, compile that data, and transform it 
into an Überblick in the form of a topographical or cadastral map. And, yet, Stifter’s story 
soon makes it clear that such a superficial representation in no way measures up to the 
Überblick associated with the Humboldtian or Goethean scientific ideal. A typical surveyor’s 
version of the Überblick, for instance, neither captures the unique individual character of a 
region, nor can it pay any heed to the interrelations between the inorganic forms that it 
measures and the organic forms—that is, humans, animals, and plants—inhabiting that 
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world. It is also blind to the dynamism of nature that produces meteorological events and 
phenomena like erosion. To survey is to record locations of points and planes; as a practice, 
then, it takes the earth for granted as a static, lifeless mass to be fixed on paper and divvied 
up amongst the living beings who inhabit it. This mode of seeing and knowing nature is thus 
a far cry from the dynamic, ecological view that Carus propounds. Likewise, as a manner of 
representation, the survey map is diametrically opposed to Carus’s notion of the “earth-life” 
painting, which strives to depict a landscape in a way that references the uniqueness of its 
character, its dynamic Stimmungen, and the specific history inscribed into its present form. 
The survey view, by definition, is decidedly anti-Romantic and anti-landscape. So, why on 
earth would Stifter, a passionate devotee of landscape painting, delegate the primary 
narration of this landscape-obsessed novella to a surveyor? As it turns out, Stifter seems 
determined to make visible precisely what the survey view misses. 
 Stifter makes it clear relatively early on that themes of vision and seeing are intended 
to impart an important lesson in the story, and these lessons are not unrelated to Carus’s 
assertions outlined above. Moreover, as I mentioned previously, Carus and Stifter both 
frequently use metaphors of vision to explore competing approaches to scientific study and 
competing ways of knowing in general. In the case of Kalkstein, the genesis of the novella’s 
central relationship—that of the surveyor and the Steinkar pastor—can be traced back to a 
church celebration in a town called “Schauendorf.” This name, “looking village,” is 
appropriate because it is indeed the place where the surveyor first observes the pastor and 
describes his appearance and demeanor to the reader. It soon becomes apparent that the 
surveyor has a remarkably keen eye, as well as a predilection for conveying extensive visual 
detail. Noting that there is only one person at this gathering in Schauendorf who is “nicht zu 
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erkennen,” the surveyor seeks to make this stranger “erkennbar,” describing his appearance 
from head to toe and in painstaking detail down to the threads of his clothing:  
Er hatte den Anzug eines armen Landgeistlichen. Sein Rock war sehr abgetragen, 
die Fäden waren daran sichtbar, er glänzte an manchen Stellen, und an andern 
hatte er die schwarze Farbe verloren und war rötlich oder fahl. Die Knöpfe daran 
waren von starkem Bein. Die schwarze Weste war sehr lang und hatte ebenfalls 
beinerne Knöpfe […]182 
 
This description continues for several more sentences. Once the pastor stands up from the 
table, the narrator observes still more detail and proceeds to relay the remainder of his 
clothing, which was previously hidden from view. He then moves on to a description of the 
man’s body: 
[…] Sein körperliches Aussehen stimmte zu seinem Anzuge. Er hatte ein 
längliches, sanftes, fast eingeschüchterteres Angesicht mit sehr schönen klaren 
blauen Augen. Die braunen Haare gingen schlicht gegen hinten zusammen, es 
zogen sich schon weiße Fäden durch sie, die anzeigten, daß er sich bereits den 
fünfzig Jahren nähere oder daß er Sorge und Kummer gehabt haben müsse.183 
 
After an exhaustive visual description of 434 words—just when the reader might expect to 
witness an interaction between the surveyor and this man—it is time for the latter to begin his 
long journey home. The surveyor thus does not come to know him personally but, as we later 
learn, he has internalized so much visual information that he easily recognizes the man when 
his work brings him back to the region almost a decade later. This situation, however, 
highlights the difference between knowing someone or something personally (kennen) and 
discerning or knowing by sight (erkennen). It also links the surveyor’s dependence on that 
which is immediately visible and present with the latter, erkennen. Despite all of the 
surveyor’s precision laid out in the narrative, his knowledge is soon revealed as shallow. 
Specifically, the surveyor is astounded at the pastor’s abject poverty, which he has “noch 
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niemals bei einem Menschen oberhalb des Bettlerstandes angetroffen,” but he learns over 
time that the man’s meager physical and material existence has little to do with hardship.184 
Thus, the irony of the story’s original title, “Der arme Wohltäter,” is that appearances often 
lie.185 It soon becomes clear that the surveyor’s mode of seeing and knowing frequently runs 
the risk of misreading signs and drawing false conclusions. Such misreadings are 
characteristic of the surveyor’s interactions with the world, regarding not only his 
relationship with the pastor but also his relationship with the land he has been sent to study.  
 Upon his return to the Steinkar region eight years after the celebration in Schauendorf, 
the surveyor immediately turns his meticulous eye to the limestone karst topography 
surrounding him: 
[J]eder Hügel bestand aus nacktem, grauem Kalksteine, der […] in rundlichen 
breiten Gestalten auseinanderging, und an seinem Fuß eine lange gestreckte 
Sandbank um sich herum hatte. Durch diese Hügel ging in großen Windungen ein 
kleiner Fluß namens Zirder. Das Wasser des Flusses, das in der grauen und gelben 
Farbe des Steines und Sandes durch den Widerschein des Himmels oft dunkelblau 
erschien, dann die schmalen grünen Streifen, die oft am Saume des Wassers 
hingingen, und die anderen einzelnen Rasenflecke, die in dem Gesteine hie und da 
lagen, bildeten die ganze Abwechslung und Erquickung in dieser Gegend.186 
 
Likewise, when he encounters the pastor again, he cannot help but scrutinize the latter’s now 
aged appearance, assessing it extensively in three separate passages. Although it turns out 
that the pastor has no recollection of having encountered the surveyor, the surveyor seizes the 
occasion as an opportunity to boast about his own skills in observing and recognizing faces: 
Mein Beruf bringt es mit sich […] daß ich mit vielen Menschen verkehre und sie 
mir merke, und da habe ich denn im Merken eine solche Fertigkeit erlangt, daß 
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185 A similar sentiment is echoed in the opening paragraph of Brigitta: “In dem Angesicht eines Häßlichen ist 
für uns oft eine innere Schönheit, die wir nicht auf der Stelle von seinem Werte herzuleiten vermögen, während 
uns oft die Züge eines andern kalt und leer sind, von denen alle sagen, daß sie die größte Schönheit besitzen” 
(123). 
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ich auch Menschen erkenne, die ich vor Jahren und auch nur ein einziges Mal 
gesehen habe.187 
 
After explaining this extraordinary proficiency in facial recognition, the surveyor’s words 
shift to a condemnation of the landscape: “Und in dieser abscheulichen Gegend haben wir 
uns wiedergefunden.” Ironically, this final remark invalidates everything preceding it by 
exposing his tendency toward misreading faces, despite his proclamation to the contrary. This 
time, however, it is the physiognomy of the landscape that he misjudges, at least from the 
perspective of the pastor. Quick to defend it, the pastor remarks, “Sie ist, wie sie Gott 
erschaffen hat […] es wachsen hier nicht so viele Bäume wie in Schauendorf, aber manches 
Mal ist sie auch schön, und zuweilen ist sie schöner als alle andern in der Welt.”188  
 When the surveyor asks how often the pastor visits this particular area, the latter 
replies: “Ich gehe heraus, um meine Füße zu üben, und sitze dann auf einem Stein, um die 
Dinge zu betrachten.”189 The pastor thus not only insists on a different reading of the 
landscape, but his choice of words also suggests that this reading is based on a different way 
of looking at it, which is represented by the verb betrachten. The surveyor, by contrast, 
describes his own mode of vision almost exclusively with words like sehen, (be)merken, and 
beobachten, which imply neutrality and even distance, while the pastor’s vision is almost 
exclusively rendered as betrachten. With regard to knowing nature, betrachten is noteworthy 
because it conveys a close attunement to the natural world that develops through 
contemplative watchfulness and the immersion of oneself in it, rather than merely noticing or 
recording its appearance at a given moment. The pastor’s defense of the landscape also 
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suggests that his manner of engaging with it acknowledges its dynamism and capacity for 
change. He asserts that it is how God created it but then describes this piece of creation as 
something that is not static in form or appearance but something that is “manches Mal […] 
schön, und zuweilen […] schöner als alle andern in der Welt.” For the pastor, it is a moving, 
breathing system, and his relationship with it makes him an integral part of that system. 
Appropriately, when the surveyor first notices the pastor in his practice of betrachten, the 
man is literally entangled with the land, sitting in a sand heap with his “Schuhe fast in den 
Sand vergraben” and sand “auf den Schößen seines Rockes.”190  
 Over time, the surveyor comes to value both the pastor’s way of seeing and his intimate 
appreciation for the landscape and its peculiarities. Betrachten eventually becomes a shared 
practice between them that is occasionally paired with the pronoun “wir”: 
Wir gingen später öfter mit einander in den Steinen herum oder saßen auf einem 
und betrachteten die andern. Er zeigten mir manches Tierchen, manche Pflanze, 
die der Gegend eigentümlich waren, er zeigte mir die Besonderheiten der Gegend 
und machte mich auf die Verschiedenheiten mancher Steinhügel aufmerksam, die 
der sorgfältigste Beobachter für ganz gleich gebildet angesehen haben würde.191 
 
With this statement, the surveyor concedes that, despite his own skill for observing detail, the 
pastor’s practice of betrachten has opened up a kind of perception that otherwise would have 
been inaccessible to him. The obvious irony here is that the presumed expert in observing 
landforms only truly learns to distinguish them with the help of the local pastor. This 
problem of perception, represented by the figure of the surveyor, resonates strongly with the 
penultimate letter of Carus’s Neun Briefe, which addresses questions of vision and nature. As 
I previously noted, these earlier observations from the 1820s condemned the current state of 
painting for its failure to correctly capture the myriad forms present in nature, suggesting that 
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scientific study could help artists correct this vision. A decade later, specifically in Zwölf 
Briefe, Carus tends to reverse the recommendation, this time citing scientific vision as 
deficient and urgently in need of an aesthetic sensibility. In both cases, his admonishment of 
those self-proclaimed artists and scientists who observe nature with a crude, untutored eye is 
relevant for Kalkstein’s surveyor, who is excessively proficient at collecting data but 
painfully blind to the underlying patterns holding it together: 
Dem rohern Sinne nämlich erscheint in der Naturbetrachtung nur zu Vieles als 
willkürlich, als zufällig, als gesetzlos, denn er ist selbst noch außer dem Gesetz 
und eben darum um so befangener. Ihm ist es bedeutungslos, ob ein Gebirge nun 
gerade mit dieser oder jener Art der Linien sich umschreibt, ihm ist es 
gleichgültig, ob eine Wolke so oder so zieht, eine Welle in dieser oder jener Linie 
sich erhebt, ihm gilt es einerlei, ob ein Baum gerade so oder so gewachsen sei ja 
er wird wol [sic] kaum den Unterschied, den verschiedene Baumformen im 
Ganzen darbieten, als etwas Nothwendiges gewahr. Dergleichen Rohigkeit 
begleitet dann wol den Künstler sein ganzes Leben hindurch, wenn nicht eine 
kräftig und schön ausstrebende Seele ihn dagegen schützt oder eingreifende 
Wissenschaft ihn erweckt.192   
 
In this passage, Carus speaks of the artist whose vision is in need of a scientific awakening to 
enhance his ability to distinguish all of nature’s diverse forms and in a context that grasps 
their necessity.   
 Kalkstein, by contrast, presents a scientist who requires an awakening of his own, 
although the exact nature of this awakening is not initially clear. One might tend to 
characterize it as a spiritual awakening, given the pastor’s religious status. And, yet, while 
the pastor’s guidance often exudes a spiritual quality, this medial layer of the novella 
contains remarkably little talk of God or the Bible. Moreover, the Steinkar church is only 
described briefly in passing, and, with the exception of the schoolchildren, his congregation 
is absent from the story as well. The aging pastor primarily experiences a connection with the 
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divine through personal contact with the natural world, and the “awakening” that he offers 
the surveyor is therefore reminiscent, if anything, of a perspective on nature espoused by 
Romantic Naturphilosophen or by Goethe. As such, the pastor is a relic of a bygone era in 
which philosophical contemplation enjoyed a role within scientific inquiry, and in which the 
function of the imagination, or inner eye, was just as important as detached, externally 
oriented empirical vision. These older modes of vision and the epistemological approach they 
represent might also explain why the pastor’s time immersed in and actively contemplating 
the limestone landscape yields an intimate familiarity that trumps any superficial or crude 
knowledge that the surveyor can gather.  
 The pastor’s intuitive, participatory relationship with his surroundings echoes   
Müller-Tamm’s characterization of Carus’s persistent plea for a more Goethean approach to 
understanding nature, whereby one should "im Bewusstsein, Teil der Natur zu sein, forschen; 
er soll die Natur in Beziehung zu sich auffassen, ohne darum seine Individualität ins Zentrum 
zu stellen.“193 The pastor figure does indeed evoke the approach to natural study described by 
Goethe’s in his own writings on morphology several decades earlier. In these writings—most 
famously in Metamorphose der Pflanzen—Goethe celebrates the kind of scientist who so 
attentively watches a leaf unfold that its process of development shapes his own being in 
return. The Goethean scientist seeks to grasp at once the external form of the plant and the 
internal necessity of that form as a stage in its transformation over time. This approach to 
science tends to be expressed throughout Goethe’s morphology writings as a process of 
Anschauung, but, notably for Kalkstein, the process is also often associated with the verb 
“betrachten,” which is how the pastor’s vision is described. According to Goethe, such an 
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approach to scientific inquiry is necessary because it displays “eine aufrichtige, reine, 
belebende Teilnahme” towards nature as well as a sense for “Zusammenhang” and “das 
Ganze,” in contrast to the emerging scientific paradigm of objective empiricism.194 In the 
introductory essays later composed to frame his botanical study, Goethe also advocates for 
his approach by measuring it against what he views as negligent approaches to scientific 
inquiry. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Kalkstein’s surveyor figure, his methods, and the semantic 
choices associated with his character in the story echo Goethe’s charges:  
Wenn der zur lebhaften Beobachtung aufgeforderte Mensch mit der Natur einen 
Kampf zu bestehen anfängt, so fühlt er zuerst einen ungeheueren Trieb, die 
Gegenstände sich zu unterwerfen. […] Leider findet man aber [..], bei denen die 
sich dem Erkennen, dem Wissen ergeben, selten eine wünschenswerte Teilnahme. 
Dem Verständigen, auf das Besondere Merkenden, genau Beobachtenden, 
auseinander Trennenden ist gewissermaßen das zur Last, was aus einer Idee 
kommt und auf sie zurückführt. Er ist in seinem Labyrinth auf eine eigene Weise 
zu Hause, ohne daß er sich um einen Faden bekümmerte, der durch und durch 
führte.195 
 
Similar to Stifter’s characterization of the surveyor’s vision in Kalkstein, Goethe associates 
this inferior mode of scientific vision with verbs such as “beobachten, “erkennen,” and 
“(be)merken.” Likewise, his primary criticism stems from the fact that the corresponding 
form of science is based on distance and separation. In aiming to remove the human from its 
object of study, this approach effectively disregards the role of subjective participation, 
which would otherwise take the individual observations collected and integrate them with the 
inner eye to arrive at an image or idea of the whole, similar to the process of Stimmung 
outlined above. Moreover, Goethe frequently associates this objective, distanced approach 
with a tendency towards “Trennung” and thus a focus on the individual components of a 
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natural body or process rather than the whole. He locates this impulse, for instance, in the 
study of chemistry and anatomy and notes that, although both have achieved a certain level 
of new insight into nature, these disciplines ultimately create divisions rather than exposing 
connections. The result is an image similar to Heinrich Drendorf’s pile of gravel cited at the 
beginning of this chapter: 
[D]iese trennenden Bemühungen, immer und immer fortgesetzt, bringen auch 
manchen Nachteil hervor. Das Lebendige ist zwar in Elemente zerlegt, aber man 
kann es aus diesen nicht wieder zusammenstellen und beleben. Dieses gilt schon 
von vielen anorganischen, geschweige von organischen Körpern. Es hat sich 
daher auch in dem wissenschaftlichen Menschen zu allen Zeiten ein Trieb 
hervorgetan die lebendigen Bildungen als solche zu erkennen, ihre äußern 
sichtbaren, greiflichen Teile im Zusammenhange zu erfassen.196  
 
Goethe lamented these divisive tendencies within the sciences and continually sought to 
reconcile the study of detail with an appreciation of the bigger picture. As it happens, Carus 
had composed a similar critique around the same time (ca. 1820):  
Wo vermag denn sonst der Mensch auch nur das Geringste lebendig zu 
erschaffen, wo führt eine Wissenschaft unmittelbar zur Belebung, wo nicht 
vielmehr zunächst zur Ertödtung, d. i. zur Zerlegung? — Man zerlegt das 
Pflanzenblatt in seine Zellen, Athmungsöffnungen, Gefäße und Fasern, das 
kleinste Thier lehrt uns die vergleichende Anatomie in noch kleinere Gebilde 
trennen, und doch! wer belebte mit all dieser Wissenschaft auch nur die kleinste 
Milbe, wer setzte dadurch das kleinste Pflanzenblatt zusammen?197  
 
With the growing rift between science and art, as well as the rising status of modern 
empirical study and its technological trappings, the task of  “beleben”—of reassembling and 
“revitalizing” dismantled objects of scientific study with an eye to the whole—increasingly 
fell outside the scope of what was now considered science. Moreover, the fact that thinkers 
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geschaffen, die Verwandtschaft des Menschen zum Weltgeiste beurkunden.” This reflection also asserts a sense 
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like Carus were still calling for a counterbalance to science’s dissecting impulse in 
subsequent decades (and continued to do so after Goethe’s death) suggests that it was 
becoming an evermore elusive pursuit.  
  Goethe’s disapproval of the “trennende Bemühungen” within science primarily 
addresses the treatment of organic nature. However, his emphasis on the importance of 
holistic-aesthetic vision for understanding both organic and inorganic bodies in the last 
passage suggests that he shares with the Romantic Naturphilosophen a tendency towards 
monism, acknowledging a quality of divinity or vitality in all of nature, whether organic or 
inorganic and whether animate or inanimate. Although a superficial comparison of 
Kalkstein’s surveyor and pastor might lead us to associate the surveyor with science, 
according to earlier definitions of science, such as those found in explanations by Goethe and 
Carus, the pastor possesses qualities that are equally, if not more, critical for fully grasping 
the karst landscape surrounding him. The pastor’s intimate, participatory relationship with 
the environment—his “Teilnahme” as Goethe might put it—is a gesture of vulnerability, a 
willingness to be moved and changed by the object or process observed and thus also an 
acknowledgement of its power and presence. Time and again we witness the pastor’s 
readiness to expose himself to the elements without fear. The combination of his 
accumulated experience with the land and his immersion in it makes his knowledge subtle 
and intuitive: it allows him, for instance, to sense what is otherwise undetectable and 
seemingly immaterial, such as the onset and severity of an approaching storm or the future 
threat of a washed-out river.  
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Physiognomies of Erosion: Learning to See Dynamic Entanglement in Nature 
 Just as the pastor teaches the surveyor to see the landscape in a different way, Stifter’s 
own tendency toward didacticism reveals itself in this story. Just as the “Bewegung II” 
painting teaches its viewers how to see and reflect on the phenomenon of movement and 
dynamism in inorganic nature, his literary aesthetic in Kalkstein gradually teaches the reader 
how to view the natural landscape it presents. Not only does he call attention to the erosive 
qualities of this karst landscape, but he also presents these qualities in a certain pattern of 
repetition to create a sense of kinship and unity between the human and natural worlds. 
The pastor’s tendency to immerse himself in nature and become shaped by it points to 
the sense of entangled human-nature unity that Stifter is trying to achieve. The pastor buries 
himself in the sand, wanders for hours underneath the harsh sun, and plunges himself into 
deep water after a powerful storm floods the Zirder River. Moreover, the karst landscape 
itself reflects these same properties, as limestone rock is partially solvent in acidic water and 
thus chemically reactive and susceptible to change.198 The pastor and his natural environment 
have a dynamic, reciprocal relationship that is repeatedly underscored by the narrative’s 
tendency to draw out similarities in their physiognomies. The mirroring effect between 
humans and nature that Stifter creates here, however, is quite unlike the Romantic tendency 
to present landscape merely as a projection of the human psyche. Rather, the pastor and his 
karst landscape are bound to one another through a common essence coursing through their 
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innermost being, which is signified by the blue waters of the Zirder river and the blue hue of 
the pastor’s eyes.  
This entangled relationship is introduced most powerfully by the scene in which the 
pastor is found sitting—immersed—in a sand heap at the beginning of the story. 
Appropriately, the ubiquity of sand in the story points to another striking physical feature 
shared by the pastor and his environment: both have a distinctively eroded and aged 
appearance. Despite the occasional hint of blue water, the landscape’s colors are 
predominantly gray and yellow; similarly, its profile is dull and worn, with “rundlich” and 
“breit” hills through which “Windungen” have been carved by the modest river traversing 
it.199 The overall character of this landscape stands in stark contrast to the dramatic 
“Wildnisse, Schlünde, Abgründe, Felsen und stürzende Wässer” that the surveyor prefers to 
see. Likewise, the pastor’s face, with the exception of his eyes, also bears marks of 
weathering: his hair has grayed and “deutliche Falten” have developed in his face.200 Just as 
the Steinkar’s rock formations are relayed to the reader as “nackt” and largely lacking in 
vegetation on the surface, so too is the pastor’s exterior described as worn and depleted. His 
clothing is utterly threadbare and his hat shows “nicht ein einziges Härchen auf ihm.”201 
Unlike the surveyor, who frequently shields himself from the elements with his bulky 
outdoor gear, the only buffer shielding the pastor’s body from the elements is a thin layer of 
fine linen.202 
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 The congruence—one might say the Gestimmtheit—between the pastor and the 
Steinkar region is further underlined by a peculiar pairing of adjectives in the text that 
provide additional insight into Stifter’s use of erosion as a key motif.203 Early on, the 
surveyor characterizes the Steinkar as a “fürchterliche” Gegend. The reader is led to infer 
that he considers it ugly or uninspiring because he notes his preference for exciting, sublime 
landscapes with “zerissen” or “steil” features—as opposed to the dull colors, smooth lines, 
and round contours that make up his current work setting. In a subsequent passage, he then 
relates his encounter with the pastor sitting in the sand and describes the latter’s destitute 
appearance as “ängstlich reinlich.” Had the adjectives “fürchterlich” and “ängstlich” 
appeared in another context, their significance might seem marginal. But due to their 
proximity to one another as well as their role in further establishing the landscape and the 
pastor as analogous figures, the barely masked synonyms Furcht and Angst seem likely to be 
Stifter’s way of reinforcing their Gestimmtheit at the verbal level. Not only are the surveyor’s 
two objects of study pitiful or unpleasant to look at, but, through a kind of Freudian slip in 
the narrative, they are also revealed to the reader as fear-inducing, even if the surveyor does 
not appear to perceive them as such consciously. In both cases, the couched expression of 
fear is followed by a description of visible signs of exposure, weathering, and deterioration, 
which are captured with terms such as “nackt,” “auseinander[gehen],” “Lockerheit,” “das 
Unhaltbare,” and “das Wesenlose.”204 Thus, precisely those features that connect the 
landscape and the pastor are also the characteristics that provoke the surveyor’s discomfort: 
                                                                                                                                                  
prevents him from correctly determining imminent danger, as we see in the rainstorm scene. 
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namely, their susceptibility to physical transformation and the visible evidence of dissolution 
and decay, both on their bodies and all around them. Even the pastor’s rectory is located 
within a cirque (Kar), a bowl-like geological feature usually formed by centuries of glaciers 
scrubbing away at the bedrock below. When the surveyor accompanies the pastor to his 
home for the first time, he notes that, here, even “das stärkste Gestein” [presumably granite] 
“sich ein wenig auflöset,” and that they must descend down into the carved out area where 
the rectory is situated. The external appearances of both the pastor and the landscape are 
frightening, then, because they serve as a reminder of the old adage that the only constant is 
change. In this case, that transformation is a slow path towards decline, death, and 
disappearance. 
  The surveyor not only experiences fear and repulsion in the face of this world of 
dissolution and loss, but his negative reaction also seems partially triggered by what he longs 
for and does not find: signs of growth, fertility, and abundance. In other words, that which 
does not bear Frucht instills Furcht. Accordingly, the only respite he finds in this terrible 
landscape resides in the “schmalen grünen Streifen, die oft am Saume des Wassers 
hingingen, und die anderen einzelnen Rasenflecke, die in dem Gesteine hie und da liegen.” 
His preference for such features is emphasized throughout the novella. Looking back, for 
instance, it suddenly becomes significant that the beginning of the surveyor’s story included 
praise for the pastor of the nearby village of Schauendorf. In particular, the surveyor 
expresses his admiration for this pastor’s flourishing orchards: 
Da kam ich in das nahe gelegene Dorf Schauendorf und lernte dessen Pfarrer 
kennen, einen vortrefflichen Mann, der die Obstbaumzucht eingeführt und 
gemacht hatte, daß das Dorf, das früher mit Hecken, Dickicht und Geniste 
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umgeben war, jetzt einem Garten glich und in einer Fülle freundlicher Obstbäume 
dalag.205 
 
Here, the surveyor identifies the Schauendorf pastor as an active cultivator of the land. Not 
only has this “admirable” pastor brought the unruly weed population under control by 
introducing “friendlier” plants, but he has also scaled up the area’s productivity and thus 
transformed it into something that is both fruitful and beautiful, according to the surveyor. 
Likewise, when the surveyor visits the Steinkar pastor’s rectory after descending into the 
cirque, his attention is focused on locating fertile land, which he spots only much further out 
in the distance: “[w]eit draußen gegen das Land hin lag auch ein fruchtbarerer Teil, der zu 
der Gemeinde gehörte, und der auch Acker-, Wiesen- und Kleegrund hatt.” By contrast, the 
Steinkar pastor’s favorite spots for contemplation, and the rectory in which he lives, are 
largely situated within a landscape of rocky, sandy barrenness and erosion, with only a small 
patch of the “freundlicherem Grün der Wiese.”206 While the Schauendorf pastor and his fruit-
bearing trees represent youth, growth, and the proliferation of life and form, the Steinkar 
pastor and his limestone are associated with age, decline, and the slow degradation of form. 
The surveyor’s inclination not only to perceive life in the organic realm alone but also to 
consider youthfulness as the essence of life extends to the human realm as well, as we 
witness in his encounter with the Steinkar schoolchildren:  
Sie sahen mich anfangs mit trotzigen und scheuen Angesichtern an; aber da ich 
von Jugend auf ein Kinderfreund gewesen bin, da ich stets die Kinder als 
Knospen der Menschheit außerordentlich geliebt habe und seit meiner 
Verehelichung selbst mit einer Anzahl davon gesegnet worden bin, […] so war 
ich bald von einem Kreise plaudernder und rühriger Kinder umringt.207 
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Not only does the surveyor associate the children with the fruit tree motif by referring to 
them as the “buds” of humanity, but he also self-identifies with their youthfulness by 
deeming himself a “Kinderfreund.” Finally, he mentions his marriage and “numerous” 
children in this context as further evidence for his fondness of children but also, it seems, as a 
testament to his own his own “fruitfulness.” The Steinkar pastor, by contrast, neither 
cultivates an orchard, nor does he have children of his own. In fact, because his twin brother 
(and only sibling) died without progeny and his father and grandfather were only children, 
his family line as he knows it will terminate at his death with no chance for continuance.  
 By revealing subtle distinctions in the surveyor’s descriptions of his surroundings 
according to whether they are “fruitbearing” and “non-fruitbearing,” Stifter sheds light on the 
subconscious judgments made by the surveyor, particularly in an era of science that 
increasingly equates nature with “living” nature. That humans and objects in the story who 
represent death and loss are associated with Furcht suggests that the surveyor perceives them 
as foreign; accordingly, he seeks to define himself against them. By the same token, the 
presence of the word Freund within descriptions of those humans and objects deemed full of 
vitality and productivity suggests that the surveyor feels an affinity toward them and thus 
self-identifies with them. The lopsided dichotomy and consequent process of exclusion that 
emerges here resonates with Carus’s observations regarding the problem of anthropocentrism 
within scientific inquiry. As I noted in the introduction to this chapter, Carus specifically 
takes issue with the tendency within science to privilege the study of complex organisms 
because they are most similar to the human form. Because of this limited, “egoistic” 
perspective, Carus argues, the nonliving components of the natural world, such as the earth 
and sky, are unjustly disregarded as “etwas durchaus Heterogenes,”—in other words, as an 
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unknown, “fearsome,” Other.208 The constant temptation to alienate inorganic nature 
highlights, once again, the characteristic subject-object dualism accompanying the 
institutionalization of the sciences in the first half of the 19th century in Germany. Kalkstein’s 
surveyor takes the organic-inorganic distinction to another level, however. With his attention 
to questions of productivity and procreation, he widens the rift between organic and 
inorganic nature by sorting his objects of study based on their generative capacities, but with 
organic reproduction as a standard. The irony of his perspective lies in the contradiction that, 
even though the surveyor’s conscious narration neglects inorganic nature as non-productive 
and thus inconsequential, his word choice betrays the response (i.e., fear) that it actually 
produces in him. It may not reproduce or give rise to life, but it can, apparently, shape living 
beings by provoking reactions.  
 Moreover, even with regard to the issue of reproduction, the surveyor stands to be 
enlightened by the pastor’s unconventional conception of nature. One of the most 
conspicuous instances of the pastor’s mentoring appears when he is bedridden toward the end 
of the novella. He asks the surveyor to report on the transformations taking place outside, 
noting specific processes that should be examined: 
Er fragte mich, ob die Brombeeren an dem Kulterloche schon zu reifen begännen, 
ob der Rasen gegen die Zirderhöhe, welchen der Frühling immer sehr schön grün 
färbe, schon im Vergelben und Ausdorren begriffen sei, ob die Hagebutten schon 
reiften, ob das Verwittern des Kalksteins vorwärts gehe, ob die in die Zirder 
                                                
208 Zwölf Briefe 51. In Neun Briefe (57), Carus makes a similar note about beauty in the enclosure to letter III 
(written ca. 1820): that humans tend to see beauty in more highly developed forms because these exhibit 
qualities of the divine (with the human as the pinnacle of this development). Landscape (or nature in general, 
but I think he means landscape here) is a strange case because it is then actually perceived as most beautiful 
when it is expressed through the human (i.e. as landscape painting). If more progressed forms are more 
beautiful, erosion is ugly/threatening because it feels not only less progressed but regressive. The conflict 
between a model of progress and a cyclical model (with “regessive” phases) also plagued Schelling, according 
to Bätschmann (4). 
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gefallenen Stücke sich vermehrten und der Sand sich vervielfältige, und 
dergleichen mehr.209  
 
The list begins with an organic process—here again, the flourishing of fruit—but ends with a 
more nuanced interest in the transformations occurring within the inorganic realm, namely, 
the continual weathering of the limestone and the resulting accumulation of sand. It is 
certainly no coincidence that the verbs the pastor reportedly uses to describe erosion—sich 
vermehren (to breed/procreate), sich vervielfältigen (to multiply)—are typically reserved to 
describe the reproductive processes of living organisms. The erosion motif so central to 
Kalkstein thus shows that, not only is inorganic nature always engaged in a continual process 
of movement and transformation, but it also has its own models of productivity and self-
propagation. While organic generation is ultimately a mode of self-preservation in nature 
(albeit ersatz preservation), the eroding bodies of limestone in Kalkstein generate new form 
through a process of slow, steady self-sacrifice. These bodies sacrifice their material form as 
the sun, wind, and water slough off grain after grain of sand; in sacrificing themselves, they 
produce voids and generate new spaces, which is merely a different manifestation of the 
creative impulse in nature. And while the aggregate “parent” form will not recur in the image 
of the “offspring” grains of sand that it bears, those sand grains become integrated into future 
natural forms, both organic and inorganic. Erosion is the inorganic realm’s contribution to 
productivity in nature, both in and of itself and because it creates the environmental and 
material potential for life. 
 
                                                
209 Kalkstein 75. The surveyor’s addition of “und dergleichen mehr” suggests that he, as usual, doesn’t have the 
skills to distinguish between which details are more important or heavily emphasized—it all has the same 
weight to him. This points to the “democracy of data” problem in empiricism: how do you draw out what is 
important? 
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 The analogy that Kalkstein establishes between the pastor and the limestone is 
tenuous at times, but it does open the reader’s eyes to important qualities of both figures that 
might otherwise go unrecognized. For instance, what initially appears to be a case of 
indigence or miserliness turns out to be a result of the pastor’s commitment to extreme self-
sacrifice; the money he intentionally lets go is able to accumulate and provide new, future 
opportunities for the Steinkar children. With this realization in mind, the limestone landscape 
(and by extension, stone in general) emerges as a generous actor in the economy of nature. 
Additionally, the text’s exposure of erosion as an ultimately productive and life-giving 
process can be translated onto the pastor’s circumstances. Most importantly, it helps overturn 
the myopic notion that his legacy will extinguish with his death. By foregoing material 
possessions in the present moment and allowing that wealth to accumulate, he creates the 
possibility for a new “form” to be built: specifically, a schoolhouse for the Steinkar 
schoolchildren to learn and flourish. The motivation for this commitment is the pastor’s 
recognition that their current route to school poses too much danger. He thus makes his 
sacrifice in order to prevent their death—or, in other words, to protect and promote their life. 
Finally, even though the stones and the pastor do not have “living” progeny of their own, 
their charity nonetheless fosters ideal conditions for new life or contributes to the shaping of 
that life during its individual path of growth. It is therefore also significant that the pastor, 
with his plan for the schoolhouse, both conceives of a new space for the children’s 
intellectual formation (Bildung) and, upon its successful implementation, literally changes 
their path.210 
                                                
210 The connection between the idea of bilden/Bildung as human education and bilden/Bildung as geological 
formation is discussed in: Ireton 194. 
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 With Kalkstein’s exploration of the genesis and development of organisms, Stifter 
reveals his own preoccupation with theory of life discourse of the first half of the 19th 
century.211 However, as I have shown above, he also uses this discourse metaphorically and 
extends it to understand non-organisms and non-physiological development.212 In so doing, 
he explodes dichotomies that privilege life, such as procreative/non-procreative, 
living/nonliving, and organic/inorganic. Furthermore, while Goethean morphology and the 
flourishing fields of biology and comparative anatomy primarily seek to understand which 
inner regulatory systems (both physical and metaphysical) guide development, Stifter seems 
equally invested in revealing the dynamic interplay between internal and external (i.e., 
environmental) regulation. Kalkstein reveals that, just as a landscape of mostly non-living 
elements—for instance, a limestone karst—is an active contributor to the conditions that 
allow life to thrive, so too do natural environments in general provide more than merely a 
backdrop for a story or history as it develops. Especially in the eyes of a landscape painter 
like Stifter, natural environments are dynamic actors that move, shape, and share in the 
outcomes of the events that unfold within them. These qualities reinforce his assertion of the 
power of landscape and Stimmung.  
  
PART THREE — Stimmung as a Corrective for a Divided Natural World 
 
 
Uniting Subject and Object in Stifter’s “Vorrede” 
 
 Stifter’s narrative vision has often been described as “empirical” and his literary style 
deemed “anti-plot” or “non-narrative.” However, the analysis of Kalkstein above suggests 
                                                
211 The oft-forgotten introductory frame narrative even rehashes the preformationism-epigenesis debate (with 
chiastic logic). 
 
212 For a discussion of Stifter’s use of the discourse of the body to describe cityscapes, see Broderson. 
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that his nature descriptions represent a desire for unity in nature rather than a dissection of 
nature, or a “Zerbröckeln und Zerkrümmeln der Materie,” as was so famously asserted by 
Friedrich Hebbel and echoed by other critics over the years.213 Stifter’s attempt to render 
visual detail—whether in pictorial or verbal form—is not a conservative gesture intended to 
arrest time or exert control over the object portrayed. In fact, this is actually a fitting 
characterization of the perspective that Kalkstein’s surveyor has to overcome. Instead, 
Stifter’s work reflects the impulse to rescue nature from mere “object” status—a place of 
helplessness and inertia—and to acknowledge its great (and sometimes threatening) power. 
Despite growing social and institutional pressure to discredit Romantic ideas such as 
organic dynamism and human entanglement in nature, these values are central to the agenda 
of both Stifter and Carus as objective empiricism becomes the watchword of the scientific 
world. This is particularly the case because modern empirical methods necessitate a clear 
division between the human subject and his objects of study, and because scientific 
knowledge gleaned for technological gain often asserts the subordination of nature to human 
control.214 A critical attitude toward human superiority is thus a common theme for these 
authors, reinforced by Carus’s plea for a less bio-centric science and Stifter’s tendency to 
embrace the geological. Both suggest that the human does not have sole claim to subject 
status just because he is assumed to occupy the highest rung of the scala naturae. In 
embracing inorganic nature, Stifter and Carus are thus defending, more generally, a world of 
objects that is increasingly subordinated to human control and left with no capacity for 
                                                
213 Friedrich Hebbel, “Das Komma im Frack,” Werke vol. 3, ed. Gerhard Fricke et al, München, Hanser, 1965: 
682. 
 
214 For a comprehensive history of the progressive subordination of nature in modern Germany, see: David 
Blackbourn, The Conquest of Nature: Water, Landscape, and the Making of Modern Germany, London, 
Random House, 2011. 
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action. They want to show that the so-called object world, especially the natural world of 
objects, does indeed have agency and force and, as such, a kind of subject status. The concept 
of Stimmung, with its image of attunement and delicate entanglement between parts, offers 
one model of understanding nature that helps overcome these problematic divisions. 
 These two important Stimmung-related qualities combined—that is, the agency of the 
so-called “object world” of nature and the potential for attunement and alignment between 
humans and the various parts of nature—also very clearly inflect Stifter’s aesthetic program 
as he describes it in the “Vorrede” to Bunte Steine. In an attempt to explain what others have 
found to be a flawed approach in his stories, he presents an explanation that initially seems 
like a contradiction:  
Es soll sogar in denselben nicht einmal Tugend und Sitte gepredigt werden, wie es 
gebräuchlich ist, sondern sie sollen nur durch das wirken, was sie sind. Wenn 
etwas Edles und Gutes in mir ist, so wird es von selber in meinen Schriften liegen, 
wenn aber dasselbe nicht in meinem Gemüte ist, so werde ich mich vergeblich 
bemühen, Hohes und Schönes darzustellen, es wird doch immer das Niedrige und 
Unedle durchscheinen [...]215 
 
According to his first statement, if the objects that he is presenting are “noble” and “good,” 
then these qualities will also shine through in his art because they are inherently noble and 
good. This would be the case as long as the representation is true to the actual object 
depicted. In the second statement, however, he places significant emphasis on the notion that 
the artist himself has to be noble and good in order for these qualities to become detectable in 
his works. The latter is formulated in such a way that highlights its parallels with the 
former—the necessity of inherent goodness possessed by something in order for that 
goodness to manifest itself in representational form. At first glance, this appears to be a 
contradiction, or at least a conflation of two very different modes of aesthetic representation 
                                                
215 Bunte Steine 2. 
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here: a purely objective mode (the former) and purely subjective mode (the latter).216 With 
the help of Carus, however, we can see that what initially seems contradictory, is actually an 
affirmation of Stifter’s tendency to draw on the central operations of Stimmung. His art (here, 
his prose literature) can draw from both subjective and objective qualities because, for the 
attuned artist, the subject world and object world are intimately aligned—they echo one 
another. This notion is supported by similar remarks from Carus’s Neun Briefe:  
Jede nachahmende Kunst wirkt aber auf uns nothwendig zweifach; einmal durch 
die Natur des nachgebildeten Gegenstandes, dessen Eigentümlichkeit auch im 
Bilde auf eine ähnliche Weise wie in der Natur uns afficiren wird, ein anderes 
Mal, in wiefern das Kunstwerk eine Schöpfung des Menschengeistes ist, welcher 
durch ein wahrhaftes Erscheinen seiner Gedanken ungefähr wie in höherem Sinn 
die Welt zu nennen ist, den das Gemeine erhebt.217 
 
Here, Carus presents his theory of the “twofold effect” of art: that the creation of art is 
analogous to the creation of the world, and that the same divine force propels both activities. 
While a natural landscape leaves its viewer in awe of the creative activity that shaped it, the 
landscape painting has a second, more intense effect. Nature itself bears evidence of the 
phenomenon of divine creation, but a landscape painting references both divine creation (in 
the actual landscape) and artistic creation, which is seen as an extension the divine creative 
impulse in the human mind. Thus, not only does this moment of Stimmung between nature 
                                                
216 Büchner’s Lenz says something similar in the “Kunstgespräch.” 
 
217 Neun Briefe 26f. A similar aesthetic argument appears in Stifter’s late essay “Winterbriefe aus Kirchschlag” 
(1866) in which he writes: “Die Künste ahmen die Natur nach, die menschliche und außermenschliche, und weil 
in den Künsten das Schöne der Natur beschränkter, kleiner und nur von Menschen hervorgebracht erscheint, so 
wird es von den meisten Gemütern viel leichter aufgefaßt als in der Natur, ja es ist ein sehr gewöhnlicher Weg, 
daß ein Mensch erst aus dem Empfinden der Schönheit in der Kunst zum Empfinden der unendlich größeren 
Schönheit in der Natur hinübergeführt wird.” In: Adalbert Stifter, “Winterbriefe aus Kirchschlag,” Vermischte 
Schriften, Schilderungen und Betrachtungen (Gesammelte Werke in 14 Bänden), vol. 14, ed. Konrad Steffen, 
Basel, Birkhäuser, 1972: 16-42. 
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and the artist establish a kinship between them, but it also grounds this kinship in creativity 
and divinity.218   
 Stifter’s own readings of landscape paintings suggest that he valued the kind of 
artistic ability that could reveal the invisible forces of creation—human and divine—
inscribed within the visible realm. For instance, in his Kunstbericht of A. Achenbach’s work 
“Nr. 40 Marine” exhibited in Linz in 1852, he writes: “Wie unmächtig scheint das Schiff mit 
seinen geschwellten Segeln in diesen Massen, aber es ist doch der unsichtbare Verstand, der 
das Schiff gebaut hat, leitet, und die Massen beherrscht. Eine ganze besondere Meisterschaft 
in Lasuren hat der Künstler in diesem Bild erreicht.” While the object of study here is a ship 
rather than a landscape scene, the reading gives insight into his perspective on the process of 
landscape painting. In order to correctly capture the ship, Achenbach had to capture its 
createdness. That is, he had to let the ship speak to him—to let it reveal its own history of 
genesis and development so that these qualities would transfer through to the painting.  
 For Stifter and Carus, then, knowing an “object”—as an artist or scientist—is not 
about merely observing and recording it but about breaking down the subject-object 
boundary and coordinating the two with one another, as the process of Stimmung requires. 
Without this possibility for bridging the subject-object divide, humans and the non-human 
world become closed off from one another, and the artistic process loses its entire foundation. 
As the next and final section will show, this is precisely the threat that the dominance of 
empirical science poses to the human-nature relationship and, accordingly, to art. 
 
                                                
218 Adalbert Stifter, “Gemälde Ausstellung vom Juli 1852,” in: Schriften zur bildenden Kunst. Gesammelte 
Werke in 14 Bänden, vol. 14, eds. Johannes John and Karl Möseneder, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 2011: 30f. 
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Stimmung: Unity without Uniformity 
 For the final section of this chapter, I will return to geological surveying as a way of 
knowing, a topic that I introduced at the beginning of the Kalkstein section. I proposed that 
the ultimate goal of the surveying endeavor—mapmaking—at first glance appears to be in 
line with the expectations of early 19th century science. After all, a surveyor collects 
microscopic detail and combines that data to form a cohesive picture of the whole. I then 
asserted that Stifter’s Kalkstein shows how the work of the surveyor is deficient, even 
negligent, as a method for understanding nature. The surveyor’s shortcomings become 
particularly clear when his approach is examined alongside the pastor, whose conception of 
nature appears to be deeply informed by the Goethean scientific approach and the notion of 
Stimmung. This juxtaposition within Kalkstein validates the Stimmung conception of nature 
and, in so doing, simultaneously reveals the most problematic aspects of the surveyor’s 
perspective. To close this chapter, I would therefore like to briefly show how the innermost 
narrative of the story—the one in which the pastor shares the story of his childhood with the 
surveyor—provides further support for these observations. 
 To avoid dwelling on the details of this internal story, I will focus on two main 
themes that are relevant to the discussion at hand and seem to motivate the pastor’s desire to 
impart his wisdom to the surveyor. Both themes are introduced as important lessons from the 
pastor’s childhood and youth. And while these themes do not initially appear to be directly 
relevant to the discussions of art, science, and human nature-relations that are central to the 
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medial and outer frame narratives, their final message creates a sense of resonance between 
all three of the story’s layers.  
 The first of these two lessons concerns the pastor’s relationship to learning and the 
process of formal education. Although the pastor and his twin brother received the same 
education growing up, their levels of achievement were markedly different. Briefly stated, 
his brother was a strong pupil and he was not. Yet, if we examine the pastor’s account of his 
own weaknesses during this period of his development, a common theme quickly emerges: 
he simply struggled to conform to a standard. In fact, in general, any abstract, standardized 
system proved difficult for him to internalize and reproduce. His account of the discrepancy 
between his brother’s and his own abilities learning the alphabet, phonetics, and penmanship, 
for instance, exemplify this point:  
[der Bruder] konnte sich die Buchstaben merken, er konnte sie zu Silben 
verbinden, […] und seine Buchstaben standen in der Schrft gleich und auf der 
nämlichen Linie. Bei mir war das anders. Die Buchstaben wollten mir nicht 
einfallen, dann konnte ich die Silbe nicht sagen, die sie mir vorstellten […]. Bei 
dem Schreiben hielt ich die Feder sehr genau, sah fest auf die Linie, fuhr 
gleichmäßig auf und nieder, und doch standen die Buchstaben nicht gleich, sie 
senkten sich unter die Linie, sie sahen nach verschiednenen Richtungen und die 
Feder konnte keinen Haarstrich machen.219 
 
Much like the Zirder River spilling out of its path after the storm, the boy’s handwriting 
cannot be forced to stay within the space laid out for it. It is noteworthy here that it is not the 
boy’s behavior but, rather, his way of relating to the world that has to be retrained in order 
for Bildung to occur. Only later, after he and his brother complete their practical, hands-on 
training in the estate’s various workshops, is he able to succeed in (re)learning the more 
rudimentary concepts introduced during the earlier stages of his education. In other words, he 
had to establish a personal connection with the “Dinge” themselves in order to understand 
                                                
219 Kalkstein 80. 
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them. Moreover, not only is a tangible, material context an essential precondition for him to 
thrive intellectually, but he is also much more capable of success when he is able to set his 
own individual tempo for learning, as he does later on.220 The lesson to be learned from this 
aspect of the story, then, is that social practices involving standardization—such as 
standardized methods of teaching and standard metrics of assessment—risk presenting a 
simplified, distorted interpretation of the learner’s actual potential. Had the pastor not had a 
twin brother to assume responsibility of the estate’s operations, he likely would have lacked 
any opportunity to start over and change the story of his own educational development. 
 As it turns out, surveying as a method of evaluating nature is problematic for similar 
reasons. It applies a standard unit of measurement221 to a landscape and ultimately produces a 
map, which is an abstraction or “shorthand” version that renders land more universally 
legible. However, as such, the resulting cadastral or topographical map necessarily privileges 
certain kinds of data, rendering other, potentially valuable, qualities of the land useless. 
Through the application of such metrics, as James Scott points out, the practice of surveying 
achieves “an overall, aggregate, synoptic view of a selective reality […], making possible a 
high degree of schematic knowledge, control and manipulation.”222 Unlike the overview 
captured by a landscape painter, for instance, the surveyor’s standardized overview does not 
attempt to capture the sense of harmony that integrates nature’s multitudes into one diverse 
                                                
220 Also relevant is the fact that his brother’s ultimate demise stems from his mishandling of a number of 
financial investments; the pastor, on the other hand, survives because he prefers to store his wealth in the form 
of material commodities (i.e., linens and silver).  
 
221 Stifter also expresses a general skepticism towards human measurements of time and space in the essay “Der 
Silvesterabend”: “Und meint nicht jeder Mensch, er wisse, was der Raum ist, und mißt nicht jeder den Raum? 
Freilich mit einem Dinge, das wieder im Raum ist. (...)” In: Adalbert Stifter, “Der Silvesterabend,” Vermischte 
Schriften, Schilderungen und Betrachtungen (Gesammelte Werke in 14 Bänden), vol. 14, ed. Konrad Steffen, 
Birkhäuser, Basel, 1972: 61-70. 
 
222 Scott 11. 
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but unified whole. Rather, it destroys diversity by distilling reality into a more simplified 
version, often for the sake of subordination and control. In this way, standardization is a 
“sameness” imposed upon nature from above and is thus markedly different from the 
Stimmung-related notion of a “chain of similarity” already inherent within nature’s 
multitudes. With the pastor’s didactic storytelling, then, Stifter appears to be promoting 
Stimmung as more complex model of knowing nature. The unique capacity of Stimmung is, 
namely, that it can maintain a sense of sameness and unity without introducing uniformity by 
eradicating individual difference.  
 The second relevant lesson in this context takes place in the infamous garden scene in 
which the boy tries to capture the attention of the laundry woman’s daughter by luring her 
with fruit. The reference to Eden—here, an Eden quarantined by iron bars—is unmistakable. 
The girl, who is often seen carrying a basket of white linens through the garden, clearly 
embodies innocence and purity, and these ideals are endangered by the looming threat of 
temptation and seduction from the external world. However, there are also signs that the girl 
represents a sexualized, “veil of Isis” conception of nature, in which the deep inner truths of 
the natural world are understood as closed off and out of reach from humankind. These 
qualities are characteristic of what Pierre Hadot calls the “Promethean” tradition of relating 
to the natural world.223 Within this tradition, nature was perceived to be withholding a secret 
that could only be revealed and possessed through the use of trickery and force—in other 
words, through a process of taming. In this particular setting in Kalkstein, the desire to “lift” 
the veil of Isis is signified by the covered basket, whose contents the boy desperately yearns 
to discover (and, eventually, possess as well). Moreover, the manner in which the boy 
                                                
223 Pierre Hadot, The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature, trans. Michael Chase, 
Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press, 2008 
. 
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approaches the girl in the first place is one of trickery, and it conjures up the taming or 
conquering of a wild animal. He places food in her path, lies in wait nearby, and approaches 
her slowly and carefully when she finally responds to his bait.224  
 The eventual condemnation of this romantic relationship by the girl’s mother—here, a 
literal expulsion from the garden—signals both the end of the girl’s innocence and an 
inauguration of self-knowledge and shame as the mother says, “Johanna, schäm dich.”225 The 
use of the girl’s name and the notion of shame accompanying this expulsion indicate that the 
girl—now torn away from the blissful prelapsarian unity of self and world—has become a 
self-conscious subject. In fact, it is the boy who contaminates her world with this division in 
the first place, because acts of seduction and conquest capitalize on the power relations made 
possible precisely by a rigid separation between subject and object. The mother’s 
condemnation of their relationship thus also seems to function as a denunciation of the boy’s 
“Promethean” relationship with her daughter—his desire to know her and uncover the secrets 
she holds.  
 Because the children’s relationship with one another also represents the relationship 
between humans and nature in general, this second lesson also functions as a kind of 
cautionary tale for the surveyor. With it, the pastor cautions him against forms of knowledge-
                                                
224 Stifter’s interest in the theme of domesticating wild animals is further supported by a fragment essay that he 
wrote in 1845, called “Zur Psychologie der Tiere.” In this essay, he tells of a man’s attempt to tame a bull and 
train it to obey only him. One day, the bull escapes from the iron gate of the corral (reminiscent of the 
“Eisengitter” surrounding Kalkstein’s garden). Everyone present is astonished when the man’s four-year-old 
son proves himself naturally adept at steering the bull back into his pen. The anecdote supports Stifter’s 
suggestion at the beginning of the essay that animals and children have similar modes of perception and systems 
of motivation and action. In the same essay, he also refers to the animal as “ein in eine mehr oder minder 
unkenntliche Knospe eingewickelter Mensch” (10) as compared with Kalkstein’s reference to children as 
“Knospen der Menschheit” (67-68), as mentioned above. Two further anecdotes report on animals’ clear lack of 
self-awareness as suggested by their interaction with mirrors. In: Adalbert Stifter, “Zur Psychologie der Tiere,” 
Vermischte Schriften, Schilderungen und Betrachtungen (Gesammelte Werke in 14 Bänden), vol. 14, ed. 
Konrad Steffen, Birkhäuser, Basel, 1972: 10-15. 
 
225 Kalkstein 88. 
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making that extend and exploit the problematic subject-object divide that has been mentioned 
so often in this chapter. The surveyor’s methods, by necessity, isolate him from his object of 
study, solidifying the subject-object divide that, according to Goethe and Romantic thinkers 
like Carus, ensures the death of the natural world. And while the garden scene in Kalkstein 
does not end in the girl’s death per se, she is soon sent off to another city to be married. To 
the boy, her disappearance is experienced as a kind of death; in fact, this is so much the case 
that the pastor recalls the intense grieving that accompanied this loss: “Ich meinte damals, 
daß ich mir die Seele aus dem Körper weinen müsse.”226 Regardless of how oblivious he may 
have been about his own controlling or manipulative behavior, the story shows us that it was 
the boy’s objectification of the girl that resulted in their eternal separation. 
 Considering these two lessons together and the message that they seek to impart 
about nature, it is clear where Stifter’s sympathies lie. With Kalkstein, he is testing the 
viability of the geological survey—and, by extension, objective empiricism—as a way to 
grasp nature as a unified whole. But, with Stimmung as a counter-model, the science of 
surveying is revealed as deficient again and again. As the German word for surveyor—
“Vermesser”—innocently suggests, every act of measuring (messen) is also an act of 
mismeasuring (vermessen), due to the complexities that it omits. Likewise, by adopting the 
principles of objectivity and distance, it sets the stage for problematic divisions and 
hierarchies that render the object world—here, the natural world—lifeless and powerless. For 
a generation of artists who saw their work as the result of a dynamic, two-way exchange 
between humans and the object world, that lifelessness and powerlessness must, tragically, 
transfer, into the realm of art. Thus, while Stifter and Carus are both invested in science, they 
                                                
226 Kalkstein 89. 
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also show how a disproportionate reliance on empirical knowledge and empirically informed 
representation endangers nature as well as the future of art.
    152 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 “[N]otwendige Harmonie”:  
The Paradox of Nature in Büchner’s Scientific and Literary Writings227 
  
 
 
Introduction  
 
 Perhaps the most obvious figure of analysis within this project’s purview is Georg 
Büchner (1813-1837). For many scholars, this revolutionary activist, natural scientist, and 
literary writer embodies the strained relationship between science and art that defined the 
first half of the 19th century in the German-speaking lands.228 His short life spanned an 
intense period of epistemological growing pains. For one, a growing valorization of objective 
empiricism began to invalidate speculative Romantic approaches to science such as 
Naturphilosophie. Moreover, Büchner’s own activity as a scientific researcher also coincided 
with rapid and often contradicting theories in life-science disciplines such as biology and 
anatomy. His diverse range of preoccupations—much like those of Goethe, Carus, and 
Oken—suggests that predisciplinary models of knowledge were influential for his work. At 
                                                
227 The phrase “notwendige Harmonie” is taken from Büchner’s Probevorlesung. The full sentence reads: “Alle 
Funktionen sind Wirkungen desselben; sie werden durch keine äußeren Zwecke bestimmt, und ihr sogenanntes 
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times, however, his work also displays a dedication to rigorous empiricism and disciplinarity. 
These inconsistencies reflect as much about the culture in which Büchner was immersed as 
they do about his own habits and beliefs. 
 To complicate things, Büchner’s own voice is notoriously difficult to extract from his 
writing. Helmut Müller-Sievers notes, for instance: “Ein Autor kann nur dann Gegenstand 
einer übergreifenden monographischen Untersuchung werden, wenn an sein Werk Fragen 
gerichtet werden können, die zumindest potentiell Aussicht auf eine Antwort haben, wenn 
wir [...] mit seinem Werk ins Gespräch kommen können.”229 Büchner’s writing, with its 
unmarked citations and its “enteignete desorientierte Sprache” frequently eludes and even 
precludes interpretation, sending philologists chasing its many references “wie entlaufene 
Hunde.”230 Müller-Sievers rightly asserts that, because of this tendency towards unmarked 
citation, many of Büchner’s texts—particularly his literary writing, but also his scientific 
contributions—are cryptic and cannot be trusted as stable or reliable sources of his personal 
beliefs. Despite countless academic articles that have attempted to read Büchner’s own 
position through the expressions of his characters, this pursuit has proven largely futile.231 In 
Metaphor and Materiality, Peter Smith has likewise demonstrated that scholarship has 
proven itself oddly effective at presenting diametrically opposed readings of Büchner’s views 
on nature and science. To this day, scholars remain “divided as to whether Büchner should be 
                                                
229 Müller-Sievers Desorientierung 7. 
 
230 Müller-Sievers 7f. He sees Büchner’s tendency towards disorientating citation as a result of his contact with 
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regarded as an idealist or a materialist in his approach to Natur.”232 Smith cites John 
Reddick’s scholarship, for instance, which sees Büchner as a backward-looking idealist who 
espouses the “holistic world-view” of figures like Goethe, Lavater, and Oken and who aims a 
critical eye toward teleological and mechanistic explanations of life.233 At the same time, 
Smith identifies others, such as Walter Müller-Seidel and Otto Döhner, who maintain that 
Büchner’s view of human history is “profoundly deterministic” and that his relationship to 
Romantic science is primarily a critical one; for this latter group, Büchner embodies “the new 
materialist scientific world-view, dominated by ‘Beschreibung, Analyse und Erkenntnis.’”234 
They see Büchner’s science itself as “a pronounced act of defiance towards the speculative 
science of the Naturphilosophen in Germany.”235  Whether Büchner was backward-looking, 
at the cutting edge of the empirical scientific movement of his day, or even a century ahead 
of his time, as some claim, my project is concerned with Büchner’s writing in the context of 
the unique era in which he lived. 
 Like Müller-Sievers and Smith, then, I am less concerned with the impossible task of 
understanding Büchner’s own voice than I am with probing the contradictions his works 
expose. These contradictions often allow insight into the way he perceived the dominant 
scientific and aesthetic discourses of his time. My previous chapters provide evidence that 
various literary and scientific figures from this era sought to reconcile increasingly 
competitive and mutually exclusive approaches to scientific inquiry. This desire exists in 
Büchner’s writing as well, and it is precisely this impulse that fuels his critical destabilization 
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of both the Romantic and the objective-empirical approach to science as independently viable 
methods. While these scientific paradigms were becoming increasingly disentangled from 
one another historically, figures like Droste-Hülshoff, Stifter, and Carus appear to have 
remained hopeful (or naive) enough to entertain models of integration and reconciliation. 
Büchner’s work, on the other hand, suggests an interest in revealing the specific deficiencies 
of each model as a stand-alone mode of inquiry. As science in Europe sheds 
Naturphilosophie as a viable method of scientific engagement in favor of strict empiricism, 
Büchner does not necessarily embrace the shift. Instead, he often presents it as an epistemic 
value that is just as questionable as the idealist underpinnings of Naturphilosophie. This 
ambivalent position makes sense for a student of science who was, in the words of Müller-
Sievers, “im Geist der vergleichenden Anatomie, d.h. im Spannungsfeld von empirischer 
Naturforschung und naturphilosophischer Spekulation ausgebildet.”236  It is also significant 
that Büchner produced almost all of his scientific (and literary) writing within five years of 
Goethe’s death and that his approach to anatomical research appears to have been largely 
influenced by the morphological work of Goethe and Lorenz Oken. Perhaps for Büchner, 
then, as a practitioner of science who himself directly employed the empirical method to his 
anatomical objects of study, it was more readily clear that speculative or interpretive forms of 
scientific inquiry were at the brink of obsolescence, for better or for worse.    
 The relationship between Büchner’s science and his literary writing is a complicated 
one that has stood at the center of a great deal of scholarship. While I do not claim that his 
science can or should be neatly projected onto his literature or his literature read as a simple 
extension or reflection of his scientific views, it is important to recognize the recurring 
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constellation of concerns that pervades both genres. Chief among these concerns is the 
relationship between humans and nature, as well as the relationship between representation 
(whether scientific or aesthetic) and reality. Placing Büchner’s writing alongside other 
scientifically inclined authors of this period—regardless of their politics—can bring to light 
some of the reasons why the very relationship between science and art (specifically 
literature) was also a central problem for him. Many polymaths at this time struggled with 
such issues: What was the relationship between science and literature to look like, 
particularly in an era in which non-scientific and non-empirical ways of knowing were 
increasingly being excluded from the realm of legitimate knowledge production? In 
examining Büchner’s work, I do not intend to project the conclusions that I draw from one 
genre of writing onto the other; however, the likelihood that these two genres already stood 
in a tense relationship already makes them, in a way, inextricable from one another. 
 This project is concerned primarily with understanding how the 1830s and 1840s in 
Germany were perceived as an era of epistemological tension due to the rising status of 
empiricism and the increasing differentiation of knowledge. Accordingly, the sites of tension 
within Büchner’s written work are of primary interest and relevance for this chapter. The first 
section of this chapter will outline some of the inherent contradictions found by scholarship 
within Büchner’s scientific approach and his scientific presentation of nature. It will then 
explore how this ambivalence resonates with the nature depictions in his novella Lenz as well 
as the aesthetic quandary presented in the novella’s famous Kunstgespräch. These 
observations will allow me to draw some conclusions about the function of Lenz the 
protagonist and his own ambivalent relationship to nature. In my reading, Lenz’s own state of 
schizophrenia and sense of longing seems to reflect a broader sociocultural schizophrenia 
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with regard to the status of science and knowledge, rather than simply a fascination of the 
historical figure J.M.R Lenz. The fact that this schizophrenia about science also extends to 
his other works, such as Woyzeck, further speaks to its broader cultural resonance. 
 The second section of this chapter will draw from the Stimmung discussion from 
previous chapters to show how Büchner’s work reveals some of the distinct growing pains 
associated with the rise in objective empiricism and the dominance of life science discourse 
within this era’s scientific culture. My reading suggests that Büchner is revealing how life 
science discourse and discourses of the body are shedding their previous Romantic trappings. 
Specifically, I will show how scientific theories for the innerworkings of the organism collide 
with and sometimes begin to co-opt Romantic notions like Stimmung throughout the middle 
decades of the 19th century. 
 
Part 1: Büchner’s Science and its Contradictions 
 
 Descending from a long line of physicians and surgeons, Büchner decided to continue 
the family tradition by pursuing medicine. He began his studies in 1831 in Strasbourg. After 
a period of illness and a brief return to Hesse in 1834 (during which time he was involved in 
the Hessischer Landbote scandal), he returned to his studies in Strasbourg, completing his 
dissertation in 1836. This dissertation—titled Mémoire sur le système nerveux du barbeau 
(Abhandlung über das Nervensystem der Barbe)—presented an anatomical study of the 
nervous system of the barbel fish. The project was published by the Société du museum 
d’histoire naturelle the same year after Büchner had successfully presented his work in a 
number of lectures and won the society’s approval.237 Later in the year, he applied for an 
academic post at Zurich University and presented his now well-known “Probevorlesung” on 
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the 5th of November. Deemed a promising comparative anatomist, he was hired to begin 
lecturing immediately. Tragically, he fell ill in February of the following year and died. 
 Smith notes, however, that a such a brief sketch of Büchner’s life and relatively short 
foray into biological research 
fail[s] to communicate the significance of his work for the emerging life-sciences 
or his abilities as an empirical scientist. His dissertation on the anatomy of the 
barbel was reviewed positively by Johannes Peter Müller (1801-1858), one of the 
key figures in the development of modern medical science.238 
 
In general, Büchner sought to determine the origin and development of the brain in 
vertebrates.239 The first paragraph of his dissertation outlines the key questions he sets out to 
explore: 
Welcherart ist die Beziehung zwischen den Hirnnerven und den 
Rückenmarksnerven, zwischen den Schädelwirbeln und den Anschwellungen des 
Gehirns? Welche von ihnen finden sich als erste auf der untersten Stufe der 
Rangordnung der Wirbeltiere? Welche sind die Gesetze, nach denen sich ihre 
Zahl vergrößert oder vermindert, sich ihre Verteilung kompliziert oder 
vereinfacht?240 
 
He notes from the beginning that the answer to these questions are only made possible via the 
“genetische Methode,” by which he means an “äußerst gewissenhaftes Vergleichen des 
Nervensystems der Wirbeltiere, ausgehend von den einfachsten Organisationen und 
fortschreitend Schritt für Schritt zu den entwickeltsten.” Here he is referring to the 
morphological work of thinkers like Goethe and Lorenz Oken. Indeed, the theory of the 
vertebrate skull that had been separately propounded by each of them in previous decades 
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was an important influence for Büchner.241 However, he laments that anatomists cannot agree 
on “die Zahl, die Bedeutung und die Verteilung der Nerven,” and for this reason, he 
concludes: “Der Natur selber muss man sich zuwenden.”242 He thus frames his project as an 
attempt to bring clarity to these questions by introducing a more rigorously empirical 
approach.  
 Already in the introduction of his project, we see a contradiction in methodology: he 
is admittedly drawn to, and indebted to, comparative anatomy and the interpretive 
morphological work that it entails. Yet, at the same time, one of his goals seems to involve 
refining the baseline for this comparative work. To do so, he tries to establish a clearer 
understanding of the nervous system of the lowest, simplest class of vertebrates, and he 
points out in his introductory pages that Carl Gustav Carus had deemed the barbel “den 
reinsten Typus der Knochenfische.”243 Büchner thus presents this species as an ideal object 
for close empirical study, due to its simplicity and relative symmetry. However, he later uses 
his empirical observations to imagine it as an original form from which he can understand the 
development of the nervous system in all other vertebrates.244 His dual interest, in both a 
rigorous description of the anatomy of this fish and an interpretation of the relationship 
between the cranial nerve function with the fish and that of “weiter oben steheneden Tiere,” 
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is also reflected in his choice to divide the dissertation into two larger sections: Partie 
descriptive (“Beschreibender Teil”) and Partie philosophique (“Philosophischer Teil”).245  
The question of whether this pairing suggests his ambivalence as a scientist or his 
privileging of one approach over the other has been a particularly challenging question for 
scholars. Müller-Sievers, for instance, sees Büchner’s entire dissertation in some ways as a 
(largely failed) attempt to lend validity to the genetic-interpretive project of morphology.246 
Smith, on the other hand, believes that Büchner’s choice to begin with the descriptive 
section—which is significantly longer than the philosophical section—is significant; 
furthermore, he notes that Büchner’s “repeated attacks on the futility of a priori thinking, 
such as characterized both Cartesian rationalism and idealist Naturphilosophie, lead one to 
conclude that although he was no follower of the French iatromechanists [...], Büchner was 
also far from being a mystic.”247 What is once again clear is that Büchner’s work lends itself 
to a multitude of possible conclusions about his relationship to science, whether he intended 
it as such or not. The most oft-cited (and significantly shorter) piece of his scientific writing, 
his “Probevorlesung” of 1836, provides some clarity, however, and it is often considered the 
most direct articulation of his thoughts on the appropriate scientific philosophy and 
methodology. Because the trial lecture is more relevant for the analysis presented in the 
second half of this chapter, it will be covered in more depth later. 
 For the moment, then, I would like to dwell on the general problem of scientific 
methodology that the ambivalent structure and ambivalent claims of Büchner’s dissertation 
clearly pose, as this tendency towards ambivalence and Versöhnung is a central theme of my 
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entire project. Specifically, I will focus on the significance of the somewhat awkward 
relationship between Büchner’s objective, empirical study in the first section and his 
subsequent inclusion of a more subjective, interpretative approach in the second section. The 
tension embodied by the mere structure of this dissertation—and the fact that he chose not to 
exclude either approach—lends insight into Büchner’s era and the models of scientific 
inquiry available at that time. However, it also presents a fundamental incommensurability 
between these approaches because they involve different models for relating to nature. The 
previous chapters have already outlined some of the implications of excluding 
Naturphilosophie in favor of empiricism as an approach to understanding human-nature 
relations. To these authors, objective-empirical science yields a specific kind of knowledge 
about nature that is critical but also deficient when isolated from other ways of knowing. 
Unfortunately, the trend towards positivism during this era threatened to exclude and 
possibly extinguish other ways of knowing nature, and contemporaneous literature often 
grapples with this troubling reality. In Droste’s case, the lyric poet stands at the brink of 
endangerment; for Stifter, both the landscape painter and the Goethean scientist are faced 
with an existential threat. However, of the literary authors studied in this project, the stakes 
seem especially high for Büchner, himself a formally trained scientist as well as a literary 
writer.  
 Though he begins with an empirical approach in his dissertation, Büchner’s many 
references to Naturphilosophen (i.e., Carus, Oken) in his scientific writing, as well as his 
inclusion of morphological-genetic analysis248 in the second part of his dissertation suggest 
that he was somewhat invested in the ideals of the Naturphilosoph-scientist described in 
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previous chapters. As a promoter of aesthetic science and scientific art, such a scientist would 
show dedication to detailed, empirical study but, in some ways, less adherence to the 
principles of objectivity and self-restraint that would soon become the hallmarks of modern 
science. This figure would also show a deep aesthetic interest in the natural objects of study 
at hand. Curiously, in the literature surveyed thus far, this idealized encounter with nature is 
often performed not by a scientist, strictly speaking; rather, it comes from someone who 
knows nature intimately in a different way, such as the priest in Kalkstein or the lyrical voice 
of “Die Mergelgrube.” These works thus, in some ways, resist empirical objectivity by 
presenting human characters who have an entangled, participatory relationship with nature 
and are often more deeply attuned to the local natural world than the scientists who 
investigate them could hope to be. These figures, however, might also be portrayed as 
outdated, as is the case with Kalkstein’s priest; or the state of mind that allows them to 
become close to nature might be fleeting, as is the case with Droste’s lyrical subjects. The 
result is a sense of impending loss. The literature thus present a warning that this model of 
entanglement with nature is fragile, as is the possibility of a more aesthetic form of science—
and perhaps even art in general. At the same time, these literary figures’ intimacy with nature 
also subtly points to the liability that accompanies such a relationship—the dangers of 
becoming too close. Droste’s subject in “Die Mergelgrube,” for instance, faces the threat of 
being swallowed up by the pit she’s examining, of becoming petrified like her fossilized 
objects of study; likewise, Stifter’s Kalkstein priest has taken on the physiognomy of the 
landscape around him but is also eroding and wasting away just as the limestone is.  
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The Double-Nature of Büchner’s Lenz 
 
 The two main contradictions outlined above will prove fruitful for understanding how 
Büchner’s concerns align with those that preoccupy Droste and Stifter. Recapitulated, these 
are: 1) the conflict in Büchner’s dissertation between objective, empirical study and a more 
interpretive form of study (i.e., the “morphological-genetic method”); and 2) the notion that 
each corresponding relationship with nature is both necessary and, in some way, potentially 
perilous at the same time. Within this general context, I will consider Büchner’s novella 
fragment Lenz and its eponymous protagonist, who is allegedly modeled on the Sturm und 
Drang author J. M. R. Lenz. While a number of scholars have attempted to uncover the 
relationship between the historical figure of Lenz and his literary counterpart, my analysis 
will focus on Lenz the literary character.249 
 The literary character Lenz, with his curious relationship to nature, provokes a 
number of problems that resonate with the concerns of Droste, Stifter, and Carus. For one, 
Lenz shows both an intimacy with nature and a peculiar vulnerability based on that intimacy, 
as is the case with the other characters described above. Moreover, at times, Lenz’s 
notoriously schizophrenic behavior seems to contain within it—or perhaps even hinge 
upon—a largely schizophrenic relationship with nature. The two poles of this schizophrenia 
toward nature are already familiar in the context of this project: on one end, we have a human 
subject whose perception is sober, clear, and withdrawn (i.e., Droste’s lyrical subjects before 
the trance, Kalkstein’s surveyor); on the other, the human subject is entangled with his 
environment and emotionally receptive to it (Droste’s subjects in the trance state, Kalkstein’s 
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priest). Lenz’s vacillation between two different attitudes or positions can in many ways be 
read as an extreme form of the dichotomies that appear in these other works.  
 Already in the first passage of the novella, two starkly different versions of Lenz 
emerge, which also correspond to two very different descriptions the natural environment. 
The shifts or breaks in Lenz’s character are not always well delineated in the text, but signals 
do exist nonetheless, through chronological markers and descriptions of his disposition. In 
the first few sentences, for instance, he has a relatively sober outlook, continuing along the 
mountain path in a way that is described as “gleichgültig.”250 The suggestion here is that the 
indifference applies to his perception of the environment around him—to everything that is 
described up until this point in the narrative. It is, indeed, a bleak, largely gray picture, and, 
with the famous line “nun war es ihm manchmal unangenehm, dass er nicht auf dem Kopf 
gehen konnte,”251 the narrator hints at Lenz’s sense of discomfort or displeasure concerning 
this current order of things. Directly following this peculiar observation, however, the 
narrative creates a sudden chronological break in its description of Lenz’s relationship with 
nature. This break is signaled by the word “[a]nfangs,” which introduces an earlier period of 
time when Lenz was not yet sober and indifferent but, rather, extremely sensitive and 
reactive to his environment:  
Anfangs drängte es ihm in der Brust, wenn das Gestein so wegsprang, der graue 
Wald sich unter ihm schüttelte, und der Nebel die Formen bald verschlang, bald 
die gewaltigen Glieder halb enthüllte; es drängte in ihm, er suchte nach etwas, wie 
nach verlornen Träumen, aber er fand nichts.252 
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Here, Lenz is stirred by his natural surroundings and moved to seek out something he has lost 
(or is currently losing). Furthermore, Büchner’s repeated use of the word “drängen” gives the 
impression that nature is acting upon him or even entering into him; this is further underlined 
by the anthropomorphized descriptions of nature that are expressed with the active verbs 
wegspringen, schütteln, and verschlingen and the image of gewaltige Glieder. In contrast to 
the opening sentences, where Lenz was “gleichgültig” and nature seemed heavy, dull, and 
lethargic (“träg”), this glimpse into the past shows a strikingly different relationship. Here, 
Lenz is open and receptive to his natural environment and the environment itself is alive, 
even playful. The nature described in this scene—primarily comprised of inorganic elements 
and meteorological forces—includes storm winds that awaken, roar, and sing; clouds that 
gallop; and a sun drawing its sword against the snowflakes. Lenz shows his physical 
openness to it all by standing with “Augen und Mund weit offen” as the busy activity of the 
landscape encircles him and “[reißt] ihm in der Brust,” stirring him emotionally.253 In fact, 
one might even say that when Lenz presents himself as receptive, nature also emerges as a set 
of vibrant forces that interact with him and act upon him. Lenz experiences this activity—this 
reißen and drängen of nature—as both pleasure and pain, but in the end, he remains inclined 
to control it by absorbing it all into himself—“den Sturm in sich ziehen, Alles in sich 
fassen.”254 The dilemma presented by Lenz’s extreme receptivity to nature resonates sharply 
with Stifter’s priest and Droste’s lyrical subjects: in opening himself up to nature, he runs the 
risk of becoming dissolved by it, of losing all boundaries of himself as an individual, as well 
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as his autonomy. Yet, in seeking to control nature’s power or distance himself from it, he 
also risks isolating himself completely. 
 In a manner that is once again abrupt, the narrative next presents an alternative mode 
of existence to Lenz’s early interactive relationship with nature: it returns to the sober, 
removed perspective at the beginning of the story. This time, the break is marked even more 
distinctly by a semicolon and the conjunction “oder”:  
[…] er dehnte sich aus und lag über der Erde, er wühlte sich in das All hinein, es 
war eine Lust, die ihm wehe tat; oder er stand still und legte das Haupt in’s Moos 
und schloß die Augen halb, und dann zog es weit von ihm, die Erde wich unter 
ihm, sie wurde klein wie ein wandelnder Stern […]255 
 
Lying stretched out on the earth, Lenz opens himself up completely to the universe; he then 
stands up and begins to close his eyes and, in doing so, closes himself off from his 
surroundings. When he does, the earth pulls away from him, transforming into a distant body, 
“wie ein wandelnder Stern,” and leaving him isolated and alone. The initial, horizontal 
position reflects a model of dissolution into and oneness with nature, while the vertical 
position introduces a hierarchized model of detachment between Lenz and his natural 
surroundings. Both prove to be troubling for Lenz because they manifest only in their 
extreme forms. Indeed, the word “oder” suggests that this vacillation between extremes has 
recurred multiple times in the past rather than just once.256 Being fully immersed in nature 
means being fully subject to its whims and moods, which can be violent (“gewaltig”) and 
fear-inducing at times. It means a surrendering of individual control and of one’s own will. 
However, when Lenz asserts a more sobered and distanced stance, nature itself becomes still 
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and empty, leaving him feeling “entsetzlich einsam” and “allein, ganz allein, er wollte mit 
sich sprechen […].”257  
  
Pathologizing the Space of Nature in Lenz and Woyzeck 
 
 The peculiar incongruences in Lenz’s perception in this opening passage suggest that 
the descriptions of nature in the text are bound up with problems of space, scope, scale and 
vision, as is the case with literary descriptions of nature in other works from this era. The 
narration of Lenz’s environment in this passage is focalized through Lenz himself, such that 
the reader experiences the scene through his view. Perhaps reflective of Lenz’s own 
instability, the images that emerge are exceptionally disorienting for the reader due to their 
inconsistency: the narrator indicates that Lenz feels near to but also profoundly distant from 
the objects he observes and that those objects register for him as both small and larger than 
life at different times. The scale of things is distorted to Lenz, and the distance that he 
perceives among objects or between them and himself often fails to correspond to what his 
body actually experiences when traveling through  space: “er begriff nicht, daß er so viel Zeit 
brauchte, um einen Abhang hinunter zu klimmen, einen fernen Punkt zu erreichen.”258 The 
text thus presents a juxtaposition of largely incompatible images of nature, both directly 
through the eyes of Lenz and also when describing Lenz’s spatial confusion. These apparent 
contradictions attest to Lenz’s unrest at both extremes and challenge the reader to consider 
the significance of the nature description presented in this passage. 
  Topics such as nature depiction and spatial orientation in Lenz have garnered a fair 
amount of scholarly attention over the years. One of the more comprehensive studies on the 
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topic of Lenz and nature is Harald Schmidt’s monograph dedicated to the connection between 
landscape and psychosis in the text. He views the protagonist’s distorted, inconsistent spatial 
perception as a symptom of the specific pathological afflictions that plagued the historical 
figure J.M.R. Lenz.259 Schmidt examines Büchner’s literary portrayal of Lenz’s spatial 
perception non-historically, through the lens of 20th century psychiatric research documenting 
the “Raumerlebenstörungen” experienced by sufferers of depression and schizophrenia. He 
believes that “[b]estimmte Komplexe in Büchners Lenz wären [...] nicht nur mit klinischem 
Material aus beiden Psychosen zu relationieren, sondern könnten durch Studien sowohl zur 
Melancholie wie zur Schizophrenie erhellt werden.”260 In other words, Schmidt asserts that 
the distorted nature description in Lenz aligns with the distortions in spatial perception 
reported by real psychiatric patients; with this connection, he attempts to shed light on J.M.R. 
Lenz’s actual mental state and to illuminate Büchner’s general interest in matters of the 
psyche. For Schmidt, the nature presented in Lenz shows how depression (“melancholia”) is 
first and foremost a “raumzeitliche Grundstörung.”261 
 While Schmidt views the sense of extreme closeness and isolating distance 
experienced by Lenz as two extreme symptoms of the same cluster of psychological 
disorders, I read them as two distinct and competing versions of Lenz—and by extension, 
two distinct versions of how human subjects might relate to nature. Schmidt’s 
characterizations of these symptoms are nonetheless invaluable to my reading, as they 
highlight precisely the qualities that make Lenz interesting in the context of Büchner’s 
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science. Schmidt focuses on Lenz’s feeling of “Weltverlust” or “Raumverlust” and draws 
from Hubert Tellerbach’s study Die Räumlichkeit der Melancholischen to define melancholic 
space perception.262 According to Tellerbach, the melancholic subject experiences an 
involuntary sense of estrangement from his environment—an “Entrückung” or “Entrücktsein 
[...] vom Umraum” in which the “interagierende Bezug des Subjekts zum Raum, den Dingen 
und Menschen verlorengegangen ist.”263 Citing Heidegger, Tellerbach frames this 
“Entrückung” as a deviation from the ordinary way of relating to the objects in one’s 
immediate environment. Schmidt paraphrases the healthy, non-pathological relationship to 
one’s environment as a “handelnde Vernetzung des Vorhandenen mit dem eigenen Dasein,” 
and a “notwendig interagierendes Durchdringen des Raumes in Blick, Handlung und 
Fortbewegung, das die Dinge in eine existentielle Nähe zum Menschen rücke.”264 The 
melancholic-schizophrenic subject, however, loses a sense of interconnectedness between 
self and world and all sense of context; even the individual objects within that world form 
only a mosaic-like image in his perception and thus fail to reflect a harmonious whole. 
Objects in space become merely “eine Summe von Punkten für beliebig vorhandene Dinge, 
in der nichts mehr seinen Platz hat.”265 
 Tellerbach and Schmidt assert that the melancholic-schizophrenic subject can also at 
times experience precisely the opposite of this estrangement and instead be overcome by a 
“beklemmende Enge” rather than an “öde leere Weite.”266 As the adjective “beklemmend” 
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suggests, this feeling of nearness to the objects in the surrounding world is a far cry from the 
sense of existential connectedness conveyed by the Heideggerian “In-der-Welt-sein” 
described above. It is the alternation between these extreme modes of spatial experience, 
along with a general flattening of the objects in the subject’s field of vision, that characterize 
the melancholic-schizophrenic perception of space.267 For Schmidt, this set of “psychotische 
Raumerlebensstörungen” explains many of the peculiarities of nature description in Lenz. 
 Schmidt’s observations do offer a compelling perspective on the novella and 
invaluable tools for thinking about the “space of nature” in this passage. However, he fails to 
consider the chronology of Lenz’s symptoms. The narrative does in fact hint at a process of 
development in his oscillation between one mode of perception and the other. For instance, 
Schmidt neglects to ask whether it is significant that Lenz is closer to nature in the period 
that is designated as “anfangs.” He also fails to point out that Lenz only later learns to 
withdraw himself and to assume a more sober, distanced perspective on his environment. 
Moreover, the narrative begins with the latter and jumps back in time, as if to investigate the 
course of events that led to the problem at hand. Taken symbolically, this history of Lenz’s 
pathological condition(s) could represent the development of a broader cultural shift with 
regard to the relationship between humans and nature.  
 Historically, this argument holds up, for the realms of science as well as aesthetics. 
18th and early 19th century models of scientific inquiry and representation were driven by 
what Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison call a dedication to being “true to nature” rather than 
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trying to capture an objective image of nature without influencing it.268 Goethe is one oft-
cited example of a scientist who subscribed to this particular epistemic virtue: while he was 
devoted to tireless empirical observation, he ultimately sought archetypes ([Ur]typen) in 
nature—exemplary forms that could not be seen directly but had to be intuited by direct and 
cumulative experience.269 In other words, a scientist dedicated to uncovering the truth within 
or behind nature had to spend a great deal of time sitting in it and observing it closely, being 
impressed by its forms, and allowing those impressions to inspire a composite, “typical” 
image in the mind. Though diametrically opposed in scope, this perspective on nature is also 
related to the notion of physiognomy that underpins both Humboldtian science and 
Stimmungslandschaft aesthetics in the first half of the 19th century: in order to truly grasp the 
function of individual natural forms within a given spatial realm, a scientist (or artist) had to 
be open and receptive to the impression offered by the overall picture—the Totaleindruck, as 
Humboldt called it. Despite the physical distance between a landscape and its onlooker, for 
figures like Humboldt and Carus, the emotional attunement between the two reinforced an 
existential intimacy and a sense of interconnectedness between humans and nature. Though 
not physically immersed in the natural scene before him, the attuned landscape viewer 
experienced an emotional, even spiritual closeness to the whole of nature that would make 
him more adept at examining its individual components. Thus the relationship between 
observer and observed in this early 19th century “true to nature” paradigm—whether the 
nature observed was an individual form or an intricate system of forms—is one of mutual 
interaction and entanglement. The human was moved and shaped by the process of coming to 
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know nature, and the representation of nature that emerged—whether scientific or poetic—
was one distinctly marked by an active human mind.  
 The rapid trend toward objective empiricism in the middle decades of the 19th 
century, however, frames human intervention in nature’s processes and nature’s 
representation as unacceptable acts of contamination and subjective imposition.270 The older 
paradigm welcomed, even required, curation, synthesis, and interpretation provided by the 
trained eye of a so-called “genius of observation”; however, the newer paradigm increasingly 
cast the scientist as a will-less machine, an expert in self-restraint.271 This tension between 
old (true) and new (objective) epistemic virtues with regard to studying nature is clearly 
visible in Büchner’s dissertation methodology, and the shift in Lenz’s manner of relating to 
nature seems to reflect this historical trajectory as well.272 
 A further dimension of the opening passage that Schmidt fails to acknowledge is the 
fact that, as I mentioned above, nature itself is characterized in two different ways in the 
narrative, depending on Lenz’s manner of relating to it. When he opens himself up to nature, 
nature itself appears as forceful and dynamic, with a broad spectrum of actors. It moves him 
physically and emotionally. Conversely, when he closes himself off and becomes indifferent, 
the environment tends to feel lifeless, dull, and flat. Thus, rather than an involuntary mental 
disturbance, the shifting spatial perception he experiences seems to be at least partly 
determined or initiated by Lenz himself, depending on the way he approaches nature. If it is 
true that nature is “reacting” to Lenz just as much as he is reacting to it, then perhaps 
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Büchner wanted to explore the consequences of different epistemic virtues and modes of 
representation. Perhaps he was trying to show that nature reflects the premises of our own 
methodologies and representational norms back to us (i.e., that we find nature as we expect 
it, or need it, to be). These two perspectives on nature—as something near and powerful, or 
something faraway and lifeless—largely reflect how nature was required to be imagined 
within these two different paradigms. The malleability of nature description in Lenz thus also 
strengthens the argument that Lenz’s madness is actually two separate kinds of madness—
two separate pathological conditions that each seem to have a specific symbolic resonance 
culturally. 
 Rather than trying to determine where Büchner’s sympathies actually lie—a largely 
impossible and perhaps irrelevant pursuit—it is important to explore why both positions 
seem to be portrayed as pathological in Lenz’s case. As Schmidt points out, Lenz’s actual 
experience of “Nähe” to nature turns out to be “beklemmend,” or oppressive, rather than 
harmonious: he’s too involved, too affected, too entangled. In fact, he’s nearly swallowed up 
by it at times; not only does he risk contaminating it but it seems to be contaminating him as 
well, causing him to lose the boundaries of his individual identity as an autonomous human. 
Likewise, the distance—and accompanying indifference—goes too far, and it is not only 
physical distance that he perceives but also ontological distance. He loses all sense of 
relation—between things and between himself and the world. The distance does not provide 
him a better overview or a clearer understanding of the relationship between the things 
around him; it simply removes all context. Lenz seems to flee repeatedly to each side of this 
spectrum—becoming more intimate or distant—and comes up empty handed regardless of 
what he tries. Truth-to-nature no longer seems safe (due to the mutual contamination it 
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involves); yet, objectivity still seems too cold and machine-like, still too inhuman for this 
world. Often, Lenz seems to be trapped either in a discursive world for which he has not yet 
totally evolved or an earlier discursive paradigm that he has outgrown and can only reach for 
“wie nach verlorenen Träumen.”273 The consequent friction seems to be the root of his 
neverending psychosis.  
 A brief look at Büchner’s unfinished drama Woyzeck shows that the madness 
associated with this uncomfortable in-between space extends beyond Lenz. In the opening 
passage of the “Kombinierte Werkfassung” of Woyzeck,274 Woyzeck the protagonist is 
presented as a figure whose natural environment oscillates between forceful animation and 
deadly silence. In one moment he perceives “[e]in Feuer um den Himmel und ein Getös 
herunter wie Posaunen”; in the next, he declares, “Still, alles still als wär die Welt tot.”275 As 
the story develops we come to associate Woyzeck’s restless “Raserei” and lack of willpower 
with his “animistic” perception of nature, as Smith describes it. The experimenting doctor, on 
the other hand, represents the still, dead world and cannot understand why Woyzeck cannot 
show the same machine-like indifference that he can. In trying to convince Woyzeck to exert 
more willpower over his instincts and emotions, he proudly notes: “Ärger ist ungesund, ist 
unwissenschaftlich. Ich bin ruhig, mein Puls hat seine gewöhnlichen sechzig und ich sag’s 
Ihm mit der größten Kaltblütigkeit.”276 Woyzeck’s sensitivity to nature (and susceptibility to 
nature’s call) is portrayed, however, as far from ideal. Yet, the doctor’s sober 
“coldbloodedness” is equally questionable within the world of Woyzeck. It is clear that the 
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two live in entirely different—and mutually exclusive—paradigms and will never see eye to 
eye:  
Woyzeck: Herr Doktor, haben Sie schon was von der doppelten Natur gesehn? 
Wenn die Sonn in Mattag steht und es ist, als ging’ die Welt in Feuer auf, hat 
schon eine fürchterliche Stimme zu mir geredt! 
  
Doktor: Woyzeck, Er hat eine Aberratio.277 
 
To Woyzeck, there is a second side of nature that the doctor fails to see. But Woyzeck’s 
ability to perceive what the doctor cannot is written off as an aberration, a pathology, in the 
eyes of this figure of scientific authority. On the narrative level, however, the doctor emerges 
as equally pathological because he is human who has transformed himself into a heartless 
machine in the name of science. 
  
 Though Droste, Carus, and Stifter tend to present characters and perspectives that 
attempt or at least optimistically hope for reconciliation between the old and new models of 
science and nature, Büchner makes them seem impossible to reconcile and yet also radically 
deficient—even pathological—as stand-alone approaches. There is no “middle ground” for 
characters like Lenz and Woyzeck to inhabit—only a widening rift. They want to be “close” 
to nature in the entangled, involved, Goethean sense, but that relationship is simply no longer 
acceptable, or even accessible in the way that it once was. Woyzeck still wishes for the 
revival of this increasingly obsolete science so that humans can continue striving to decode 
the mysterious book of nature. He exclaims, for instance: “Haben Sie schon gesehn, in was 
für Figuren die Schwämme auf dem Boden wachsen? Wer das lesen könnt!”278 On the other 
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end of the spectrum, both Lenz and Woyzeck are constantly plagued by the feeling of a 
hollow coldness where that warm, dynamic relationship with nature used to be. Within Lenz, 
the words “leer” and “Leere” appear 9 times and the word “kalt” appears 13 times, often 
together and often accompanied by an image of impending death:  
Je leerer, je kälter, je sterbender er sich innerlich fühlte, desto mehr drängte es 
ihn, eine Glut in sich zu wecken; es kamen ihm Erinnerungen an die Zeiten, wo 
alles in ihm sich drängte, wo er unter all seinen Empfindungen keuchte. Und jetzt 
so tot. Er verzweifelte an sich selbst […]279   
 
The more nature becomes lifeless, the more images of lifelessness apply to Lenz as well, and 
vice versa. This sense of decline helps explain why he both understands himself as dying and 
simultaneously feels that he is a “Mörder”: if he once perceived the universe as one giant, 
interdependent organism, he has now cut himself out of it, and it has severed ties with him, 
leaving both now damaged and defective. Lenz’s only hope for recovering the metaphysical 
connection that has been lost during this shift towards detachment and objective empiricism 
is Oberlin and the Christian religion. He thus tries to cultivate a religious identity to recover 
these lost connections and bring himself peace. More importantly, he puts his faith in the idea 
that such a step might help him revive this dying universe for which he feels responsible, 
despite his distance. When Lenz tries to channel God to resurrect a dead girl, he realizes that 
the answer is a disheartening “no.” 
 In Woyzeck, coldness and death also loom large as the doctor’s self-professed 
“Kaltblütigkeit” contaminates the subjects of his experiments. He encourages Woyzeck to 
assert more willpower over his emotions and instincts—in other words, to arrest or kill them 
in the name of cold indifference. Woyzeck argues that these drives are his “Natur,” and the 
doctor assures him that they are meant to be stopped. But Büchner suggests otherwise. While 
                                                
279 Büchner 1:241. 
  
 177 
it initially appears that Woyzeck’s uncontrolled emotions are what drive him to kill Marie, 
the narrative repeats the “cold nature” language in the description of Marie after she has died: 
“Marie? Ha Marie? Still. Alles still! Da liegt was! kalt, naß, stille.” The text thus implies that 
the doctor’s influence is what finally pushes Wozyeck over the edge to become a 
coldblooded, indifferent murderer. And once again in Büchner’s work, the death of a woman 
confirms the idea that nature itself is dead, and irreversibly so.  
 
The Reliability of Objective Narration 
 In the previous section my analysis operated under the assumption that one must 
move beyond a biographical interpretation of J.M.R. Lenz and work to understand the 
novella as an attempt to navigate the shifting discourses and epistemological values of its 
own time. Specifically, the scientific discourse of Büchner’s era proves useful in 
understanding the disturbed spatial perception portrayed in the novella. While Lenz the 
literary character can hardly be considered an example of a scientifically inclined subject, his 
ambivalent relationship with nature seems to shed some light on the difficult task Büchner 
faced as a scientist trying to navigate these shifting paradigms and define his own 
relationship to nature. Still, it would be a mistake to equate Lenz’s dilemma as it has been 
outlined here with Büchner’s. As Müller-Sievers points out, Büchner is more inclined to 
create characters who speak and act in a way that reflects contentious views circulating 
throughout society rather than his own personal beliefs.280 
 It is also important to note that, in the years following Goethe’s death in 1832, 
attempts to define the scientific self in Germany necessarily involved reflection about the 
poetic self as well. The increasingly fraught relationship between the two was certainly 
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germane to Büchner’s situation as a scientist and literary writer. Lenz may less explicitly 
highlight the dilemma of the scientist than Büchner’s other writings (such as Woyzeck or his 
scientific work). However, its preoccupation with human-nature relations in the opening 
passage contributes to some of the larger tensions lurking throughout Büchner’s entire 
oeuvre. Of course, Lenz’s—and, by extension, society’s—conflicted relationship with nature 
also has implications for art. Aesthetic discourse was certainly following a related trend 
toward more objectively realist modes of representation over the course of the 19th century, 
and this is a problem that does not escape explicit attention in the novella’s Kunstgespräch. 
 Even before the Kunstgespräch, however, the novella’s own aesthetic approach 
experiments directly with objectivity as a narrative mode. Although two different versions of 
Lenz exist in the opening passage of the novella, the cold, detached narrative makes them 
difficult to discern initially. This is perhaps due to the fact that objective representation aims 
to give all phenomena equal weight, rather than making judgments and drawing out 
distinctions for the sake of comprehensibility. The field of vision presented is thus 
overwhelmingly uncurated, and the resulting pile of “data” is difficult to navigate. Moreover, 
the dearth of distinctions has a homogenizing effect on the text. Like an objective scientist, 
then, the narrator declines to tease out a coherent image of Lenz’s life for the benefit of the 
reader. It soon becomes apparent that he does not succeed in this endeavor, but he strives to 
at least give the impression that he does not meddle in the information or discard the apparent 
anomalies. Like Stifter’s surveyor with the limestone landscape, Lenz’s narrator gathers and 
presents information about his object of study, but he declines to forge the connections 
necessary to understand the core problem faced by Lenz. The narrator’s scientific coolness 
aims to relay details in all of their imperfection and incompleteness so that he distills nothing 
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for the reader the way a true-to-nature scientist drawing a “typical” specimen for a scientific 
atlas might. In fact, not only does he refuse to insert his own interpretation so that a “true” or 
“characteristic” picture of Lenz emerges, but he also leaves the reader almost exclusively 
with strange contradictions and moments of dissonance.   
 One could say, then, that it is this narrator’s deliberate agenda to rob the reader of a 
unified sense of character. Instead, he appears to step back and let the minute details of 
Lenz’s life and inner life speak for themselves, however unwieldy, disparate, and 
inexplicable. None of nature’s “accidents” are allowed to be expunged.281 The narrator’s 
relationship to his object of study—Lenz and his world—however unbiased it may aim to be, 
is thus not as unproblematic as its proponents might purport. At a linguistic level, the text 
displays some of the same problems that the world exhibits when Lenz views it from a sober, 
indifferent perspective. In fact, the qualities that would make for a good objective narrator 
are included in those qualities that Schmidt identifies as indicative of Lenz’s madness—
namely: indifference, coldness, and emotional distance from the surrounding world.  
Most importantly, as the story of Lenz proceeds, certain moments in the text suggest 
that the narration is not actually as unbiased or distanced as it sets out to be. The narrator, for 
instance, allows himself some insight into Lenz’s thoughts and sensations. Such insights are 
not unusual for an omniscient third-person narrator; however, they do provoke a sense of 
tension between the external appearance of events and Lenz’s internal perception of them. At 
times, particularly when Lenz’s impressions from the external world begin to accelerate, the 
narrator seems to momentarily lose his position of distance and pull the reader into Lenz’s 
perspective. This shift is exaggerated by a shift in syntax from sober, hypotactic to frantic, 
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paratactic sentences. Therefore, not only do two versions of Lenz seem to exist here, as 
elaborated above, but the narrator also succumbs to a dual-perspective, dual-voice 
presentation of Lenz. Pure objectivity, it appears, is a rather hubristic pursuit; the dilemma of 
Lenz’s narrator reveals how difficult and unnatural it can be. 
One of the central arguments in Daston and Galison’s history of objectivity is that the 
epistemic virtue of objectivity should not be naturalized and taken for granted because it is 
itself a construction, a code of values:  
The values of objectivity are admittedly specific and strange: to refrain from 
retouching a photograph, or removing an artifact, or completing a fragmentary 
specimen is not obviously an act of virtue—not even to all other scientists, much 
less to humanity at large. Nor will everyone acknowledge resolute passivity or 
willed willessness as values worth aspiring to. […] they are […] values, rooted in 
a carefully cultivated self that is also the product of history.282 
 
The authors point out that the representation of a thing says as much about the knower—his 
vision of what knowledge is and how it should be produced—as it does about the thing that is 
being known.283 What makes Lenz a work of art and not just a scientific account is the fact 
that, in creating a certain kind of knowledge, it also reveals its own conditions of that 
knowledge creation. It reveals the gaps and fissures between knower and known, between 
narrator and narrated.  
 What the novella shows us, then, is that the narrator is not, after all, simply allowing 
nature to reveal itself without intervention; he is actually imposing the values of objectivity 
on the world he is representing and sometimes forcing it to comply. This primarily becomes 
visible when we consider the two different versions of Lenz discussed previously. The 
distant, “gleichgültig” version of Lenz sees through the same kind of filter as the narrator, 
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and consequently, the syntax is in this section is fairly typical. Beginning with the word 
“Anfangs,” however, the syntax changes and becomes very peculiar. As the narrator presents 
the other version of Lenz—the one who desperately seeks connection with nature—he begins 
listing his observations in rapid succession, often with no pause. This seems to occur because 
there is generally more movement within the scene at this point. Yet, the repetition of “und” 
between clauses reinforces the sense that this is a list of descriptions with little or no framing 
by the narrator. Consequently, there is little or no clear causality or temporality in this 
section, despite the fact that more action is happening; indeed, objective modes of 
representation—whether scientific or aesthetic—are notorious for their inability to capture 
movement. It therefore seems that the more resistant the narrator’s object is to objective 
description, the more urgently the narrator tries to stick to pure description as a mode of 
representation. The exaggerated list of descriptions and the abnormal syntax make Lenz’s 
behavior seem excessively aberrant precisely in those moments when he seeks out 
connection with nature.  
  
Living Art and the Life Sciences 
 
 When trying to determine Büchner’s position on aesthetics, scholars have typically 
turned to the so-called Kunstgespräch, which takes place between Lenz and Kaufmann in the 
middle of the novella. Robert Holub’s oft-cited interpretation of this scene in Reflections of 
Realism sees the conversation as a complex, largely confounding attempt to define and 
evaluate the validity of realism in art. Holub points to three different points of discussion 
within the Kunstgespräch that consider realism’s advantages and disadvantages: the 
possibility of “fidelity to life” in literature; Lenz’s experience watching girls on a hillside and 
wishing to freeze that image like a “Medusenhaupt”; and Lenz’s assessment of the narrative 
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potential in classical Italian painting versus Dutch painting. Ultimately, all three discussions 
circle around the tension that arises when realist values conflict with the temporality and 
vitality of life. For Holub, this tension should lead to the realization that art and life must be 
separated—that art can never actually imitate life and should not aim to. However, of the two 
characters in the story, it is only Kaufmann, a self proclaimed supporter (“Anhänger”) of 
classical, idealist art—who is able to accept this perspective. Holub explains:  
In a certain way […], both Lenz and his would-be opponent [Kaufmann] postulate 
a separation of art and life: the latter explicitly in his call for idealism, and the 
former implicitly in his de facto separation of his own life from his aesthetic 
convictions to adhere to reality. And it is perhaps just this recognition and 
acceptance of the gulf between art and life that helps to define Kaufmann’s sanity, 
whereas the refusal to admit a difference between the two, despite its necessity, 
characterizes Lenz’s madness and his aesthetic views. In drawing the last 
consequences from realism, Lenz is unable to think of art and life as separate 
spheres; but in identifying them so closely, he is unable to grasp the reality upon 
which this type of art is supposed to be based.284  
 
Lenz’s dilemma is thus as follows: he values realism as a mode of knowledge and 
representation and he also simultaneously values “life” as an object of that knowledge and 
representation.  
 Here I agree with Holub’s argument but would like to extend it by narrowing the 
definition of life that he uses. “Life” should not be understood in its most general sense—as 
“reality,” that which happens or exists in the realm of human experience. Rather, it should be 
understood as “the living world” (as opposed to the nonliving world). If the object to be 
represented were already static or not living in the first place, realism would perhaps seem 
less problematic. The specific combination of (objective) realism and vitality is what is 
difficult to make compatible. It is no coincidence that a very similar constellation of 
questions is surfacing in scientific discourse in the 1830s. This is due to the confluence of 
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objectivity as an ever-more dominant epistemic virtue in science and the urgency with which 
scientists in Germany were flocking to research in the life sciences rather than the earth 
sciences and botany. The notion of the “Medusenhaupt” and the implied concern that art can 
only capture and present life in a lifeless state thus resonates deeply with Büchner’s pursuits 
and frustrations as a scientist. This would have been all the more pressing for him because he 
specialized in anatomy, a field in which one can only view, study, and explain the living 
object at hand once it is dead and cold.  
 
Part 2: “Über Schädelnerven” and the Genetic Approach 
 
The field of anatomy necessarily involves the study of an organism’s life processes 
by examining its expired corpus. In 1836, the life sciences had only recently begun 
differentiating themselves from other branches of science, and anatomical study was surely 
difficult work without the help of a guiding theory. Büchner’s views on comparative 
anatomy’s usefulness for learning about the organic body are illuminated by his dissertation; 
however, scholars also often point to the much shorter essay “Über Schädelnerven” as a more 
concise version of the scientific view presented in his doctoral work.285 Composed as a trial 
lecture—a speech required before he could be confirmed as “Privatdozent” at the newly 
founded University of Zurich in 1836—this essay addresses the relationship between cranial 
nerves (“Hirnnerven”) and the spinal nerves (Rückenmarksnerven) in vertebrates. Before he 
is able to fully understand the function of these nerves in the living body, however, Büchner 
feels that he must better understand the origin of these vertebrate forms in nature and the 
paths of their development over time. He thus compares the cranial and spinal nerves in a 
                                                
285 Despite its broad use in scholarship, the title “Über Schädelnerven” was not actually used by Büchner but 
added by later editors (Büchner 2:909). 
 
  
 184 
number of fish and frogs in the hope of determining a shared structural origin. Because 
Büchner believes in recapitulation theory,286 he also expects to find similarities between the 
mature nervous systems of these simpler organisms and the nervous systems in miscarried 
fetuses of more complex organisms, such as humans. Overall, the aim of his work is to 
determine laws or patterns by which these homologous nerve systems might have evolved 
over time and resulted in the variances in the number, complexity, and function of specific 
nerves that are seen in nature’s many different species.  
Throughout his lecture, Büchner privileges the “genetic” mode of inquiry inherent in 
this kind of comparative work. This approach seeks to trace complex forms in nature back to 
one simple type or “Urtyp,” and it is best known in the German tradition through the work of 
Goethe as well as Lorenz Oken. As mentioned previously in this chapter, both Goethe and 
Oken had independently theorized the emergence of the highly specialized cranium as an 
extension of the less complex spinal column.287 In seeking to conceptualize the “Urpflanze” 
from which all other plants diverged and developed, Goethe’s Metamorphose der Pflanzen 
also famously espoused the genetic method.288 Büchner cites both figures, as well as Carl 
Gustav Carus, in his lecture and uses their work as the basis of his own investigations into the 
origins of the brain:  
                                                
286 Recapitulation theory was a commonly held belief at the time among scientists. It was believed that ontogeny 
recapitulates phylogeny. In other words, the developmental phases of an individual organism over its lifetime 
(especially in the womb) recapitulate the all past evolutionary phases of that species. 
 
287 See, for instance, Richards 497ff. 
 
288 Because Oken was to be Büchner’s future colleague in Zurich, some scholars have discounted the scientific 
view presented in his lecture as mere ingratiation towards Oken and his work. However, I agree with Reddick 
that Büchner deserves more credit and likely did espouse the genetic method because it was foundational for his 
own field of comparative anatomy. Very few scientists from this era can actually be placed squarely in one 
camp, whether purely empiricist, materialist, mechanist, speculative, or idealist. Such views were not always 
mutually exclusive although they may seem so from today’s perspective. 
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Nur für das Gehirn ließ sich bis jetzt kein so glückliches Resultat zeigen. Wenn 
Oken gesagt hatte: der Schädel ist eine Wirbelsäule, so mußte man auch sagen das 
Hirn ist ein metamorphosiertes Rückenmark und die Hirnnerven sind 
Spinalnerven. Wie aber dies im Einzelnen nachzuweisen sei, bleibt bis jetzt ein 
schweres Rätsel. Wie können die Massen des Gehirns auf die einfache Form des 
Rückenmarks zurückgeführt werden?289 
  
Büchner is certain that there is a way to trace the emergence of the brain back to the spinal 
marrow; the pressing question, then, is how to prove that these ancient transformations 
occurred. Comparative anatomy cannot afford its practitioners the opportunity to travel back 
in time and make empirical observations about those actual processes. However, it does 
encourage the use of empirical data about presently existing organisms for speculation about 
past organisms and the stages of their phylogenetic development. Comparative anatomy as a 
practice thus aptly captures the scientific spirit of the times, as it marries objective 
empiricism and speculative, a priori thinking. It is thus no surprise that so many proponents 
of Naturphilosophie were at the forefront of comparative anatomy and remained dedicated to 
it even as its influence in the scientific community waned. 
The idealist underpinnings of the genetic method propounded by many German 
comparative anatomists, however, made it an often controversial science, however appealing 
it may have been. We see in the excerpt above that even Büchner’s language is colored by a 
desire to discover original unity by identifying common archetypes within the natural world. 
Reddick attributes this need to locate patterns of order and unity in nature to the 
overwhelming masses of unorganized scientific information that had accumulated over 
previous centuries:  
                                                
289 Büchner 2:160. 
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Büchner puts a quite remarkable emphasis […] on his sense of the natural world 
as an organic whole characterized by order, proportion, unity, and essential 
simplicity. The study of the natural world, he says […], has taken on a new shape. 
Previously, botanists and zoologists, physiologists and comparative anatomists 
had been confronted by a monstrous chaos of data—‘a huge mass of material, 
laboriously heaped up over the centuries, that had scarcely even been 
systematically catalogued’, ‘a confusion of weird forms under the wildest names’, 
‘a mass of things that previously weighted heavily on one’s memory as so many 
separate, unconnected facts’.290 
  
The genetic method in comparative anatomy was in part so appealing because it historicized 
biology and in doing so could distill this chaos of data into tidy groups. Just as Goethe 
believed that all plant forms could be traced back to the form of simple leaf, Büchner appears 
to have believed that all organic forms, simple and complex, could be traced back to a few 
“einfache, natürliche Gruppen.”291  These forms were not necessarily visible in nature but 
they could be reconstructed after careful empirical observation. Büchner thus describes the 
aim of his work as such: “In der vergleichenden Anatomie [strebt] Alles nach einer gewissen 
Einheit, nach dem Zurückführen aller Formen auf den einfachsten primitiven Typus.”292 
 To conclude this introduction to Büchner’s Trial Lecture “Über Schädelnerven,” I 
will return to the first two pages of the essay, which make clear why it was important to 
Büchner to discuss the viewpoint behind his own methodology. Here, Büchner famously 
defends the genetic method and its corresponding worldview (which he at times also calls the 
“philosophical view” of nature), by trying to discredit those scientists who espouse the 
diametric opposite perspective—which he calls the “teleological view” of nature.293 
Proponents of the latter—mostly found in England and France, he notes—explain living 
                                                
290 Reddick 326. 
 
291 Büchner 2:159. 
 
292 Ibid 160. 
 
293 As the edition author points out, the word choice “teleological” is somewhat odd here. What he seems to 
mean is teleological in the sense of “causative” (Büchner 2:913). 
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organisms and their functioning parts incorrectly. What drives nature in the teleological view 
is absolute necessity or purposiveness—“die großmöglichste Zweckmäßigkeit.” Thus, forms 
(e.g., bones and organs) emerge to fulfill a purpose: they are necessary in order for the body 
to survive. In contrast, proponents of the philosophical view believe that all bodies are the 
manifestation of the same “Urgesetz,” which is continually striving to reach the highest and 
purest forms. Büchner summarizes the difference as follows: “[D]ie Tränendrüse ist nicht da, 
damit das Auge feucht werde, sondern das Auge wird feucht, weil eine Tränendrüse da 
ist.”294 For Büchner, there is no externally imposed “Zweck” that drives the development of 
nature. Even the appearance of a “zweckmäßiges Aufeinander- und Zusammenwirken” 
within nature is just the “notwendige Harmonie in den Äußerungen eines und desselben 
Gesetzes.”295 These remarks are important because they also reveal Büchner’s desire to 
understand the historical development of nature as open-ended and freely expressive rather 
than deterministic and purpose-driven. Although the lecture takes place well after 
Romanticism has been declared dead in Germany, Büchner still apparently tends to imagine 
nature’s own creativity as something that unfolds much like the human poetic process. This 
tendency to view nature as both a symbol of freedom and a model for common origins also 
clearly reflects Büchner’s liberal-democratic political perspective. 
  
A “Notwendige Harmonie”? 
 
If we had only been left with Büchner’s scientific writing—specifically, the Trial 
Lecture—we might be inclined to believe that he was simply a Naturphilosoph clinging to an 
already obsolete Romantic worldview. But we do have remnants of his literary writing, 
                                                
294 Ibid 158. 
 
295 Ibid 159. 
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however sparse, and, as I have shown in the previous section, much of it portrays a world that 
is quite the opposite of an Idealist Romantic utopia—namely, a world that is hopelessly 
disintegrated, disconnected and untidy. Lenz, for instance, conveys the story of a man who 
has not only lost a sense of continuity or common lineage with nature; he has become almost 
completely estranged from it. Even at the level of Lenz’s physical body—and Woyzeck’s as 
well, for that matter—there are clear signs of disintegration and confusion, as if the internal 
communication between organs has been scrambled and normal sensory operations such as 
vision, hearing, and spatial perception have been distorted. Büchner’s science on the other 
hand—that is, the “philosophical”/genetic perspective in his Trial Lecture—claims that the 
coordination of a body’s individual parts does not occur for the sake of that body’s 
preservation or survival. Rather, this intricate cooperation simply reflects the great harmony 
inherent in nature. In other words, because each piece of nature’s whole is derived from one 
single law, each part is necessarily calibrated to all of the other parts and should naturally 
work in tandem with them to produce increasingly higher and purer forms of life. And yet, it 
is precisely this model of “necessary harmony” that is so radically absent or radically 
perverted in Büchner’s literary stories. 
  Because this harmony of the whole is what breaks down in the worlds of many of 
Büchner’s literary characters, he must have been conscious of the problems and logical 
contradictions in his own scientific view presented in the Trial Lecture. Two aspects in 
particular seem to serve as significant obstacles. 
 The first problem with the “Goethean” genetic approach to scientific inquiry is that it 
relies heavily not only on speculation but also on Romantic metaphors, which are beginning 
to overextend themselves in the scientific context of the 1830s. One important metaphor in 
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this context is the notion of Stimmung that has already been discussed extensively in the 
previous chapter on Stifter and Carus. In this era, which sees an ever-increasing valorization 
of objective, empirical observation, scientific theories that depend on Stimmung as a model 
of logic begin to fail, since its mechanisms are metaphysical and thus cannot be observed. 
Though the term Stimmung itself is not always cited explicitly, the forces of Stimmung are 
often what hold the natural world together in the minds of the Naturphilosophen who practice 
the genetic method of science. In the Trial Lecture, Büchner’s own mention of the 
harmonious self-alignment of organic bodies very clearly alludes to this concept.  
 Originating in the realm of music, Stimmung became a metaphorical “Denkfigur” for 
many different spheres of knowledge between the 18th and 20th centuries. According to 
Caroline Welsh, its primary use during the era in question fell into the categories of 
physiology, psychology, and aesthetics.296 The concept’s power lay in its ability to illustrate 
vividly the phenomenon by which an individual component of a group (i.e., a stringed 
instrument within an ensemble) is tuned and ready to be activated (“gereizt”) to contribute a 
harmonic tone toward the sound of the whole. This “whole” is presumably a musical 
production whose power is much greater than the sum of its individual parts. Moreover, in 
the event of a key-change or a contingent event, the instrument has the ability to adapt via re-
tuning, or “Umstimmung,” in order to remain in coordination with the whole. A foundational 
idea for both Romantic poetics and the scientific pursuits of many Naturphilosophen was the 
more generalized version: that there is a natural readiness or underlying attunement 
(Stimmung) between a human’s affective disposition (“Gemüt”) and the surrounding natural 
environment. This attunement—or in Büchner’s words, this “necessary harmony”—was 
                                                
296 Caroline Welsh, “Stimmung im Spannungsfeld zwischen Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften NTM 17.2 
(2009) 144. 
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based on the idea of supreme original unity propounded by practitioners of the genetic 
method of science. The notion of Stimmung had also seeped into the field of physiology as 
early as the 18th century to help fill in the gaps that science could not yet explain. Namely, it 
provided a model for understanding the unknown processes by which organs and nerves 
within a body coordinated their activities (e.g., responding in tandem to external stimuli) in 
order to sustain the life of the organism. There are a number of instances in the early decades 
of the 19th century in which scientific writers refer to the Lebensstimmung of an organism, as 
well as instances of Mißstimmung when an illness or other pathological condition is 
present.297  
 Welsh notes that Stimmung was an appealing model of understanding for many 
diverse fields because of its strong metaphorical imagery but also because of its vagueness, 
which made it broadly applicable: 
Die Stimmung stellt eine Struktur, eine bestimmte Logik, zur Verfügung, nach der 
die Wechselwirkungen zwischen Innen und Außen, zwischen Seele und Körper, 
Auge und Lichtstrahl, Organismus und Umwelt, allgemeiner zwischen Zustand, 
Reiz, Reaktion und Folgezustand gedacht werden können.298  
 
As differentiation of the sciences into concrete disciplines began to take place throughout the 
middle decades of the 19th century, however, Stimmung necessarily had to assume a narrower 
range of use. Throughout the second half of the century, it was used increasingly frequently 
in the Geisteswissenschaften, such as psychology, where empirical verification was less 
critical. This example thus illustrates the waning influence of Romantic metaphors in the 
natural sciences in the 1830s and the sense of disorientation that the impending loss of these 
important models of thinking may have provoked in young scientists like Büchner. Büchner 
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must have sensed that the metaphysical and at times even mystical underpinnings of the 
genetic method were nearing obsolescence. It is curious, moreover, that Lenz, the literary 
character perhaps most affected by this cultural shift away from an intimate, mystical 
relationship with nature suffers from a vague mental illness that, at times, seems aptly 
identified as a disharmony with his environment, a kind of “Mißstimmung.” 
 The second, and, for Büchner likely more troubling, problem associated with the 
genetic method relates directly to the principles of genetic science itself. As mentioned 
above, Büchner opposes the “teleological” view of nature because it denies the existence of 
freedom in nature in two ways: by ascribing all action in nature to the principle of cause and 
effect and by supporting the idea of a predetermined purpose in nature and thus a fixed 
direction of development. The determinism inherent in this view clearly clashes with 
Büchner’s liberal political agenda that so heavily relies on the notion of freedom. The 
freedom, open-endedness, and equality of origin inherent in the genetic view seems much 
better aligned with his political worldview. However, this may only be the case at first 
glance. Büchner’s own scientific work, in which he attempts to prove the evolution of the 
spinal marrow into the more complex organ of the brain, has its own political implications: if 
nature, by definition, must produce evermore complex organisms (such as the human) and 
evermore complex organs within those organisms (such as the brain), isn’t it creating its own 
hierarchies of governance within nature and within the body? Rather than a diffuse, 
“democratic” and freely-willed alignment of bodies that the Stimmung model can 
accommodate, doesn’t the genetic view’s principle of increasing complexity also eventually 
justify a problematic model of hierarchization? Much of Büchner’s own empirical work did 
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indeed support this principle, affirming the brain as the center of command for the nervous 
system.  
 The political implications of hierarchization throughout all of nature might have been 
even more problematic for Büchner than hierarchization within the body, especially because 
his era was so steeped in Romantic mythology. That is, if nature itself suggests (via scientific 
evidence) that humans are supposed to be elevated above the other species as the “highest 
and purest” natural forms on earth, then the consequences for human-nature relations could 
be dire. Moreover, if humans were naturally, and thus rightly, poised to constitute a 
governing class above the rest of nature, then science might also find evidence to justify 
hierarchization amongst humans as well. If we look at the world of Woyzeck, all of these 
hypotheticals become realities: humans are told they must strive to overcome “Natur” and 
strip themselves of any qualities that seem animalistic rather than humanly. However, in the 
same world, becoming the “highest and purest” also means the coldest, most calculating, and 
the most removed from “Natur”—in other words, machine-like. Appropriately, in the drama, 
science is the predominant discourse used to advocate this shift. 
   
  
 Büchner’s Trial Lecture “Über Schädelnerven” exhibits confidence in its perspective, 
and in it, he takes fairly clear stances with few loose ends. Just as this piece of scientific 
writing is relatively tidy and unified, so too is the view of nature presented there tidy and 
unified. However, his literature is just as radically chaotic and disjointed. The extreme level 
of tension between his science and his literature forces the reader to speculate more than is 
typical, just as I have done at times in this chapter, and just as others before me have done.  
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 The clearest message we can take away from Büchner’s work as a whole is, therefore, 
the idea that no single approach to science can yield a perfect, or even favorable, worldview. 
In fact, in the end, the older genetic approach and the newer objective-empirical approach to 
studying nature lead to the same conclusion: that humans and nature must necessarily be 
separated and that they will both suffer as a result. Whether a person chooses to embrace or 
resist the prevailing scientific trend or to embrace or resist the prevailing view of nature, 
chances are that he or she will end up like Lenz or Woyzeck: disoriented, despaired, and 
possibly even mad.
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The literary worlds presented in the works of Droste, Stifter, and Büchner bear 
witness to the many conflicting ways of understanding the relationship between humans and 
nature in the middle decades of the 19th century. Yet, as this project has shown, literature did 
not only serve as a witness; it also sought to actively participate in the shaping of 
contemporaneous science and nature discourse. Moreover, because science and nature 
discourse were deeply influenced by the early 19th century phenomenon of disciplinarity, the 
literature of this era is also necessarily invested in examining the implications of competing 
ways of knowing nature, whether through the lens of art and literature or through one of the 
various scientific methodologies prevalent at the time. Even Droste and Stifter—who did not 
pursue science professionally as Büchner and Goethe had—made painstaking efforts to 
incorporate multiple scientific personas and perspectives into their literary worlds. As the 
previous chapters show, such perspectives were never taken for granted but, rather, 
challenged, analyzed, and often even corrected or counterbalanced with other perspectives on 
science and nature. This cohort of authors thus represents a distinct generation of writers who 
actively and self-consciously sought to influence the way their readership understood the 
relationship between humans and nature, and the role of the sciences and the arts in gaining 
knowledge about the human-nature relationship.  
Academic readings of Droste, Stifter, and Büchner have traditionally oscillated 
between viewing these authors as either nostalgic and regressive or prescient and far-sighted, 
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though to differing extents; within literary scholarship, the work of all three authors is 
therefore frequently removed from its historical moment entirely. However, this project has 
shown that the major questions reflected in their works are, in fact, anchored very deeply in 
their own specific moment in the history of science and knowledge. Expanding the context of 
these literary works by showing the weight of Romantic nature discourse and tensions 
surrounding the trend toward objective empiricism allows us insight into just how unstable 
and transitional the epistemological paradigm of this period was. The analysis presented here 
has also shown that the birth of disciplinarity had an impact on literature’s self-image vis-à-
vis science that cannot be overlooked or underestimated as a defining characteristic of this 
era’s cultural production. 
Both the literary and scientific writers of this era clearly shared a number of common 
concerns: they lamented the growing divide between humans and nature; they favored 
reconciliation between older Romantic values and the various new trends gaining popularity 
throughout the 19th century; and they worried about how new approaches to science would 
alienate other ways of knowing, such as art and literature. They offer similar points of 
criticism and express similar desires—mostly for unity, harmony, and cooperation; and yet, 
they often see the importance of both older and newer values and rarely come down in one 
camp or the other, as much as they seem tempted to do so. 
It is not my intention, however, to portray these writers as a definitively monolithic 
group. Their individual interests and experiences lend a distinct character to each and every 
work they wrote. Moreover, all three authors lived in very different parts of the German-
speaking realm—though they had contact with several of the same influential works and 
thinkers. Because each of these writers views the primary conflicts at hand in a different 
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light, slightly different values are at stake for each one. Droste’s lyric poetry, for instance, 
emphasizes the necessity of a dynamic, enchanted natural world in order for poetry to exist, 
since these qualities in nature are precisely what pull the human observer into a meditative, 
poetic trance. If newer scientific approaches now seek to distance humans from nature in the 
name of objectivity, then they erase the opportunity for that entangled, poetic moment. 
Likewise, if science is increasingly used to control and contain nature’s power, rendering it 
lifeless and more standardized and “legible,” poetry itself faces the threat of obsolescence. 
For Droste, the fossil is an important metaphor not only for this troubling petrifaction of 
nature but also for the way that modern science seems to be nudging non-scientific ways of 
knowing nature into extinction. 
Stifter’s Kalkstein expresses similar concerns about scientific methods of gaining 
knowledge about nature. Surveying, for instance, makes nature more standardized and 
legible, but it risks obscuring other dimensions of nature and discourages humans from 
knowing nature intimately. In both his and Droste’s work, this more poetic, intimate 
relationship makes itself present through a mirroring of the physical features of humans and 
the landscapes in which they live. Stifter, like Droste, also fears that one-dimensional ways 
of knowing nature ultimately lead to the sense that all parts of nature are dead, static, and 
without any emotional impact for the observer. However, his tendency to reveal nature’s 
deep history and dynamism in landscape painting suggests a slightly different concern. 
Despite his reputation as a proponent of sober, empirical vision who seeks to portray nature 
objectively in his work, my analysis shows that Stifter’s depictions of nature in both his 
painting and literature are actually often in tension with this programmatic position of 
objectivity that he seems to present in his “Vorrede” to Bunte Steine. Instead, his work itself 
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often suggests that poetic-aesthetic vision, which more adequately grasps nature’s 
complexities and subtle transformations, must serve as a counterbalance to the objective-
scientific view. 
Büchner’s scientific writing recognizes the value of both Romantic (i.e. “genetic”) 
and objective-empirical approaches to natural inquiry and even seeks to synthesize them in 
practice; much like Stifter with his painting, Büchner is interested in using observations 
about present forms to reconstruct the history of their development. His interest in 
maintaining a form of science that can grasp nature’s dynamism aligns well with the agendas 
of the other two authors. His literary writing, however, is much more fatalistic in its outlook. 
With Droste and Stifter, reconciliation between different approaches to natural inquiry still 
seems vaguely possible in certain places and at certain moments. In Büchner’s fiction, not 
only is there no longer any possibility for synthesizing the two, but each approach is also 
revealed as fundamentally flawed from the beginning. In a similar way, Droste and Stifter 
remain hopeful that harmony between humans and nature can at least be partly restored, 
especially through poetic reflection; Büchner’s fiction, however, exposes this hope as a naïve 
dream with potentially dangerous consequences. As Lenz and Woyzeck seem to suggest, 
society has moved on and anyone clinging to nostalgic, Romantic notions of harmony will 
find himself irreversibly out of place in the world. As always, it is unclear whether Büchner’s 
literary worlds are meant as a warning about some future moment that will occur if the status 
quo fails to change, or if it is truly already too late. In any case, he was certainly not the only 
literary or scientific thinker struggling with these tensions. The many literary and scientific 
writers addressed in this project collectively provide a timeless framework for thinking 
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through the implications of different approaches to natural inquiry, whether scientific, poetic, 
or even philosophical. 
 
This project has opened up several promising new paths for future research. Tracing 
this constellation of questions through the second half of the 19th century and into the 20th 
century, for instance, would likely be a fascinating and fruitful project. Realist literature, for 
one, continues to struggle with the legitimacy of objectivity as a value for literature and the 
visual arts. Now clothed in the language of Realist discourse, the paradoxes populating 
Büchner’s “Kunstgespräch” and Stifter’s “Vorrede” continue to reverberate throughout 
Realist literature, as authors and narrators ponder whether “reality” is even empirically 
perceptible at all or, instead, a series of ideals that simply manifest themselves in material 
form. They also continue to explore whether a close-range, subjective perspective or a more 
distant and fact-oriented objective perspective is more conducive to capturing the “real.” 
More specifically, the problem of representing “life” (i.e., living form) in art still preoccupies 
Realist authors, and the scientific and literary backstory provided by the current project can 
lead to a richer understanding of this elusive pursuit in the face of “objective” Realism. 
Moreover, as the narration of Lenz made clear, claims to objectivity can also be misleading to 
the person on the receiving end of the story because they can obscure the fact that human 
perspectives always involve a subjective lens; the question of the possibility of objectivity in 
general likewise permeates Realist literature and contributes to the unique “poetic Realism” 
tradition in Germany. That is, German literature never quite overcomes the tension between 
subjective and objective perceptions of reality that were so urgently addressed in the 1830s 
and 1840s in science, literature, and philosophy. 
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Nature also remains an important topic throughout Realism, both with regard to the 
question of how to appropriately represent a living, dynamic system in visual-art form and, 
later, with regard to environmental questions, which are increasingly influenced by late 19th 
century Darwinian discourse. Darwinian evolution reintroduced the notion that humans are 
necessarily “entangled” with their physical environments and that the development of the 
human species is inextricably linked to its surrounding natural conditions. Thus not only do 
ecological questions reemerge at this time, but the developmental perspective reappears as 
well, though in a more advanced scientific context. The Naturalist movement in literature 
both pursues radical objectivity in art and extends the environmental perspective to include 
social environments, revealing how not only natural but also social circumstances dictate the 
unfolding of one’s psychological and physical development. 
The early 20th century, particularly in the Austrian context, is another era rich with 
scientific advances and a complex scientific discourse. Interestingly, some of this era’s 
literature revisits the notion of an irreparable rift between human subjects and the non-human 
object world (though in a way that is less explicitly focused on the natural world). Drawing 
in some ways from Romantic and post-Romantic discourse, Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s “Ein 
Brief,” for instance, reflects on moments of “interaction” between humans and non-human 
objects and longs for a common language that would allow these objects to “speak” to the 
human observer. To some extent reflecting the meditative approach to nature espoused in the 
early 19th century, Hofmannsthal’s narrator seeks to attune himself to, or become impressed 
upon by, the vibrancy and animation of the non-human object world.  
The theme of an increasingly impossible reconciliation—between humans and nature, 
life and non-life, subject and object, real and ideal, art and science, subjectivity and 
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objectivity—defined the transitional era between Romanticism and Realism; however, the 
desire to pursue a fuller, more balanced perception of reality nonetheless lingered long after 
the era’s key thinkers were gone. Without a survey of the history of science and knowledge 
spanning this period, the many themes explored in this project may have simply appeared to 
be a series of unrelated concerns without much of an afterlife in the German tradition. 
However, the broader context shows that the constellation of science and nature-related 
questions addressed here are deeply entangled with one another, with no clear beginning or 
end. Because writers like Droste, Stifter, Carus, Büchner and Oken lived in an era in which 
these epistemological tensions reached a critical urgency, their writing provides key insights 
that allow us to better understand the impact of 19th century science and nature discourse on 
the German tradition as a whole. 
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